


SPHOṬASIDDHI
of
Maṇḍana Mīśra
(English Translation)

by

K. A. Subramania Iyer, M. A., (London)



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SPHOTASIDDHI

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25

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Abbreviations

DS	' La Démonstration du Sphoṭa ', French Translation of the ' Sphoṭasiddhi ' by M. Biardeau. (Institut Français d'Indologie, Pondichery, 1958)
G	Gopālikā, the commentary of Parameśvara on the Sphoṭasiddhi (published with the text in Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 6)
HVNRSS	Hindu Viśvavidyālaya Nepal Rājya Sanskrit Series.
Jai. Nyā.	The Jaiminīya-nyāyamālāvistara. (Anandashrama Sanskrit Series).
M. Bhā.	The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Kielhorn's edition)
M. Bhā. ṭī—	The Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā of Bhartṛhari edited by V. Swaminathan (HVNRSS 11)
Mī. Dar.	The Mīmāṃsādarśana (Anandashrama Sanskrit Series).
Mī. Sū.	The Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini (published in the Mīmāṃsādarśana)
Ni.	The Nirukta of Yāska.
P.	The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.
Śab. Bhā.	The Śabarabhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini (published in Mī. Dar. Anandashrama Sanskrit Series).
Śl. Vār.	The Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)
S. S.	The present translation of the Sphoṭasiddhi.
S. S. G.	The Sphoṭasiddhi with Gopālikā (Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 6)

- Tant. Vār. The Tantravārttika of Kumārila (published in the
Mīmāṃsādarśana-Anandashrama Sanskrit Series)
- Vā. The Vārttikas of Kātyāyana on P.
- Vai. Su. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇāda
- Vāk. a. (1) The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari (the old Benares
edition)
- Vāk. b. (2) Vākyapadīya I and II (edited by Pandit Charu
Deva Shastri—Lahore 1934)
- Vāk. c. (3) Vākyapadīyam (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No.
CXVI and University of Travancore Sanskrit Series,
No. CXLVII)
- (4) Vākyapadīyam with the commentary of Helārāja-
Kāṇḍa III, pt. 1 (edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer
—Deccan College Monograph Series 21)
- (5) Vākyapadīya-Kāṇḍa I, with the Vṛtti and the
Paddhati, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer—Deccan
College Monograph Series 32
- (6) Vākyapadīya (Kārikā only) edited by K. V.
Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye (University of Poona
Sanskrit and Prakṛt Series, vol. II, Poona. 1965)
- (7) Vākyapadīya—Brahmakāṇḍa avec la Vṛtti de
Harivṛṣabha. Traduction, Introduction, notes By Dr.
Biardeau (Publications de l'Institute de Civilisation
indienne, Fascicule 24, De Boccard, 1964)

INTRODUCTION

1. No apology is needed for publishing a translation of a work of an author of the calibre of Maṇḍana Miśra in Indian philosophy. A draft of this translation had been lying with me for many years. I made it chiefly as an aid to my study of the work. On the basis of my study, I published an article entitled "The Doctrine of Sphoṭa" in the Journal of the Gangānātha Jhā Research Institute, Vol. V pp. 120—147. But I always had an idea of publishing the translation some day. When Dr. S. M. Katre suggested that he would like to include it in the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Monographs, I agreed to revise it and get it ready for publication. In the meantime, Dr. M. Biarreau's French translation of it with a revision of the text by Sarvashri N. R. Bhatt and T. Ramanujam had appeared in 1958 as No. 13 of the "Publications de l'Institut Français d'Indologie, Pondicherry" After reading it, I did not think that any change was called for in my earlier translation of the work. Though, in the revised text of the work published with the French translation, some variant readings, mainly from the commentary Gopālikā, are given in the footnotes, the translation itself is based on the text of the Madras University Sanskrit Series, No 6 (1931). My translation is also based on that text which is, therefore, given here for the convenience of the reader. The author of the Gopālikā knew many variant readings of the text at many places, but he shows his preference for one of them and the editor has usually adopted it. Parameśvara, the author of the Gopālikā, may have had manuscript authority for the variant readings which he mentions but does not seem to favour. I suppose he had manuscript authority also for the readings which he seems to have adopted.

A few notes have been added to my translation of all but three of the *kārikā*-s and Maṇḍana's *Vṛtti* on them. They are partly explanatory and partly in the nature of references to the works on which Maṇḍana's observations are based. The *Gopālikā* is a word for word explanation of the *kārikā*-s and the *Vṛtti* on them. Parameśvara has spared no pains to make the meaning of Maṇḍana Miśra clear. He has not aimed at brevity in his explanations. In fact, some may find his commentary too elaborate. In some places, he gives alternative explanations which also appear to be acceptable. Many of my notes are based on the *Gopālikā*. In some places, I have actually quoted it.

2. Tradition associates Maṇḍana Miśra with Śaṅkarācārya, of whom he may have been an elder contemporary. The following works of his are known:

1. *Brahmasiddhi*
2. *Vidhiviveka*
3. *Bhāvanāviveka*
4. *Vibhramaviveka*
5. *Mīmāṃsānukramañī*
6. *Sphoṭasiddhi*.

In the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, with which we are concerned Maṇḍana Miśra establishes the existence of *Sphoṭa*. The *Sphoṭa* doctrine is that of the Grammarians and the chief exponent of it is Bhartṛhari (5th cent. A. D. ?). The chief opponents of the *Sphoṭa* doctrine were the *Mīmāṃsakas* and their chief representative in this matter was Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (VIth cent. A. D. ?) who, in his *Slokavārttika* (*sphoṭavāda*) has put forward his arguments against the acceptance of *sphoṭa*. Maṇḍana Miśra came after both and quotes the *Vākyapadiya* and the *Ślokavārttika* in his *Sphoṭasiddhi*. It would be correct to say that Maṇḍana Miśra states, in his own words, the main arguments of Kumārila against the *sphoṭa* doctrine, supported by quotations from the *Slokavārttika* wherever necessary. Similarly, in order to establish the existence of *sphoṭa*, he presents the arguments of Bhartṛhari, again in his own words, with, of course, quotations from the

Vākyapadīya wherever necessary. The essence of the sphoṭa doctrine is the idea that the word, mainly in the form of the sentence and secondarily in the form of the individual word and the phoneme, is an entity over and above the sounds and not a mere collection of them and that it is this entity which is the bearer of the meaning. It is an indivisible entity which already exists in everybody. The speaker manifests it when he utters the sounds by the movements of the vocal organs. When the hearer hears these sounds, this indivisible entity which is in him also is awakened and he understands the meaning which the speaker wants to convey and which is eternally associated with the word which has been awakened. This entity over and above the sounds is the sphoṭa, primarily the sentence sphoṭa, but secondarily also the word sphoṭa and the phoneme sphoṭa. As against this, the Mīmāṃsaka holds that there is no entity over and above the phonemes (वर्णः). The word, whether it be the sentence or the individual word, is nothing more than a collection or group of phonemes and it is with this collection that meaning is associated. When the group is brought to the mind of the hearer by the sounds uttered by the speaker, he understands the meaning.

For the grammarian, this entity over and above the sounds, eternally associated with meaning, has its roots deep in the Self, not only of this life, but of the previous lives also. It is the very essence of the Self. It is part of the personality which we have inherited from our previous lives. Maṇḍana Miśra does not go into this aspect of sphoṭa in his Sphoṭasiddhi. I shall, therefore, not deal with that aspect of sphoṭa in this introduction, especially as I am dealing with that topic in my study of the Vākyapadīya which will be published in due course. In the Sphoṭasiddhi, Maṇḍana deals mainly with the question whether the word which conveys the meaning is an entity over and above the sounds or the phonemes. His answer is that it is and it is because he has tried to establish its existence apart from the sounds that the work is called the establishment of sphoṭa, the Sphoṭasiddhi. For Bhartṛhari, the sphoṭa has mainly the form of a sentence, but he accepted the word-sphoṭa and the phoneme-sphoṭa

also. What Maṇḍana's attitude was on this point will be discussed later. Suffice it to say for the present that in the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, Maṇḍana tries to establish the *padasphoṭa* as against the *Mīmāṃsaka* for whom the word was nothing more than the phonemes themselves

3. The *Mīmāṃsaka* view is already stated in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* as follows :

अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति
भगवानुपवर्षः ।¹

“What constitutes the word गौ ? His Holiness Upavarṣa has declared that the phonemes ग्, औ and विसर्ग constitute it.” To the objection that the meaning cannot be understood from the cognitions of these phonemes, which, being momentary, cannot coexist, the answer given is—

“पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्त्यो वर्णः प्रत्यायक इत्यदोषः ”²

“There is no defect in the view because the last phoneme, with the help of the impressions left by the previous ones, conveys the meaning ”

This way of explaining the understanding of the meaning was put forward to dispense with the necessity of postulating an entity over and above the phonemes. That there were persons who postulated the existence of such an entity in Śabara's time or before him is quite clear because that view is referred to as follows :

“अतो गकारादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽन्त्यो गोशब्दोऽस्ति यतोऽर्थप्रतीतिः स्यात् । ”³

“Therefore, there does exist the word गौ, apart from the phonemes ग् etc, and from that, the understanding of the meaning would take place.”

But Śabara does not accept this and prefers to explain the understanding of meaning from the phonemes themselves, assisted by the impressions of their cognitions.

1. *Mīmāṃsā—darśana*. I. p. 45 (*Ānandāśrama* edition)

2. *Ibid.* p. 46.

3. *Ibid.* p. 45.

This all too brief a statement of Śabara has been elaborated by subsequent writers, notably by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the *Śloka-vārttika* and his arguments have been summarised in the *Sphoṭasiddhi*. The Mīmāṃsaka position may be briefly stated as follows. Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Grammarians agree that the sounds which the speaker utters and the hearer hears are momentary and that their function is to manifest the real word which conveys the meaning. Their disagreement is as to what the real word is which the sounds manifest. The Mīmāṃsakas look upon the phonemes as eternal and all-pervasive. They are manifested, that is, brought within the range of our cognition by the sounds which the speaker utters. For Bhartṛhari, the momentary sounds manifest the sphoṭa, primarily the sentence sphoṭa and secondarily, the word-sphoṭa and the phoneme—sphoṭa also. The very fact that Bhartṛhari looks upon the phoneme as a sphoṭa shows that he accords it some kind of permanence, though it is not clear whether he looked upon it as eternal and all—pervasive as the Mīmāṃsaka did. For the latter, the phonemes themselves, manifested by the sounds, constitute the word. The name word is applied by everybody to something which can be heard and it is the phonemes which are heard. It is undeniable that when somebody utters the word गौः, he manifests the phonemes ग्, औ and विसर्ग in succession and the hearer hears them and in his cognition, these phonemes do figure. These cognitions have the form of phonemes. The upholder of the sphoṭa also accepts that the cognitions in which the phonemes figure do take place in succession, but he interprets them differently. The Mīmāṃsaka stresses the fact that we understand the meaning when we hear the last phoneme, namely, the visarga and have the impressions or the residual traces of the previous phonemes in our mind. There is nothing to be surprised at in the fact that transitory events which take place in a sequence produce one common effect. This is taking place all the time in other spheres. The different moments of an action like 'going' take place in a sequence and yet produce the common effect of the agent reaching the destination.⁴ The different parts of a

4. गमनक्षणाश्चाणुपरिमाणदेशातिक्रमक्रमेण समीहितदेशाधिगतये प्रभवन्ति ।

S. S. kā 5. p 14.

Vedic ceremony are performed in a sequence and cease to be as soon as they are performed. But they jointly bring to the performer the reward mentioned in the Vedas. Similarly, phonemes uttered and heard in a sequence can have the common effect of conveying a meaning.

The Mīmāṃsakas were aware that the cognitions of the phonemes were momentary, though the phonemes were eternal according to them and that, unless these coexist somehow in cognition, they cannot cooperate to produce the common effect of conveying the meaning. They, therefore, tried to interpret Śabara's

“पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्त्यो वर्णः प्रत्यायक इत्यदोषः”

in such a manner as to bring about this coexistence in cognition. It is through the impressions or residual traces left by the previous phonemes that a kind of coexistence of the cognitions of all the phonemes is thought of. Śabara has said that the cognition of the last phoneme causes the understanding of the meaning in the case of one who had heard the two previous phonemes also immediately before and who has, therefore, their residual traces within him. One who has heard the visarga only understands no meaning. Ordinarily, residual traces, when awakened, can only bring back to the mind the previous experiences which caused them. The traces left by the cognitions of ग् and औ should, therefore, only cause a remembrance of those two cognitions. But Śabara credits them with the power of conveying the meaning of the whole word गौः, in collaboration with the cognition of the visarga. The idea is that it is better to credit a well-known entity with a new power than postulate an unknown entity called sphoṭa.⁵

It needs to be explained further that the impressions or residual traces do not directly convey the meaning. When awakened, they cause a single cognition of all the phonemes.

5. तस्मात् कार्यान्तरपरिकल्पितसत्ताकस्य संस्कारस्यैव शक्त्यन्तरपरिकल्पनामात्रमस्तु, इह विषये कार्यान्तरदर्शनात्; न तु स्फोटपरिकल्पना युक्ता ।

S. S. Kā. 6. p. 17.

This single cognition is, according to some, a complex one partly perception and partly remembrance, perception as far as the last phoneme is concerned and remembrance as far as the previous phonemes are concerned.⁶ It is this complex cognition or all the three phonemes which figure in it at the same time which convey the meaning. Others look upon this cognition, not as a complex one, but as a simple remembrance in which all the three phonemes figure and which conveys the meaning.⁷ This simple cognition takes place immediately after the cognition of the last phoneme, so that its own residual trace can combine with those of the two previous ones to produce it. Though all the phonemes figure in the final cognition, complex or simple, they do not do so in any particular sequence. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the phonemes themselves are eternal and so can have no sequence. The speaker utters and the hearer hears the manifesting sounds in a sequence which is, therefore, an attribute of the act of uttering or of hearing. It cannot figure in the final cognition as an attribute of the phonemes.

This, of course, creates a difficulty, because it does not explain why different meanings are understood from the words नदी and दीन, considering that in the final cognition, the same phonemes would figure in both cases and their difference of sequence would not figure in it. It is in order to meet this difficulty that the Mīmāṃsakas gave a final shape to their view as follows:

The impression or residual trace which the cognition of each phoneme leaves is different from the impression which, when awakened, causes remembrance. It is more like the "apūrvas" which are generated by the various subsidiary acts of a Vedic ceremony and ultimately bring about the reward of heaven to the performer. The impression which causes remembrance causes something similar to what produced

6. स चैष प्रत्ययः स्मरणप्रत्यक्षरूपाभ्यामुभयात्मा सदसद्वर्णरूपावभास्यन्त्यवर्ण-
गोचर इष्यते कैश्चित् । S. S. kā. 7, p. 20

7. अन्यैस्तु सकलवर्णोपलब्धिनिबन्धननिखिलभावनाबीजजन्मा युगपदखिलवर्णरूप
परामर्शी चरमवर्णप्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिसमनन्तरः स्मरणैकरूपः संगीर्यते । S. S. kā 7. p. 20

it. But the impression left by the cognition of a phoneme causes something different from its own cause, namely, the understanding of meaning. Therefore, it is like the 'apūrvas' which are produced by the various subsidiary acts of a religious ceremony, performed in a particular order by a particular agent, but cause, in their turn, the attainment of heaven which is very different from their cause. Similarly, it is only when the phonemes are uttered and heard in special circumstances, that is, by a particular speaker in a particular sequence that they can convey the meaning. The unity of the word consists in the fact that the phonemes which figure together in the final simple or complex cognition are looked upon as one word because they jointly convey one meaning. This explanation also agrees with the worldly view that the meaning is understood from the word because the phonemes constitute the word. The residual traces act as a kind of function (vyāpāra) or mode of performance (itikartavyatā) of the phonemes. All agents depend upon a mode of performance for bringing about the result but that does not take away their agency.⁸ In this way, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, one can explain the understanding of meaning without bringing in an entity called 'sphoṭa' in the middle.

4. This explanation of the understanding of meaning does not satisfy Maṇḍana Miśra. He puts forward certain arguments in criticism of it but it cannot be said that these arguments are a statement in his own words of those which are found in the Vākyapadīya. This work, with the Vṛtti, is aware of the Mīmāṃsaka view that the phonemes themselves constitute the word.⁹ But it criticizes it in a quite different manner. When

8. न हीतिकर्तव्यतापेक्षित्वं कारकाणां कारकतां विहन्ति, सर्वत्र व्याहृतिप्रसङ्गात् । पूर्वेऽपि च वर्णाः संस्काराभिधानव्यापारोपाया यथास्वभिधेयप्रत्ययमुपादधाना नाप्रत्यायकाः न हि स्वव्यापारव्यवायः कारकाणां कारकतां विहन्ति मोपधानि सर्वत्र । S. S. Kā. 9, p. 29

9. येऽपि भेदवादिनो गौरिति गकारौकारविसर्जनीयमात्रमेव प्रतिपन्नाः, नान्यस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तो वर्णरूपग्रहणोपायग्राह्यो निर्भागः शब्दात्मा विद्यत इति मन्यन्ते नित्यत्वं च शब्दानामभ्युपगच्छन्ति तेषां क्रमेणाव्यपदेश्यवर्णतुरीयांशाभिव्यक्तौ स्वरूपानवधारणमविषयत्वं चान्त्यस्य व्यक्तरूपग्राहिणः परिच्छेदस्य प्रसज्यते ।

Vṛtti on Vāk, I. 92.

Maṇḍana Misra expounds the sphoṭa doctrine, he uses more or less the same arguments as those which are found in the Vākyapadīya.

Against the Mimāṃsaka view, it is first pointed out that there is no justification to credit the residual traces which, when awakened, ordinarily cause remembrance, with an unusual power, that of conveying the meaning. When awakened, they can only recall the experience which caused them and not cause a different kind of experience. Nor is it clear why the Mimāṃsaka maintains that the sounds must be uttered by the same speaker in a particular sequence if they are to convey the meaning. Even when uttered by a plurality of speakers and in a different order, their residual traces would be the same, but he maintains that it cannot be understood at all. The meaning is supposed to be understood, not directly from the residual traces, but from the phonemes which figure simultaneously in the final cognition, simple or complex. These phonemes would be the same, no matter in what order the manifesting sounds were uttered. As the sequence does not figure in the final cognition, there is nothing to distinguish नदी and दीन. And yet, the meaning understood is not the same. Moreover, what is there to prevent the understanding of the meaning even when the speakers are many? Nobody ascertains the sameness of the speaker before understanding the meaning. Provided there is similarity of voice and uninterrupted utterance, meaning should be understood even if the speakers are many.¹⁰

The other point of the Mimāṃsaka that the residual traces left by the cognitions of the phonemes are not like those which cause remembrance when awakened but are rather like the 'apūrvas' produced by the subsidiary acts of a religious ceremony is also open to criticism. There is no justification for assuming that if the phonemes are uttered in a certain order, they leave traces resembling apūrvas, but if they are uttered in a different order, they leave traces which

10 संभवति हि स्वरसादृश्ये निरन्तरोच्चारणे वक्तृभेदेऽपि कलकलशब्दश्रुतौ चार्थज्ञानम्, कस्तत्र वक्तुरेकत्वनानात्वे विवेक्तुं क्षमः । न च ध्वनिमात्रश्रवणं तत्र, वर्णपदवाक्यपरिच्छेदानामपि केषांचिद् बुद्धानुपारोहात् । S. S. Kā. 15. p. 39.

cause remembrance. The phonemes are the same, no matter in what order they are uttered. They cannot leave two different kinds of residual traces. Lastly, the point that the unity of the word consists in the fact of all the phonemes figuring together in the final cognition and conveying one meaning is exposed to the defect called अन्योन्याश्रयः. Unless the phonemes are cognised as a unity, a unit of meaning cannot be understood and unless a unit of meaning is understood, the phonemes cannot be grasped as a unit, a very unsatisfactory position.¹¹

The doctrine of sphoṭa seeks to remove the above difficulties and provide a better explanation of the understanding of meaning. Practically all the arguments advanced by Maṇḍana Miśra, including the analogies, have been taken from Vāk. I. with the Vṛtti.

As an upholder of sphoṭa, Maṇḍana Miśra maintains that it is something over and above the phonemes. It is not a mere grouping of phonemes on the basis of their figuring in the same cognition and conveying a single unit of meaning. The sounds uttered by the speaker do no more than manifest this sphoṭa which is within him and within the hearer. Once manifested, it conveys the meaning. Between the sphoṭa, that is, the word unit and the meaning, the relation is that of expression and thing expressed (वाच्यवाचकभाव). Between the manifesting sounds and the sphoṭa, the relation is व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव. That it is an entity which is within us is emphasised by Bhartṛhari. All of us instinctively feel the existence of this entity within us. It is manifested by the sounds and its unity exists primarily in the sentence.¹² It is one of the important points of the doctrine that it is directly perceived and not a matter of inference only.

11 अर्थस्याधिगमो नर्ते पदरूपावधारणात् ।

तदर्थबोधाद्यदि व्यक्तमन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥

न खल्वविदितपदरूपावधिरर्थे प्रत्येति । अवध्यन्तरपरिग्रहे तत्त्वेऽपि वर्णानामप्रत्ययात् । तत्रार्थप्रतीत्या पदरूपावधिविशेषमुपकल्पयन् दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयमाविशतीति ।

S S. Kā. 26, p. 66.

12. यदन्तःशब्दतत्त्वं तु नादिरैकं प्रकाशितम् ।

तदाहुरपरे शब्दं तस्य वाक्ये तथैकता ॥

Vāk. a II. 30.

Each sound of a word uttered by the speaker reveals the *sphoṭa*, **the whole of it**, the first one vaguely, the second one more clearly and so on, until the last one, helped by the impressions left by the previous cognitions, reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness. To explain this, Maṇḍana gives the analogy of the expert jeweller who examines the genuineness of a precious stone. He continuously looks at it for some time. A continuous cognition is taken to be a series of uninterrupted cognitions. In each one of them, the genuineness of the stone is perceived. In other words, the object of all of them is the same, but it is perceived progressively more clearly. Each cognition leaves its residual trace and the last one, with the help of the residual traces left by the previous ones, grasps the genuineness of the stone quite clearly. The difference between the first cognition and the last cognition is that the latter has the help of the residual traces whereas the first one has not. This shows that the residual traces play an important part in the grasping of the genuineness of the precious stone.¹³

This illustration is taken from the *Vākyapadīya* though it comes there in another context. There the context is the value and importance of tradition as a means of acquiring knowledge about certain matters. The unreliability of reasoning is particularly stressed. There is a limit to what one can understand through reasoning. It is a matter of common experience that the reasoning of even clever people is upset by that of cleverer ones. Ordinary mortals, however gifted, are so liable to error. Ancient sages are in a different position. Traditional knowledge is what has come down to us through them. It is in this context that the special knowledge of experts, the result of their long experience and practice and not easily communicable to others is mentioned. Expert jewellers (रत्नकर्तादयः) can tell the genuineness of precious stones by continuously gazing at them. A continuous gaze is a series of cognitions of the precious stone and in each

13. यथा रत्नपरीक्षिणः परीक्षमाणस्य प्रथमसमधिगमानुपाख्यातमनुपाख्येय-
रूपप्रत्ययोपहितविशेषायां बुद्धौ क्रमेण चरमे चेदसि चकास्ति रत्नतत्त्वम्. न ह्यन्यथा
स्फुटप्रकाश उपपद्यते, पुर इव पश्चादपि, विशेषाभावात् । S. S. Kā 18, p. 43.

successive cognition, its genuineness shines more clearly than in the previous one. The jeweller is not able to explain to others why he considers it to be genuine, but he perceives its genuineness. This knowledge of his is based on long practice (अभ्यास). In that sense, it is nearer to tradition than to perception or inference.¹⁴

Maṇḍana Miśra brings in another illustration of the process by a direct quotation from the Vākyapadīya.¹⁵ In it the understanding of the meaning is compared to the process of learning a Vedic passage or a verse by heart, by reading or reciting it repeatedly. Each later recitation leaves a clearer impression of the passage or the verse than the one left by the previous recitation. The last recitation helped by these impressions fixes the verse fully and clearly in the memory,

The sphoṭa is a unity which already exists in the mind of the speaker and he utters the sounds in order to manifest it. His efforts to utter sounds differ according to the sphoṭa which he wants to manifest and the sounds differ according to the efforts even though the movements of the vocal organs may be the same. The effort to manifest नदी is different from the effort to manifest दीन and so the न in नदी is different from the न in दीन. Therefore, the sphoṭas manifested by them could be different and hence the meanings conveyed by them would be different too.

In this process of manifesting the sphoṭa, no new kind of residual trace is postulated. It is the usual kind which, when awakened, causes the remembrance of the cognition which

14. परेषामसमाख्येयमभ्यासादेव जायते ।

मणिरूप्यादिविज्ञानं तद्विदां नानुमानिकम् ॥

न हि रूपतर्कादयः सूक्ष्मानप्रसिद्धसंविज्ञानपदान् कार्षापणादीनां कल्पयित्वापि समधिगमनहेतून् परेभ्य आख्यातुं शक्नुवन्ति ।

Vāk. I. 35 with the Vṛtti.

15. यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोढत्वमुपगच्छति ।

आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति निरूप्यते ॥

Vāk. I. 82 quoted in S. S. Kā 18, p. 43.

originally caused it. The weak point of the Mīmāṃsaka explanation was that it either postulated a new power for the ordinary kind of residual trace, or postulated a new kind of residual trace in order to explain the fact that, though caused by the cognition of the sound, it does not stop at causing a remembrance of it but causes the understanding of the meaning also. In the Sphoṭa doctrine, each sound manifests the whole sphoṭa though vaguely, and the residual trace has the whole sphoṭa as its object. When awakened, it causes the remembrance of the whole sphoṭa, the cognition of which becomes very clear at the time of the last sound because of the co-operation of the previous residual traces, all of which have the same indivisible sphoṭa as the object. The early vague cognitions of the sphoṭa, their residual traces and the cognition of the [final sound have the same object, namely, the sphoṭa. This is certainly a more satisfactory position.

Another point in the doctrine is that even though each sound causes the cognition of the whole sphoṭa which is thus its object, it has the form of the sound with all its properties such as accent, duration, timbre and so on. Wherever a cognition has one thing as its object and the form of another, it is an error. When we mistake a rope for a snake in the dark, the rope is the object of our error, but the error has the form of a snake. The rope is the object, because, after all, it is the rope which is in contact with the senses and not the snake. Similarly, the sphoṭa is the object of the cognition of each sound, but it appears as the sound. In other words, when we finally get a clear cognition of the sphoṭa, it is through a series of errors that we come to it. Maṇḍana Miśra gives here an analogy taken from the Vākyapadīya. From a distance one mistakes a tree for an elephant. Later careful observation reveals the truth. We have come to the truth through an error. The sense is in contact with the tree and not with the elephant. The error has the tree as the object and the form of the elephant. When, in the final correct cognition, the object and the form are the same, the previous error has played a part in it. It is error which has led to the truth. Similarly, it is through a series of errors,

consisting in cognising the sphaṭa in the form of the sounds that we finally grasp it in the form of the sphaṭa itself.¹⁶

This error has some features which have to be kept in mind. Not only does the sphaṭa appear as the sounds or phonemes, but the latter appear as parts of the indivisible sphaṭa. How it happens may be stated briefly as follows—The effort to utter the phoneme ग् by itself is different from the effort to utter ग् in the word गौ; and both are different from the effort to utter ग् in the sentence गामानय. As the efforts are different, the resulting sounds are also different. But they are looked upon, wrongly of course, as the same. They are wrongly identified because of the resemblance in the contacts and separations of the vocal organs, necessary for producing these sounds. Being wrongly identified, their powers are confused. The sounds meant to manifest the sphaṭas of the phonemes, words or sentences, differ from one another in their causes and effects. Their causes are different because they are the result of different intentions and efforts. Their effects are different because they manifest different sphaṭas. As their effects are different, they are themselves different from one another, but they are wrongly identified. Their difference is not perceived. This failure to perceive the difference has two analogies, according to the Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 88. The shape of a cow is fit to manifest the universal called गोत्व and that of gayal is fit to reveal the universal called गवयत्व, but this difference is not perceived and so one sees resemblance between the two. Similarly, the moments of the action of

16. (a) यथैव दर्शनैः पूर्वदूरात् सन्तमसेऽपि वा ।

अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्यथैवाध्यवस्यति ॥

यथा विषयेन्द्रियधर्म एवायं प्राकृतचक्षुषां दूरादाकृतिमात्रोपलब्धौ वृक्षादीन् हस्त्यादिवत् प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तद्देशावस्थिता एव प्रणिधानाभ्यासात् क्रमेण पुनर्यथावय-मुपलभन्ते ।

Vāk. I. 89 with the Vṛtti.

(b) आरूपालोचितेष्वस्ति ह्यन्यथात्वप्रकाशनम् ।

तत्संस्कारक्रमाच्चापि व्यक्तं तत्त्वं प्रकाशते ॥

दृष्टमिदमारूपालोचिताः पदार्थाः कचिदन्यथा प्रकाशन्ते यथा दूराद् वनस्पतयो हत्यादिरूपप्रख्यानाः ।

S. S. Kā. 19. p. 48.

turning are different from those of the action of pouring out. The former are the substrata of the universal called turning and the latter of the universal called pouring out; but this difference is not perceived and so one sees resemblance between the two series of moments. In the same way, one sees resemblance between the sounds which are really different from one another, both in their causes and effects. So one confuses them and mixes them up. The confusion takes the following form : because one sees resemblance between the sound ग् meant to manifest the word गौ; and the one meant to manifest the phoneme ग् one thinks that the phoneme ग् is also manifested when the word गौ; is manifested. One looks upon the phoneme ग् as a part of the word गौ;. Similarly, because one sees resemblance between the sounds meant to manifest the word गौ; and those meant to manifest the sentence गामानय, one thinks that the word गो is a part of, a division within the sentence गामानय. One looks upon the sounds meant to manifest the sentence as manifesting the word and phoneme also as its parts and that the sentence is nothing more than a collection of these parts. Because of this confusion, one thinks that sentences, words and phonemes have parts, whereas they have none.¹⁷

Not only do the many appear to be parts of the partless sphoṭa, but the latter appears to have the properties of the former. It is the manifesting sounds which can be short or

17. (a) प्रत्येकं व्यंजका भिन्ना वर्णवाक्यपदेषु ये ।

तेषामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि संकीर्णा इव शक्तयः ॥

वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नास्तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिहन्ति । स्थानाभिवातप्राप्तसंस्काराश्च ध्वनयो यद्यपि परस्परव्यावृत्तस्वभावाः तथापि गोगवयजात्युपव्यंजनवद् भ्रमणरेचनादिकर्मसामान्यविशेषावयवच्च तेषामुपव्यंजनानां दुर्ज्ञानो भेदः । सामान्यमात्रया कयाचिदनुगतः प्रविभक्तकार्याणामपि शक्तीनामात्मा कुतश्चित्कार्यविशेषात् संकरेणैवावस्थितः । ततश्चायं निरवयवेषु वर्णेषु मात्राविभागाध्यवसायः, पदेषु च वर्णविभागाध्यवसायः, वाक्येषु च पदविभागाध्यवसाय इति । Vāk I. 83 with Vṛtti.

(b) यद्यपि वर्णपदवाक्यविषया भिन्नात्मानः प्रयत्ना मरुतश्च तदुदीरिताः स्थानाभिवातिनः स्थानाभिवातलब्धजन्मानश्च ध्वनयः शब्दाभिव्यक्तिहेतवः तथापि स्थानकरणादिसाम्येन कथंचिल्लब्धसादृश्याः संकीर्णा इव, तन्निबन्धनोऽयं शब्दान्तरेषु शब्दान्तरग्रहणाभिमानः...

long, but the sphoṭa appears to be so. The sphoṭa is One, without any inner distinction, but it appears to be many in the form of the manifesting sounds. The face is one, but its reflection appears to be different in such different reflectors as a precious stone, the blade of a sword, or a mirror. In all reflections, we recognise the face to be the same.¹⁸ The Vākyapadiya also gives the analogy of the reflection but in a different manner. Several views were current about the nature of a reflection : (1) In the presence of the original, a luminous object like water is affected and seems to reflect the original, but it is only a change in the water. There is no reflection apart from the water. (2) The reflection exists in the water apart from it and has the original as its material cause. (3) The rays of the eye, turned back by luminous surfaces like those of water, mirror etc. see the original and that seeing is the reflection, According to the first view (तत्त्वपक्ष), the reflection appears to be in the water and to have its movements, but it is only the water which one sees in that condition. In the second and the third views (अन्यत्वपक्ष), the reflection is something different from the water. There is no contact between the wind and the reflection and so there cannot be any movement in the reflection itself. Because the reflection is in contact with water and the latter with the wind, the movement in the water appears to exist in the reflection. According to all the three views, the reflection by itself is without any movement, but appears to have it because of the water. Similarly, the sphoṭa appears to be short, long or prolated because the primary sounds which manifest it (the prākṛtadhvanis, which will be explained later) are short, long or prolated or it appears to be of

18. भेदेनानन्वीयमानमपि मणिकृपाणदर्पणादिषु तत्त्वस्य भेदविरोधात्तत्त्वप्रत्ययेन समुत्त्वारितनिखिलभेदं मुख्यमवसीयते । तथा दीर्घादिभेदानुगमेऽपि वर्णात्मा प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन विधूतभेद एकोऽवगम्यते, तथा पदमपि स्वप्रत्ययावगम्यमानैकस्वभावं किञ्चिद्भेदपरा-मर्शोऽप्यभिन्नं निश्चीयते ।

quick, medium or slow speed, because the secondary sounds are such (*vaikṛtadhvanis*).¹⁹

In other spheres also sometimes the cognition of the one appears to be mixed up with that of the many and to have their properties, but with all that, the cognition remains that of the one. When we perceive the universal of an object, we perceive the particular and its properties also, but the cognition is that of the one universal. Similarly, when the cognition of the whole takes place, we are also conscious of the parts which make up the whole, but with all that, it is the cognition of the whole. Our cognition of a picture, though mixed up with that of the colours belonging to the different parts of it, is still a cognition of the picture as a whole. The picture is something over and above the different parts having colour. Otherwise it would have no colour itself and would be invisible. A substance (*dravya*) would be visible only if it had colour. Even those who believe that substances like *Dik* (space) and *Kāla* (Time) are visible even though they have no colour, insist that a substance which is a product and is a whole can become visible only if it has colour. Lastly, when we see a piece of cloth, we may see the threads also but the cognition is that of the cloth which is quite distinct from the threads.²⁰

19. प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः ॥

तत्त्वपक्षेऽन्यत्वपक्षे वा चन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बं यत्राधारे संसृष्टमिवोपलभ्यते न हि तत्तथा । तत्तु निष्क्रियमपि तोयतरङ्गादिक्रियाधर्मोपग्रहेणैव तोयादीनां भिन्नां प्रवृत्तिमनुपतत्येव । प्राकृतस्य वैकृतस्य च नादस्य ह्रस्वदीर्घफल्लतेषु द्रुतमध्यविलम्बितासु च वृत्तिषु तावानेव स्फोटो विचित्रां वृत्तिमनुविधत्ते ।

Vāk I. 49 with the Vṛtti

20. न खल्वन्यरूपव्यतिभिन्नात्मा कुतश्चिन्निमित्तादवबोधः प्रकाशमानो नान्यालम्बन इति चतुरश्रम् । तथा हि—जातिप्रत्ययो व्यक्तिविशेषस्वरूपसम्भेदे, अवयवविज्ञानं भागरूपानुगतावयवसमवाये, चित्ररूपावभासिनी च प्रख्या अवयवगतनीत्यादिपभेदेऽपि नार्थान्तरगोचरतां जहाति ।

Bharṭṛhari also brings in the analogy of a picture in a slightly different but related context. The context is that of unity and differentiation. The painter goes through three stages when he paints a picture : (1) he sees the object in a differentiated state, that is, he sees its parts separately, (2) he has a vision of the whole picture as he wants to paint it, (3) he paints it part by part. Similarly, the individual, as the hearer, perceives the word differentiated into phonemes and in him these merge into a unity. As a speaker he utters it in a differentiated state. Thus the word goes through three stages.²¹

The perception of the many invariably before the perception of the one indivisible word is an error, but it differs from other errors. This error ultimately leads to the perception of the truth and so it becomes the path leading to it. Its occurrence is universal, its sequence is fixed and its form is also fixed. This is not the case with other errors. One man may mistake a rope for a snake while another may mistake it for a little stream. Thus the form of the error may differ from person to person. Nor is there any fixity in the order of the errors. Sometimes one mistakes a rope for a snake at first and later for a little stream of water. At other times, it may take place in the opposite order. In the case of the *sphoṭa* appearing as the sounds, the error takes place inevitably, it is a universal error. The individual *sphoṭa* गौः appears as ग्, औ and विसर्ग for everybody and it appears in the same order for everybody.

Why there is this peculiarity in the error is explained in kā. 21 of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*. Maṇḍana quotes no less than

21. यथैकबुद्धिविषया मूर्तिराक्रियते पटे ।
मूर्त्यन्तरस्य त्रितयमेवं शब्देऽपि दृश्यते ॥

यथा सावयवा पुरुषादिमूर्तिराचिकीर्षिता क्रमोपलब्धवप्येकबुद्धिनिबन्धनत्वं प्राप्ता पटकुड्यादिषु क्रमेणाक्रियते, तथा व्यावहारिकोऽपि क्रमग्राह्यः शब्दः प्रतिसंहतक्रम एकबुद्धिनिबन्धनो भूत्वा निरवयवक्रमं बुद्धिरूपं तस्यात्मप्रत्यवभासमात्रायां पृथग्भूतायामिव प्रत्यस्य व्यवहारमवतरति । तथा चासौ तिसृभिरवस्थाभिरविच्छेदेनावर्तमानो ग्राह्यग्राहकभावं नातिवर्तते !

five Kārikas of the Vākyapadiya, bringing in some interesting analogies in order to explain the peculiar features of the manifestation of the sphoṭa by the sounds, as pointed out above. It was shown before that the cognition of the unreal sounds or phonemes as parts of the sphoṭa is a means to the comprehension of the latter which alone is real. The analogy of mistaking a tree from a distance for an elephant as a step towards its correct cognition has already been mentioned. Maṇḍana, following Bhartṛhari, gives another analogy based on Vaiśeṣika ideas. The cognition of the lower and irrelevant numbers is a means to the cognition of the higher and relevant number, even though they are different in many respects. The Vaiśeṣikas believe that from duality onwards to the highest number all numbers are produced by अपेक्षाबुद्धिः, that is, the notion that relates to many unities before the next number is cognised. When two things are brought before us, we cognise each one separately as 'this is one and that is one'. This is अपेक्षाबुद्धिः. Then arises the notion of two. This is true of all subsequent numbers. Thus the previous numbers become the means for the production and cognition of the higher numbers, though only one of them is relevant on a particular occasion.²² Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that there is a fixity in the sequence in which the cognition of the sphoṭa takes place, namely, first the cognition of the sounds or phonemes as parts of the sphoṭa takes place and then the comprehension of the sphoṭa itself. This fixity in the order of cognition is comparable to the fixity in the order of production of the effect in the phenomenal world, as when

22. (a) यथाद्यसंख्याग्रहणमुपायः प्रतिपत्तये ।

संख्यान्तराणां भेदेऽपि तथा शब्दान्तरश्रुतिः ॥

यथा शतसंख्यां सहस्रसंख्यां वा भेदिकामाश्रयस्य प्रतिपित्तमानस्तदुपायभूतानेकत्वादीन् भिन्नकार्यान् शतादीनामवयवानिव प्रतिपद्यते तथा देवदत्तादिशब्दान्तरश्रुतिपरिच्छेदोपाया वाक्यरूपप्रतिपत्तिरिति नान्तरीयकं तासामुपादानम् ।

Vāk. I. 87 with the Vṛtti.

(b) यथा चाविद्यमानात्मभूतसंख्यान्तरज्ञानं संख्यान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ निमित्तं तदुपायत्वात् तथेहापि शब्दान्तरपरिच्छेदः ।

S. S. Kā. 21. p. 53.

milk turns into curds or the seed becomes the sprout.²³ The two processes involve many intermediary stages all of which take place in a fixed order.

The cardinal fact about the manifestation of the sphoṭa is that, before it takes place, one cognises certain verbal elements which are unreal and appear to be parts of the sphoṭa. We ordinary mortals have no other way of comprehending it. We can do so only through the sounds which have differentiation and sequence and have not the same reality as the sphoṭa. We who can learn it only through the teaching of others suffer from a certain incapacity to perceive the sphoṭa directly.²⁴ We can do so only through the differentiated verbal elements. That is why all of us are subject to the same error. As this error is a means to the ultimate correct cognition, it must necessarily precede it. The particular order in which the errors follow one another is a means to the final correct cognition of the sphoṭa. Therefore, there is a fixity in the order of the error too. It is only when the one individual sphoṭa assumes unreal differentiation that it

23. (a) यथानुपूर्वीनियमो विकारे क्षीरबीजयोः ।

तथैव प्रतिपत्तुणां नियतो बुद्धिषु क्रमः ॥

...तथैषामर्वादर्शनानां प्रतिपत्तुणां वाक्यस्वरूपग्रहणपूर्वकेण वाक्यार्थग्रहणेन प्रधानेन प्रयुक्तानां नियतोपाये सः स्ये तस्मिन्नर्थे नियतक्रमपरिणामभागाकारप्रत्यवभासमात्रा युक्ता बुद्धयः प्रवर्तन्ते स्फोटेषु ।

Vāk I, 91 with part of the Vṛtti.

(b) यथैव चोत्पत्तौ क्षीरबीजादिकार्याणामानुपूर्वीनियमस्तथोपलब्धावपि ।

S. S. Kā 21, p. 53.

24. (a) असत्श्रान्तराले याञ्छब्दानस्तीति मन्यते ।

प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः ॥

.....सा खलु परप्रदर्शितविषयग्राहिणामशक्तिः प्रतिपत्तुणाम् ।

Vāk. I 85 with a part of the Vṛtti.

(b) उपायत्वाच्च नियमः परदर्शितदर्शनाम् ।

ज्ञानस्येव च वाचोऽयं लोके ध्रुव उपप्लवः ॥

.....तस्मात्परोपदर्शितशब्दतत्त्वग्राहिणामनन्योपायतया विपर्यासनियमः ।

S. S. Kā. 21, p. 53

comes within the range of worldly usage. In this respect, it is very much like consciousness itself. Consciousness is really one and formless, but it becomes differentiated when it illuminates the different objects of the world. It seems to take on the form of the different objects which it reveals. It is only when it does so that it enters into worldly usage. Similarly, as long as the word is only within us, one and undifferentiated, it cannot enter into verbal usage. It is only when it becomes differentiated that it can enter into verbal usage. Even though it is the unified word which is eternally associated with the meaning, it has to be manifested by the differentiated sounds before it can convey it. Thus consciousness and the word have to go through an unreal differentiation before they can play their part in the world. In fact, mind and the word are only two aspects which the Word-Principle (शब्दतत्त्व) within us assumes when it evolves.²⁵

While all this is true of us ordinary mortals, the great sages are credited with the power of cognising the indivisible sphoṭa directly, without going through the process of errors. Not only do they cognise it themselves, but they also impart it to others,²⁶ as stated in Yāska's Nirukta, I. 20.

5. All that the Sphoṭasiddhi says about [the sounds (dhvanis)] is that they manifest the sphoṭa and that they differ according to the intention and the effort of the speaker even

25. भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस्य वाचश्चोपप्लवो ध्रुवः ।

क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा वाग्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपाश्रयम् ॥

अभिन्नमपि ज्ञानमरूपं सर्वज्ञैरूपोपग्राहित्वान्द्वेदरूपतया प्रत्यवभासते — पञ्च वृक्षा विशतिर्गाव इति । संहृतसर्वबीजश्चायमान्तरः शब्दात्मा व्यञ्जकध्वनिभेदक्रमानुकारेणा-विर्भावकाले प्रत्यवभासते । तेन चान्यभेदरूपोपग्रहेणोपप्लुतं शब्दतत्त्वमेवेदं वाङ्मनसाख्य-मविभागमन्यथा प्रतीयत इति ।

Vāk I. 86 with the Vṛtti.

26. (a) निष्क्रमं तु दाशतयमपि उपायान्तरेण प्रतिपद्यन्ते प्रतिपादयन्ति च ।

Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 85.

(b) अपरप्रदर्शितविषयास्तु परमर्षयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणोऽन्याहतान्तःप्रकाशा विधूतविपर्ययसंक्रमं च वाक्तृत्वं प्रतिपेदिरे प्रतिपादयामासुरिति प्रतिज्ञायते ।

though the movements of the vocal organs which produce them may be the same. Without going into all the details mentioned by Bhartṛhari,²⁷ it may not be out of place to give here one or two of them briefly. In order to manifest the *sphoṭa*, do the sounds bring about in the sense of hearing or in the word itself a fitness (संस्कार) which they did not have before? How the sounds actually become the cause of manifestation of the word was one of the topics discussed in Bhartṛhari's time among those who believed in the theory of manifestation. There were three views on the subject : (1) the sounds bring about in the sense of hearing a fitness which was not there before (2) they produce a fitness in the word (*sphoṭa*) itself, (3) they bring about a fitness in both.²⁸ It is the word इन्द्रिय which is used in this context and the *Vṛtti* elaborates the idea by bringing in the words श्रोत्र, चक्षुः and वाण. The process of the perfection of the sense is not peculiar to the perception of the word. In the perception of other objects of the world also, sometimes the sense has to be made fit to do its work. The application of ointment to the eye enables one to see better. Even more important is attention and concentration without which one may not see at all. Attention makes a difference to the sense of vision, but none to the object itself. An example of the object being previously made fit to be perceived is the smell of the earth. It is only when the heated earth is sprinkled with water that its smell is perceived. The sprinkling gives the object a certain fitness. Similarly, exposure of medicated oil to the sun brings संस्कार to it. Its smell now becomes fit to be perceived. In these cases, the sense is not affected.²⁹ The act of seeing an object was looked

27. See my article "Bhartṛhari on Dhvani" ABORI Vol. XLVI. p. 49 ff.

28. इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः शब्दस्यैवोभयस्य वा ।

क्रियते ध्वनिमिवादास्त्रयोऽभिव्यक्तिवादिनाम् ॥

.....तत्र केचिन्मन्यन्ते— ध्वनिरुत्पद्यमानः श्रोत्रं संस्करोति, तच्च संस्क्रियमाणं शब्दोपलब्धौ द्वारतां प्रतिपद्यते । अन्ये त्वभिव्यक्तिवादिनो मन्यन्ते—शब्द एव ध्वनिसंसर्गात् प्राप्तसंस्कारः श्रोत्रस्य विषयत्वमुपगच्छति । केषाञ्चिद् ध्वनिरुभयोः शब्दश्रोत्रयोरनुग्रहे वर्तते ।

Vāk. I. 78 with extracts from the *Vṛtti*.

29. विषयसंस्कारस्तु तैल्यदीनामातपादिभिः पृथिव्याश्चोदकेन गन्धप्रतिपत्तिकाले दृष्टो न घ्राणेन्द्रियस्य ।

Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 79

upon by some as an example of the perfection of both the sense and the object. They held the view that the sense of vision consists of rays of light and that it reaches out to the object at the time of visual perception (प्राप्यकारि). While going out it gets mixed up with the all-pervading atoms of light outside. This is a kind of perfection of the sense of vision. At that moment, the object is also illuminated, that is, made fit to be perceived by the external light. Thus, perfection comes both to the sense and the object. Bhartṛhari seems to go by this analogy and have a preference for the view that both the sense (श्रोत्र) and the object (शब्द) are perfected by the manifesting sounds. They make the ear fit to perceive the word and the word itself fit to be perceived.³⁰

Coming to the process of manifestation itself, Bhartṛhari likened it to the process by which actions or movements are manifested and cognised.³¹ The sphaṭa to be manifested may be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, though in describing the process Bhartṛhari had especially the sentence-sphaṭa in mind. The speaker wants to manifest, that is, to convey to the hearer the sphaṭa which is within him and, for that purpose, he has to produce sounds by means of the vocal organs. His efforts to produce the sounds depend upon the sphaṭa which he wants to manifest. Only particular sounds, uttered in a fixed order, can manifest a given sphaṭa, whether it be that of a phoneme, a word or a sentence.³² Efforts differ with our desires to manifest particular sphaṭas and sounds

30. चक्षुषः प्राप्यकारित्वे तेजसा तु द्वयोरपि ।

विषयेन्द्रिययोरिष्टः संस्कारः स क्रमो ध्वनेः ॥

इहालोकानुगृहीतं घटादिविषयं सन्तमसेऽवस्थितोऽयं प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र येषामप्राप्यकारि चक्षुस्तेषामालोकेन विषयः प्रायेणानुगृह्यते । प्राप्यकारित्वे तु चक्षुषस्तुल्यजातीयेन तेजसा नयनरश्म्यनुग्रहः क्रियते ॥ Vāk. I. 80 with the Vṛtti

31. Vāk II. 20-21

32. (a) वर्णपदवाक्यविषयाः प्रयत्नविशेषसाध्याः ध्वनयो वर्णपदवाक्याख्यान् स्फोटान् पुनः पुनराविर्भावयन्तो बुद्धिष्वारोपयन्ति । Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 82

(b) वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नास्तत्तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिध्वन्ति । Vṛtti on Vāk I 88.

differ according to the difference in the efforts. The sounds have temporal distinctions, because they can be short, long or prolated. Following Vyāḍi, the author of the Saṅgraha which is quoted in the Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 76, Bhartṛhari makes an inner distinction within the manifesting sounds. I refer to the distinction between primary sounds (prākṛtadhvani) and secondary sounds (vaikṛtadhvani)³³. The sounds are, after all, uttered in order to manifest the sphoṭa which is, therefore, their root-cause (prakṛti). Hence, in their first moment, that is, at the time of the manifestation of the sphoṭa, they are called prākṛtadhvanis. They are so called because, without them, the form of the sphoṭa would remain unmanifested, and, therefore, unperceived. As soon as we hear the primary sounds, we perceive the sphoṭa. But its perception does not disappear at once. It lasts a little while more in quick speech, a little longer in speech of medium speed and longer still in slow speech. But the continuity of perception of the already manifested sphoṭa cannot be explained unless the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. These sounds of the succeeding moments having the same duration as the sounds of the first moments are called secondary sounds (vaikṛtadhvanis). They continue to manifest the sphoṭa, already manifested by the primary sounds. To put it differently, the sphoṭa continues to be perceived again and again as long as the secondary sounds last. Those are called secondary sounds by which the form of the sphoṭa, already manifested, is perceived again and again uninterruptedly for a longer period of time.³⁴ As soon as the lamp is lit, one perceives the object and, if the light continues, one continues to perceive the object. The sphoṭa is perceived as identical with the manifesting primary sounds (though quite different from them) and as having their properties. The secondary sounds, on the other hand, come after the sphoṭa is manifested

33. इह द्विविधो ध्वनिः—प्राकृतो वैकृतश्च । तत्र प्राकृतो नाम येन विना स्फोटरूपमनभिव्यक्तं न परिच्छिद्यते । वैकृतस्तु येनाभिव्यक्तं पुनः पुनरविच्छेदेन प्रचिततरकालमुपलभ्यते ।

Vṛtti an Vak. I. 76.

34. See note 33.

and so their difference from the latter is clearly perceived and their properties are not wrongly attributed to the sphoṭa.³⁵ The primary sounds are produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs, themselves conditioned by the desires and efforts of the speaker. The secondary sounds on the other hand, are produced by the primary ones.³⁶ They are a continuation of the primary sounds, after the manifestation of the sphoṭa and are responsible for the continued perception of the sphoṭa. To say that the utterance is slow means that the sphoṭa continues to be perceived a little longer before the next sphoṭa is perceived. The sphoṭa cannot be perceived apart from the primary sounds which manifest it, though it is a distinct entity. Therefore the properties of the primary sounds such as duration and accent are wrongly attributed to the sphoṭa. The perception of the primary sounds, with their particular duration, is not a process external to the perception of the sphoṭa, because it is a means to the latter and because the latter is perceived as one with the former. The secondary sounds only cause difference in the speed of utterance. All the other distinctions attributed to the sphoṭa really belong to the primary sounds. They are the sounds of the first moment of utterance. The sounds which follow are like echoes or reverberations (अनुरणनरूपाः) of those of the first moment. They are the vaikṛtadhvanis. They

35. शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदे तु वैकृताः ।

ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥

तद्यथा प्रकाशो जन्मानन्तरमेव घटादीनां ग्रहणे हेतुः अवतिष्ठमानस्तु ग्रहणप्रबन्ध-
हेतुर्भवति । एवमभिव्यक्ते शब्दे ध्वनिरुत्तरकालमनुवर्तमानो बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तिं शब्दविषयां
विषयमभिव्यक्तिबलाधानादुपसंहरति । तस्मादुपलक्षितव्यतिरेकेण वैकृतेन ध्वनिना
संसृज्यमानोऽपि स्फोटात्मा ताद्रूप्यस्यानध्यारोपात् शास्त्रे ह्रस्वादिवत् कालभेदव्यवहारं
नावतरति ।

Vāk. I. 77 with the Vṛtti.

36. तस्य नित्यस्य येऽभिव्यञ्जकास्ते च केचित् प्राकृताः केचिद् वैकृताः ।
यः करणसन्निपातादुत्पद्यते यश्च तस्मात्तौ प्राकृतौ । ताभ्यां विशेषोपलब्धिः । यस्तु
ध्वनिध्वनेरुत्पद्यते स वैकृतः । ततो विशेषाभावात् ।

V. Swaminathan-Bhaṭṭarhari's Mahābhāṣyaṭikā pt 1 p 58
(Hindu University Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series I 11)

are the cause of the repeated cognition of the sphoṭa or speed of utterance, another way of saying the same thing. They are external to the sphoṭa.³⁷

Such is the nature of the sounds which manifest the sphoṭa, that is, bring it within the range of cognition. We saw that the sphoṭa is at first cognised erroneously in the form of sounds and correctly cognised only in the end. In other words, the initial error is set aside, as often happens in the case of other errors. Ordinarily, an error is set aside in a negative way. If the rope was mistaken for a snake, the error is set aside when we say : 'no, this is not a snake.' This is the negative way of setting aside an error. But it can also take a positive form,³⁸ as in the case of the erroneous cognition of the sphoṭa as sounds. We do not say in the end : 'This is not ग्, औ, or. विसर्ग'. We say: 'here is the word गौ: '

Thus, after a series of erroneous cognitions having the form of sounds, accompanied by a vague but progressively clear cognition of the sphoṭa, there is, finally, a clear cognition of it.³⁹ This clear cognition is a case of perception. The previous cognitions also had the sphoṭa as their object, but the cognition of it was vague and that is why they had the form of the sounds. When the comprehension of the sphoṭa itself is vague, it is natural that the cognition should have the form of the sounds. The latter is a natural corollary of the former. But when the final cognition reveals the sphoṭa in all its clarity and distinctness, it has no longer the form of the sounds. The error has given place to truth. Such a cognition can only be perception. The object and the form of the cognition are now identical. Another proof that the cognition of the sphoṭa is a case of perception is that it is only perception which can reveal an object, at first vaguely and later

37. प्राकृतध्वनिभिरभिव्यक्ते शब्दतत्त्वेऽनुरणनरूपा ये पश्चात्कालभाविनो ध्वनयः सन्तानेन वर्तन्ते...ततश्च ते शब्दतत्त्वाद् बहिर्भूताः न भिन्दन्ति तत् ।

Helārāja on Vāk. C. III Kāla verse 64.

38. द्वेधा हि प्रत्ययविपर्ययः, नेदं रजतमितिवत् साक्षात्, वैपरीत्येन वा इयं शुक्तिः इतिवत् प्रतियोगित्वेन वा ।

Gopālikā, p. 165.

39. अस्ति तु, व्यक्तैकशब्दपरिच्छेदार्थसिद्धेश्चान्यथा लब्धत्वादुक्तेन प्रकारेणावश्याभ्युपेय एकः शब्दः ।

S. S. Kā 22. p. 58.

clearly. The other means of knowledge like inference either reveal the object or do not reveal it at all. It is perceptual knowledge which can be निर्विकल्पक or सविकल्पक and not the other kinds of valid knowledge.⁴⁰

6. It is clear from what has been said so far that when Maṇḍana Miśra speaks about sphoṭa, it is padasphoṭa which he has in mind. One cannot help asking the question: What is Maṇḍana Miśra's attitude towards Vākyasphoṭa which is the main sphoṭa for Bhartṛhari? There is not enough evidence in the Sphoṭasiddhi to enable one to state his attitude without any ambiguity, but one or two points have to be kept in mind. The Vākyasphoṭa is mentioned in the Sphoṭasiddhi. While criticising Kumārila for denying that the sounds manifest the sphoṭa which exists in the word or the sentence he says that the sphoṭa is not something which exists in the word or the sentence as different from them, **because the word and the sentence themselves are the sphoṭa.**⁴¹ It is possible to argue that Maṇḍana Miśra is only stating the view of the grammarians and not his own, but there is no indication of it. This must be taken together with the fact that in order to support his arguments in favour of padasphoṭa, he quotes Vāk. I, 89 and 90 where Bhartṛhari describes the process of the manifestation of the sentence-sphoṭa and gives the analogy of our mistaking at first objects at a distance or in the dark and later cognising them correctly. The impression which one gets while reading this portion of the Sphoṭasiddhi is that Maṇḍana Miśra considered that the arguments establishing the existence of the Vākyasphoṭa were of the same kind as those on which the existence of the padasphoṭa is based. Perhaps there is a hint that by means of parallel arguments one can establish Vākyasphoṭa also in Kā. 36. of the Sphoṭasiddhi where Maṇḍana Miśra tell us—

40. प्रत्यक्षज्ञाननियता व्यक्ताव्यक्तावभासिता ।

मानान्तरेषु ग्रहणमथवा नैव हि ग्रहः ॥

S. S. kā. 23. p. 59.

41. तत्र पदवाक्ययोराहितं संबन्धिनं वा स्फोटं नाभिव्यञ्जन्तीति सिद्धम्.
पदवाक्ये एव हि स्फोटः ।

S. S. kā. 27, p. 69.

"Thus the truth concerning the word, free from all differentiation has been shown on the basis of reason and tradition. Let them understand the other higher unity also, free from all differentiation."

What is the other higher unity referred to in this verse ? Parameśvara, the author of the Gopālikā, has no doubt at all in the matter. He says पदस्फोटोत्तरं वाक्यस्फोटमित्यर्थः । If the commentator is giving us the traditional way of understanding this verse—I have no reason to think that he is not—it means that Maṇḍana accepted the higher unity, the Vākyasphoṭa also. But could he have done so and accept अभिहितान्वयवाद also at the same time ? The view of the grammarians is that if the word is the Vākyasphoṭa and its meaning 'pratibhā' both indivisible entities, there is no room either for abhihitānvayavāda or anvitābhidhānavāda.

Another question which arises is : did Maṇḍana Miśra, who quotes the kārīkās of the Vākyapadīya, know the Vṛtti on those Kārīkās which has come down to us and which a very long tradition attributes to Bhartṛhari himself ? There are several indications in the Sphoṭasiddhi which make one think that Maṇḍana Miśra knew the Vṛtti also. They may be stated as follows--

(i) It is stated in Kā. 18 and the commentary thereon that the sounds which the speaker utters differ from one another according to difference in intention and the consequent difference in the effort to manifest different sphoṭas even though the movements of the vocal organs may be the same. That the sounds differ from one another is mentioned in Vāk. I. 88. That the difference is due to difference in intention and the consequent difference in the efforts of the speaker is not mentioned in the Kārīkā portion of the Vākyapadīya, but in the Vṛtti portion. It is mentioned on as many as three occasions.⁴² It is reasonable to suppose that Maṇḍana has

42. (a) वर्णपदवाक्यविषयाः प्रयत्नविशेषसाध्या ध्वनयो वर्णपदवाक्याख्यानस्फोटान् पुनः पुनराविर्भावयन्तो बुद्धिध्वारोपयन्ति ।
Vṛtti on Vāk I 82

(b) वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नाः तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिन्वन्ति ।
Vṛtti on Vāk I 88.

(c) वाक्ये हि निर्भागे तदभिव्यक्तिविषयैः प्रयत्नविशेषैः समुत्थाप्यमाना ध्वनयः
etc. Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 90.

taken the idea from the Vṛtti and has incorporated it in his Kā. 18 and his commentary thereon.

(ii) As stated before, according to the sphoṭa doctrine we ordinary mortals suffer from an incapacity to grasp the sphoṭa in any other way than through sounds which have differentiation and sequence. We can learn only through the teaching of others. It is those who depend upon others for cognising the sphoṭa (परदर्शितदर्शिनः) that suffer from this incapacity. This idea is not mentioned in any Kārikā of the Vākyapadīya, but it is found in the Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 85. It is reasonable to think that Maṇḍana is only repeating in his Kā. 21 and his commentary thereon what the Vṛtti on the Vākyapadīya says. Both there and in Maṇḍana's commentary, on his own Kā. 21, a distinction is made between us ordinary mortals and the Ṛṣis. I will go further and say that Maṇḍana Miśra's

“अपरप्रदर्शितविषयास्तु परमर्षयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणोऽव्याहृतान्तःप्रकाशा विधूतविपर्यासक्रमं च वाक्तृत्वं प्रतिपेदिरे प्रतिपादयामासुरिति च प्रतिज्ञायते ।

S. S. Kā. 21, p. 53.

reads like an explanation and is certainly an echo of

“निष्क्रमं तु दाशतयमप्युपायान्तरेण प्रतिपद्यन्ते प्रतिपादयन्ति च”

Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 85

(iii) Again, I have no doubt that the two analogies given by Maṇḍana, that of mistaking a tree for an elephant from a distance and that of mistaking a rope in a dark room for a snake are taken from the Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 89. That kārīkā mentions only such an error in general but does not specify it. It is the Vṛtti which gives the concrete examples and they are reproduced in the commentary on Kā. 19 of the Sphoṭasiddhi. If there was an actual quotation from the prose portion of the Vṛtti in the Sphoṭasiddhi, there would have been no room for doubting whether Maṇḍana Miśra knew the Vṛtti or not. Short of an actual quotation, so many passages of Maṇḍana Miśra's commentary on his own kārīkās read like echoes of the Vṛtti on the Vākyapadīya.

The parallel passages from both the texts quoted in notes 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26 give an idea of the actual position. To say that there are echoes of the Vṛtti in the Sphoṭasiddhi is not to deny that there is any quotation. There is a verse-quotation. It is well-known that the Vṛtti, though written in prose, abounds in verses, mostly anonymous quotations from previous works. One of these quotations is reproduced in the Sphoṭasiddhi, next to the very Kārikā in the Vṛtti of which the quotation occurs. For me, this is a strong indication that Maṇḍana Miśra took this verse from the Vṛtti on this Kārikā and not from the source from which the author of the Vṛtti himself took it. The quoted verse is the following--

ज्ञेयेन न विना ज्ञानं व्यवहारेऽवतिष्ठते ।
नालब्धक्रमया वाचा कश्चिदर्थोऽभिधीयते ॥

S. S. p. 54

This is the verse which tells us that consciousness and the word have this point in common namely, that till they are differentiated, they cannot enter into usage, cannot play any part in wordly transactions.

A correct estimate of the position of the Sphoṭa-doctrine in the philosophy of Maṇḍana presupposes a study of all his other works. The foregoing brief account of the way in which he establishes the sphoṭa is only meant as a help in understanding the Sphoṭasiddhi itself,

I am thankful to Dr. S. M. Katre for including this translation in the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Monographs. As in the case of my edition of the Vākyapadiyam, Dr. M. M. Patkar has been very helpful by maintaining contact with the press and by seeing that delay does not take place in the receipt of proofs. My acknowledgments are also due to the authorities of the Madras University, the text of whose edition of the Sphoṭasiddhi I have used for this translation.

Poona;

K. A. Subramania Iyer

28 September 1966.

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
1	28	manuscript	manuscript
5	28	iti	iti
8	10	mening	meaning
8	31	°स्वमि°	°स्वममि°
8	3	figures	figure
11	12	capicity	capacity
17	10	°नीगमा°	°नीयमा°
17	13	°प्रत्यपता	°प्रत्ययता
21	last	mpressions	impressions
26	15	he word	the word
28	35	universa	universal
28	37	ndividual	individual
30	5	°तर्यान्त	°त्यन्ति
32	17	°द्यथा	°द्यथा
49	1	पूर्वे°	पूर्वे°
61	10	°ष्टमेकै°	°ष्टमेकै°
64	13	altri°	attri°
71	8	toe	the
74	2	Taṭrāpi	Tatrāpi
76	3	omit the whole line	
77	22	°मान्ता°	°मात्रा°
78	28	protya°	pratya°
78	last	°यययेपु	°वयवेपु
79	8	°स्मणा°	°स्मरणा°
79	18	वास्यबु	वाक्यबु°
83	33	belives	believes
87	23	°काल°	°काल°
87	28	वक्त्रेक°	वक्त्रेक°
91	26	°प्रयय	°प्रत्यया

The Establishment of Sphoṭa

(Sphoṭasiddhi)

of

Maṇḍana Miśra

योगदान्तैकदृश्यात्मा यो गदान्तकरो नृणाम् ।
तत्त्वावस्थाणवे तस्मै तत्त्वावस्थाणवे नमः ॥ १ ॥

1. "Homage to the Ātmā who can be seen only by one who has conquered himself through spiritual discipline¹, who removes the illness of men, who is the unchanging Being that brings about union with Himself² and who is incomprehensible (aṇu) in his real state.

[1. *Yogadāntaikadrśyātmā* is a compound word which can be and is actually split up in several ways in the *Gopālikā*, yielding several meanings. It is difficult to say which one Maṇḍana had in mind. The translation is based on the following analysis : *Yogena Yogābhyāsena dāntasya ekasyaiva drśyaḥ draṣṭavya ātmā yo bhavati*.

2. The word *tattvāvasthāṇu* occurs twice. In one occurrence, it may be reasonably analysed as *tattvāvasthāyām aṇu*. In the other occurrence, it may be analysed as *tattva + avasthāṇu* or *tattvāva + sthāṇu*. G. has adopted the latter analysis, because *avasthāṇu* is quite

unknown. *Tattvāva* is also obscure. G. takes it as *tattva* + *ava*. *Tattva* is, of course, well-known and can stand for many things. *Ava* from the root 'av' can also mean many things on the basis of the sixteen meanings of the root which G. enumerates. What Maṇḍana had in mind is anybody's guess. The translation gives one of the possible meanings, based on the analysis : *tattvam īśvaratvam avati karoti iti tattvāvaḥ.*]

दुर्विदग्धैरवक्षिते दर्शने पददर्शनाम् ।
यथागमं यथाप्रज्ञं न्यायलेशो निदर्श्यते ॥ २ ॥

2. In support of the doctrine of the upholders of the word which has been challenged by certain uncharitable critics,¹ a few arguments are being put forward according to tradition and my understanding.²

[1. G. refers to Śl. Vā, (Spho.) 119, as the place where the challenge has been made.

2. The view that has been challenged is that the word is something over and above the phonemes. The establishment of that view is the purpose of this work.]

किं पुनरिदं पदं नाम ? शब्दः । कः पुनरिह शब्दोऽभिप्रेतः ? किं वर्णाः ?
नेत्याह । अपि तु

अर्थावसायप्रसवनिमित्तं शब्द इष्यते । २ १/२ ।

यथोक्तं 'येनोच्चारितेन' इत्यादि ।

What is meant by 'word' ? Speech. What is intended to be conveyed here by Speech ? Does it mean the phonemes ? No ! is the reply. But rather—

3 (ab). That which causes the birth of the knowledge of an object has been declared to be speech (śabda).

As has been said : " That by the utterance of which etc."

[G. explains *Kim punar idam* etc. in two ways : as spoken by the opponent of the word and as spoken by the upholder of the word.]

नन्वेवं धूमादयोऽपि धूमकेतनादिप्रत्ययोपदर्शितसामर्थ्यातिशयाः शब्दताम-
 स्नुवीरन्, तथैकैकवर्णाश्च तद्विधर्मतया न तथा व्यपदिश्येरन् । अन्योऽपि वाचकः
 सङ्गतिस्त्वेदनसमयतश्च पुरः श्रवणेन्द्रियावसेयोऽपि न शब्दः इति निगद्येत,
 पश्चाच्च तथोच्येत; तत्र गौः इत्येष शब्दोऽशब्दश्चापद्येत । न चेदं चतुरश्रम् ;
 लोकाधीनावधारणो हि शब्दार्थसंबन्धः ; लोके च श्रोत्रेन्द्रियविज्ञेयमात्रानुपातिनी
 शब्दशब्दप्रवृत्तिः । अतः श्रवणग्रहणतैव शब्दलक्षणं न्याय्यम् । वर्णा एव चेदं
 शब्दलक्षणमनुपतन्तीत्यभिधेयधीहेतुभावमनुपयन्तोऽपि लोकप्रसिद्धेस्त एव शब्दाः,
 तदतिरिच्यमानशरीरं त्वर्थवस्तु समुपेतसत्त्वाभिधातृभावमपि न शब्दः इति व्यपदेश-
 मनुपतितुमर्हति, लोकप्रसिद्धिविरहात् ।

(Objection) If that is so, a thing like smoke which shows its special capacity to cause the cognition of fire of which smoke is the sign, would enjoy the state of being speech (*śabda*) while individual phonemes which do not have this property would not be called *śabda*. Any expressive thing, even though cognisable through the sense of hearing, would not be called a word before the moment when one understands its relation to its meaning¹ and would be so called after one knows it. Thus an utterance like 'cow' would be a word and also would not be a word. This is not right.² The relation between word and meaning is learnt from the world and in the world, the expression 'word' is applied to anything which can be just perceived by the sense of hearing. Therefore, the fact of being audible should be taken as the legitimate mark of a word (*śabda*). It is the phonemes which conform to this definition and even though they may not cause the understanding of meaning,³ they must be looked upon as the word (शब्द) on the basis of acceptance in the world. Anything which is different from them, even though it may have existence and expressive power, does not deserve to be called by the name 'word' because there is no such usage in the world.⁴

[1. *Saṅgatisaṁvedanasamayataśca purāḥ*. In one of the alternative meanings given by G. *saṅgati* would mean the eternal relation between word and meaning according to those who accept it and *samaya* would mean convention.

2. *Na cedam caturaśram.* Here *idam* stands for three things : (1) that smoke should not be called word even though it causes the cognition of fire, (2) that phonemes should not be called words even though they are audible, (3) that the same thing should be a word and yet not a word,

3. *Abhidheyadhīhetubhāvam anupayanto'pi.* This statement is only for the sake of argument, because, the Mīmāṃsaka, who is the objector here, actually believes that it is the phonemes which convey the meaning.

4. *Tadatiricyamānaśarīram tvarthavastu samupetasattvābhidhātṛbhāvamapi na śabdaḥ.* It is the Mīmāṃsaka who is speaking here. According to him, it is the phonemes which constitute the word, because they are audible and they convey the meaning. Even if it is admitted, for the sake of argument, that there is something beyond the phonemes, preceding or following them, which conveys the meaning, it cannot be called the word, because worldly usage does not accept it. The other things which can be thought of as existent, besides the phonemes, in the case of a word like *gauḥ* are (1) parts of phonemes (2) *gatva* etc., (3) *gośabdatva*, (4) the collection of phonemes, (5) *sphoṭa*. Many of these things are not accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka. [See Śl. Vā. (Spho.). 9.]

तदिदमनिरूपितपरावरस्य परिचोदितम् । तथा हि
तदेतत् प्रक्रमापेक्षं भाष्यकृत् प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥ ३ ॥

अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः इति हि प्रक्रमः । तत्र च नानाजातीयार्थमात्रोप-
हितोपरागां प्रख्यां 'इति' परेण गोशब्देन निर्दिशति; दृष्टो ह्ययमिति शब्दो विज्ञान-
मात्रप्रयोगः यथा 'गौः' इति मेऽभवदिति । तामेव च 'इति' शब्दनिर्दिष्टां
प्रख्यां 'अत्र' इति सर्वनाम्नाधिकरणतया परामृशत्याधेयमुपलक्षयितुम् । तत्-
प्रख्याप्रतिभासि च जातिद्रव्यगुणक्रियावर्णस्फोटात्मकमनेकमाधेयम्, ततः शब्दं
निर्धारयितुमनाः पृच्छति 'कः शब्दः' इति । यथा क इह शालायां देवदत्त
इति । प्रत्यय एव वा प्रत्येतव्योपलक्षणप्रवणतया निर्दिश्यते । तदुपलक्षितं

यत्तत् 'अत्र' इति निर्धारणसत्तम्या शब्दनिर्धारणाय निर्दिशति । एवं गते च प्रकृतप्रत्ययप्रतिभासिष्वेवार्थधीहेतोः शब्दत्वमवधार्यत इति कुतोऽन्यत्र प्रसङ्गः ? न हि 'क इह शालायां कठः' इति यः कुण्डली इत्यशालाधिकरणे कुण्डलिनि सम्प्रत्ययः । उपलक्षणत्वाच्चार्थप्रत्ययस्य संविद्वैकल्यादनुपजनयन-
प्यर्थप्रत्ययं न शब्दतां जहाति यथा विमुक्तकुण्डलः कठताम् । अन्वाख्येय-
शब्दलक्षणं चार्थप्रत्ययः, 'अथ शब्दानुशासनम्' इति प्रक्रमात् । तस्य च निर्जिज्ञासनात्; एकैकवर्णेषु चाप्रत्यायकेषु नान्वाख्येयता; शब्दमात्रलक्षणं त्वनुपकारकमेवेति न ते शब्दतामतिपत्स्यन्ति । यदप्युक्तं सतोऽपि वर्णातिरेकिणोऽर्थज्ञानहेतोर्न शब्दशब्दवाच्यता, शब्दप्रसिद्धयभावादिति । अहो लोकशास्त्रप्र-
सिद्धयोः परः परिचयः यदिदमपि न दृष्टम् 'शब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे'
'भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रिया प्रतीयेत' इति 'भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे' इति च ।
श्रोत्रप्राप्त्यपि च सत्त्वगुणत्वशब्दत्ववर्णत्वातिव्यापिनी न शब्दलक्षणम् । तथा हि—शब्दसमवायिनः सत्त्वादयः श्रोत्रावसेयाः । न च श्रोत्रेणैवेत्यवधारणम्,
वर्णानां मनसाप्यवधारणात् । वर्णत्वे च प्रसङ्गानतिवृत्तेः । न च सत्त्ववर्णत्वा-
द्यपहवः साधुः, सर्वसामान्यापहवप्रसङ्गात्; न हि सामान्यविशेषान्तरकल्पने
ऽपि निबन्धनमस्त्यन्यदतोऽनुवृत्तावभासिनः प्रख्यानात्; न हि शाबलेयमु-
पलब्धवतो बाहुलेयेऽन्यः पूर्वाकारावमर्शोऽन्वितावभासात् प्रकाशात् । न च
ध्वनिमात्राद्यावृत्तः कचटतपेष्पन्वयी न विद्यते प्रख्यावभासः । वर्णाश्चार्थप्रत्यय-
हेतुभावमनुपयन्तोऽपि यदि शब्दाः, कामम् । अन्वाख्येयस्त्वर्थप्रत्ययेन
निरूप्यत इत्यदोषः ॥ ३ ॥

(Answer.) All this objection is of one who has not considered what has gone before and what follows (in regard to the statement of the Mahābhāṣya.) It is like this—

3 (cd) "This is what the author of the Bhāṣya has declared keeping in view the initial problem.

The initial problem was : In this (complex experience called) *gauḥ*, what is the word ? The word *gauḥ* followed by¹ *iti* stands for an experience coloured by various kinds of things. This word *iti* is also used to refer to a mere idea as in *gaur iti me'bhavat* (the idea of cow occurred to me.) He (the Bhāṣyakāra) refers to that experience indicated by *iti* by

means of the pronominal adverb *atra* as a location, in order to include all its contents. The contents which figure in that experience are many, such as the universal, substance, quality action, phoneme, *sphoṭa*. Wishing to isolate the word from all this and determine its nature he asks 'What is the word?' It is similar to the question : Who, in this hall, is Devadatta? Or it may be put in another way : *iti* refers to the experience itself as standing for its contents. The word *atra* ending in the selective locative case-affix (*nirdhāraṇasaptamī*) points to all that content in order to isolate the word (which is one of the contents.)² That being so, the term 'word' can be applied only to that thing, among the things which figure in the experience, which is the cause of the understanding of the meaning. How can it be applied to anything else? (If the question is) 'who, in this hall, is Kaṭha?' (and the answer is) 'the one wearing ear-rings', nobody will understand one who is outside the hall, even though he may be wearing ear-rings.³ As conveying of the meaning is only an occasional feature⁴ of the word (*śabda*) it will not cease to be so, even if, due to the ignorance of the relation, it does not convey the meaning, just as Kaṭha will not cease to be Kaṭha even if he happens not to wear his ear-rings. Conveying of the meaning is an occasional feature of the word⁵ which is to be expounded (*anvākhyeya*) by the science of Grammar as is shown by the way in which it begins : "Now begins the exposition of the science of the word."⁶ It is that which is sought to be particularly known, individual phonemes are not the word which is proposed to be expounded because they convey no meaning. A definition of the bare word would not be of much use here and so they will not lose their character of being the (bare) word. As to what was said before, namely, "that which is different from the phonemes and is the cause of the understanding of the meaning cannot be called the 'word' (*śabda*) because it is not known to be the word," wonderful indeed is his familiarity with worldly and scholarly traditions who has not even seen such passages as "We understand the meaning from the word",⁷ "Words denoting rites are meant to prompt one to act and from them action would be understood."⁸ One expresses action through the verb.⁹ Nor can the fact of being

audible be the definition of the word, because it would apply to the being (which exists in the word), to the fact of being a quality (*guṇa*) (which exists in *śabdaguṇa*), to the fact of being a word and to the fact of being a phoneme. It is like this. Being and others which inhere in the word are perceived by the sense of hearing. Nor does 'audible' in the definition mean audible only, because phonemes are cognised by the mind also.¹⁰ Nor is the defect of the definition becoming applicable to the fact of being a phoneme thus removed.¹¹ Nor would it be right to deny the existence of universals like 'being' and the fact of being a phoneme, because one would then have to deny the existence of all universals. There is no other cause for recognising other particular universals than uniformity of cognition.¹² When one sees a cow of many colours (*bāhuleya*) after seeing a spotted cow (*śābaleya*), there is no other perception of previous form except uniformity of cognition. Nor can one say that there is no uniformity of cognition in the case of *ka*, *ca*, *ṭa*, *ta* and *pa* over and above that of their being sounds (*dhvanimātra*). If phonemes are to be called 'word' even though they are not the cause of the understanding of meaning, let it be so. But the word to be (grammatically) expounded is characterised by the capacity to convey the meaning. Thus, there is nothing wrong (in our view.) (3).

[1. *Nānājātīyārthamātra* etc. G. here points out that *artha* means *vastu*, a thing and not meaning, because, among the things which figure in this complex cognition, some are of the nature of meaning, while others are word elements. *Vastu* is an expression which can be applied to both word and meaning.

2. *Gaur ityatra* is explained in two ways. In the first explanation, *iti* refers to the complex experience and *atra* refers to it as the location and figuratively, to the many things which figure in that location. In the second explanation, *iti* refers to the experience as comprising the many things figuring in it and *atra* which is now taken as ending in the selective locative case (*nirdhāraṇasaptamī*.

P. 2. 3. 41.) refers to those many things in order to isolate the word from them.

3. As smoke is not one of the things which figures in the complex cognition represented by 'gauḥ' the question of applying the term 'word' to it does not arise at all, as an answer to the initial question *gaur ityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ* ?

4. *Upalakṣaṇatvāccārthapratyayaśya*. The word 'Upa√lakṣ' has been used several times before this in this section : *ādheyam upalakṣayitavyam, pratyetavyopalkṣaṇatayā, tadupalakṣitam yat*. In these cases, it means nothing more than : to stand for something else. The experience as the container, stood for its contents, just as, in the sentence *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, gaṅgā* stands for the banks of the Gaṅgā. In other words, *upalakṣaṇa*, in these cases, means *lakṣaṇā*, one of the three functions of a word. Here, on the other hand, *upalakṣana* is used as something distinct from *lakṣaṇa*. *Upalakṣaṇa* is an occasional feature of a thing as a crow sitting on a house, whereas 'lakṣaṇa' is the essential characteristic of a thing without which it would cease to be what it is.

5. It is only an occasional feature because, the word does not always convey the meaning. It conveys the meaning only to one who knows the relation between the two.

6. M. Bhā. I. 1.

7. This is supposed to be the worldly tradition, recorded in śab. Bhā. on Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 5 as follows—

“*Nanvevaṁ śabdādarthaṁ pratipadyamāha iti laukikaṁ Vacanam anupapannaṁ syāt.*”

8. Mī. Sū. 2. 1. 1.

9. Ni. 1. 1. 11. runs as follows—

“*Pūrvāparībhūtaṁ bhāvamākhyātenācāṣṭe, vrajati pacatītyupakramaprabhṛtyapavargaparyantam.*”

10. 'Audible' can mean 'audible also' or 'audible only'. The phonemes are perceived by the sense of hearing as well as by the mind.

11. If the word is defined as that which is audible, the definition would become applicable to a bare phoneme which does not cause the understanding of meaning and that is not desired. By modifying the definition to mean 'that which is perceived by the ear together with the mind', the defect would remain because phonemes are perceived by the ear together with the mind.

12. *Sāmānyaviśeṣāntarakalpane* 'pi. G. explains *śāmānyaviśeṣa* first as a karmadhāraya and then as a dvandva.' He had the text *anuvṛtta-vyāvṛttāvabhāsinah prakhyānāt* which presupposes the dvandva interpretation. But the text, without *vyāvṛtta* yields a good meaning

ननु च वर्णा एवाभिधेयाधिगमनिसितं स्वाभिधेयावबोधवधिलब्धपरि-
च्छेदाः पदपरिकल्पनाभाजः । नैतत् सारम्; प्रत्येकमप्रत्यायकत्वात्, साहित्या-
भावात्, नियतक्रमवर्तिनामयौगपद्येन सम्भूयकारित्वानुपपत्तेः, नानावक्तृप्रयुक्ते-
भ्यश्च प्रत्ययादर्शनात् क्रमविपर्यये यौगपद्ये च । तस्माद् वर्णव्यतिरेकि वर्णेभ्योऽ-
सम्भवन्नर्थप्रत्ययः स्वनिमित्तमुपकल्पयति ।

ननु च यं प्रकारमध्यासीनेभ्यो नार्थप्रत्ययदर्शनं वर्णेभ्यः, कामं तत्प्रकार-
जुषो मा भूवन् वाचकाः; समधिगतातिशयान्तराणामुपरि परिदृश्यमानानन्तराभि-
धेयप्रत्ययकार्याणां को वाचकत्वस्य विरोधः? तथा हि कार्यं कस्यचित् सद्भावेऽप्य-
नवाप्तसत्ताकं पुनराप्नुवत्सत्ताकं तस्य भाव एव परिगृहीतातिशयान्तरस्य कार-
णतां सूचयति; न त्वकारणतामेव, विशेषान्तरशालिनि तस्मिन्नेव पुनर्भावात्
तदभावे चाभावात्; न खल्वङ्कुरे बीजसमवधानेऽप्यलब्धे कुसूले समवहितक्षि-
त्यादिसहकारिग्रामबीजसमवधानसन्दृश्यमानमूर्तावबीजकार्यतां प्रतियन्ति; अपि
तु तदेव बीजं समवहितक्षित्यादिसहकारिग्राममस्य जनकम्, नेतरथेति
गम्यते । तथेमेऽपि मा भूवन् अन्यथा वाचकाः । परिगृहीतानुपूर्व्यविशेषादि-
भेदास्त्वर्थप्रत्ययहेतवः, न हि दृष्टे दृष्टप्रकारानुपातिनि सति हेतावदृष्टपरिकल्प-
नावकाशोऽस्ति । तदिदमुक्तम्—

यावन्तो यादृशा ये च यदर्थप्रतिपादने ।
वर्णाः प्रज्ञातसामर्थ्यास्ते तथैवावबोधकाः ॥

तथा—

नान्यथानुपपत्तिश्च भवत्यर्थमिति प्रति ।
तदेवास्या निमित्तं स्याज्जायते यदनन्तरम् ॥
सा च वर्णद्वयज्ञानेऽतीतेऽन्त्यज्ञानतः पुरा ।
भवतीतीदृगेवास्या निमित्तमवकल्पते ॥

(Objection). Why not say that the phonemes themselves are the cause of the understanding of meaning and that, when grouped according to the units of meaning which are understood, they are called words (pada) ?

This is not right. The phonemes cannot singly convey the meaning; they cannot co-exist, as they are uttered and perceived in a certain order; the phonemes which figure in these cognitions cannot co-exist and, therefore, cannot do anything together; when they are uttered by different speakers or in a different order or at the same time, they do not convey a meaning. Therefore, the understanding of meaning which cannot be due to the phonemes points to a cause which is different from the phonemes.

(It might be argued¹ :—) If the understanding of the meaning does not take place from phonemes in a certain condition, let them not be expressive in that condition; but if they acquire some special feature and are found thereafter to produce the effect of conveying the meaning, what is the harm in attributing expressive power to them then ? It is like this : If an effect is not produced in the presence of something and is later produced, it points to that very thing, now with an acquired special feature, as the cause and not as non-cause, because, in the presence of that very thing with the special feature added, the effect is produced, but not in its absence. The young sprout which does not appear as long as the seed is in the granary, but makes its appearance in the presence of that very seed which is now helped by the group of helping

factors such as soil etc, is not looked upon by people as not being the effect of the seed. On the contrary, it is understood that that very seed, in the presence of the group of such helping factors as soil, is the cause of the young sprout and not otherwise. Similarly, let not these phonemes be considered to be expressive of the meaning otherwise, but when characterised by such things² as a particular sequence, they become the cause of the understanding of meaning. As long as there is a visible cause and a visible mode of its being, there is no occasion for thinking of an invisible cause. As has been said.

“As many phonemes of whatever kind as are known to have the capacity to convey a particular meaning are said to be expressive of it in that very condition.”³

Similarly

“In regard to the understanding of meaning, there is no otherwise inexplicability. That immediately after which it occurs is the cause.”

It occurs, once the perception of the first two phonemes (of the word *gauḥ*) is completed and immediately after that of the last one. Such, therefore, is the cause of it.⁴

[1, What follows is an explanation of the view of the Mīmāṃsaka contained in the following statement : *Akṣareṣu nimittabhāvaḥ, tadbhāve bhāvāt, tadabhāve' abhāvāt*,

Śab. Bhā on Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 5

2. The facts of being uttered by the same person and not in some other sequence are some of the other things which must characterise them.

3. Śl. Vār, (Sph) 69.

4. Śl. Vār, Sph. 95-96. In the Chowkhambha edition of the Śl. Vār (p. 514.) the reading in 96 is *parā* instead of *purā*. The same meaning can be understood from both the readings, but with *parā*, it would be easier.]

अत्रोच्यते

अविशिष्टादजातस्य विशिष्टाद् भाव इष्यते ।

सत्यं स तु विशेषोऽत्र न कश्चन निरूप्यते ॥ ४ ॥

इदं तावदयं वर्णवादी प्रष्टव्यः । गौः , अश्वः इति वा केवलोच्चारणे वा को विसर्जनीयस्य भेदः , यत्कृतोऽर्थधीभेदः प्रत्ययभावाभावौ च ? नन्वेव विशेषः — कचिदसहायः कचिद्वर्णविशेषसहायः इति । क पुनरियं सहायता, यदा न विसर्जनीयसमये वर्णान्तरोपलब्धिरस्ति ? कार्ये खलु व्यापारतः सहायता; न चासतस्तदानीं व्यापृतिरस्ति; स्वकालेऽपि च व्यापारस्तदानीमेव प्रध्वंसा-
न्नेदानीन्तनकार्योपजननिमित्तम् । एष तर्हि विशेषः— वृत्ता वर्णविशेषोपलब्धिः कचित् , अन्यत्र न तथा । नैतत् सारम् ; न हि वृत्ता वर्णविशेषोपलब्धिर्विसर्जनीयं भेतुमर्हति, असत्त्वात् ; न ह्यजातानन्वयप्रध्वस्तयोरतिशयः कश्चित् ॥ ४ ॥

To the above objection, the following answer is made—

4. It is contended that an effect which does not come from a plain cause can yet come if the cause is distinguished by some special feature. That is true. But it is just that special feature which has not been shown in this case.

The upholder of the expressive power of the phonemes has to be asked this question : What is the difference between the visarga in the words *gauḥ* and *aśvaḥ* and an isolated one ? Which difference is the cause of the difference in the understanding of the meaning of these two words as well as of the presence or absence of a meaning at all ? Well, the difference is that in one place the visarga is isolated and elsewhere (i.e. in the words *gauḥ* and *aśvaḥ*) it is accompanied by other phonemes.¹ But where is any accompaniment, considering that at the time of (the utterance and the hearing) of the visarga, the other phonemes are not cognised at all ? There can be accompaniment only through some function in regard to the effect to be produced. Something which does not exist at the time of the visarga cannot perform any function. Any function which it may perform at the time of its own utterance

cannot be the cause of the effect produced now (at the time of the visarga) because it disappears at that very moment.

Well, then, the special feature may be put thus : in one place (i.e. in the words *gauḥ* and *aśvaḥ*) the perception of certain previous phonemes has come and gone, elsewhere it has not taken place at all.²

But this is not significant. The past perception of the phonemes cannot, in any way, distinguish the visarga because it does not exist any more. There is no difference between that which is not born and that which has perished without leaving any trace.³ (4)

[1. The last phoneme, helped by the mere visible fact that certain other phonemes have gone before, causes the understanding of meaning. Thus, there is no need to postulate an invisible entity called *saṁskāra*. See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 97.

2. In one case there is *pradhvaṁsābhāva* of the phonemes while, in the other case, there is their *prāgabhāva*. As *abhāva*, these two are quite different from each other.

3. The phonemes are said to have perished without any trace because, in this view, they are presumed not to leave any *saṁskāra*. See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 97, 101.]

ननु च यथा दर्शपूर्णमासादयः क्रमवन्तोऽपि सम्भूयकारिणः, अभ्यासाश्च स्वाध्यायग्रहणादिषु, गमनक्षणाश्चाभिमतदेशप्राप्तौ, यथा च तत्र कैवल्ये यौगपद्ये च क्रमविपर्यये कर्तृभेदे च न फलोत्पादः, केवलादिभ्यश्च विशेषात् फलोत्पादः, तथा वर्णेष्वपि किं नेष्यते ?

(How the phonemes themselves cause the understanding of the meaning may be explained as follows :—)

Just as the New and Full Moon sacrifices and other rites have sequence and yet produce their effect together, just as practices for learning one's Veda have sequence and yet produce their effect together and just as the different moments

of the act of going have sequence and yet together produce the effect of reaching the other place and just as, in all these cases, the effect is not produced if there is isolation, simultaneity, reversal of order and difference of agent and it is produced in the same circumstances if there is some special feature, in the same way, why not accept the process in the case of phonemes ?¹

[1. How parts of sacrifices like the New and Full Moon sacrifices arranged in a sequence or those of the practice for learning one's Veda, also occurring in a sequence and finally, the different moments of the act of going, also happening in a sequence, cooperate to produce the effect is referred to in Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 74-75.]

विषम उपन्यासः

एकार्थकारिणो येऽपि दृश्यन्ते क्रमवर्तिनः ।

इष्टं विपश्चितां तत्र कार्यं स्थाय्युपकारकम् ॥ ५ ॥

दर्शादिषु तावत् — क्रमवत्स्वपूर्वाणि कर्मजन्यानि स्थायीनि शक्त्यभिमतानि व्यापाराभिमतानि वोपकर्तृणि । तत्र शक्तितो व्यापारतो वा पूर्वं परं सहायतामुपयद्मिन्नन्ति, न तु केवलात् फलोपजनः । क्रमविशेषाभ्यासानुसंध्याच्च तत्रादृष्टपरिकल्पना । पूर्वकर्मोपजनितकार्यविशेषापेक्षमुत्तरस्याभिमतकार्योपजननिमित्तत्वमिति क्रमभेदे न फलोत्पादः । अभ्यासाश्च पूर्वपूर्वाहितसंस्कारसहकार्युत्तरोत्तरावृत्तिजनितसंस्कारक्रमेण स्वाध्यायग्रहणलक्षणफलप्रसवहेतवः । गमनक्षणाश्चाणुपरिमाणदेशातिक्रमक्रमेण समीहितदेशाधिगतये प्रभवन्ति । तथा हि-प्राचीनाभ्याशदेशप्राप्तिस्तथाविधोत्तरदेशविशेषाश्रयनिमित्तं तत्रेति कल्प्यतेऽनवाप्तयौगपद्येभ्योऽपि कार्यद्वारा एकार्थक्रिया ; न चैष कल्पो वर्णेषु संभवति ॥ ५ ॥

The cases are not on all fours.

5. In those things having sequence which are seen to produce one effect, there is, in them, according to thinkers, a lasting result which helps.

In the New and Full Moon sacrifices and the like which have sequence, certain new elements (apūrva) which are

produced by the acts and which last and are looked upon as powers or functions actually help (in producing the single effect). In those cases, what precedes distinguishes what follows either as a power or as a function; from any act in isolation, the effect is not produced. As a particular sequence has been handed down by tradition, one postulates an (invisible) new element. The later act being the cause of the production of the desired effect by depending upon the particular effect produced by the previous act, no effect is produced when the sequence is changed. Practice of Vedic recitation produces the effect of learning by heart one's Veda through the impression left by each succeeding repetition, helped by the impression left by the previous repetition. Moments of the act of going succeed in bringing one to the desired place by the process of going over points of space. It is like this : The reaching of the preceding point of space becomes the cause of the reaching of the next point of space. Thus even things which do not attain simultaneity are conceived as producing one result through some effect which comes in the middle. But this does not happen in the case of phonemes.¹ (5)

[1. Against the objection that the phonemes cannot convey the meaning because they cannot act together as they come and go and, therefore, do not have simultaneity, the Mīmāṃsaka pointed out (1) that the different parts of a ceremony take place in a sequence and yet together produce an effect like the attainment of heaven (2) that the different repetitions of the Veda take place in a sequence and yet together produce the effect of the student learning his Veda by heart (3) that the different moments of the act of going take place in a sequence and yet lead to the result of taking one to one's destination. In answer, it is pointed out (1) that even though the different parts of a ceremony come and go, they leave behind a lasting effect called *apūrva* in which they maintain a kind of simultaneity (2) that though the different repetitions in the process of practising one's Veda come and go, they leave behind impressions in the mind of the learner and, in these impressions, they continue to have a kind of simultaneity (3) that though the different moments

of the act of going come and go and do not have any kind of simultaneity through apūrvā or impressions (*saṃskāra*), yet each moment covers the next point of space and thus, ultimately, the destination is reached.

The question of apūrvā is discussed in the Śab. Bhā on Mī. Sū. 2. 1. 5. and the Śl. Vār. thereon. See also Jai. Nyā. p. 64.]

कथं न भवति ? यदा ते ऽपि स्त्रोपलब्धिनिबन्धनसंस्कारद्वारमन्त्यवर्ण-
प्रलयेन सहैकार्यक्रियामुपगन्तुं क्षमन्ते । यथोक्तम् “ पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽ-
न्त्यो वर्णो वाचकः — इत्यदोषः ”

How do you say that it does not happen ? Through the impressions left by the perceptions of the earlier phonemes and the last phoneme, they are also capable of serving one single purpose. As has been said : “ The last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions left by the previous phonemes, is expressive of the meaning.” Thus there is no difficulty..¹

[1 Śab. Bhā. on Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 5. (p. 46.)]

नैतत् सारम्

संस्काराः खलु यद्वस्तुरूपप्रख्याप्रभाविताः ।

विज्ञानहेतवस्तत्र ततोऽर्थे धीर्न कल्पते ॥ ६ ॥

संस्काराः खलु यद्वस्तूलपम्भसंभावितात्मानस्तत्रैव नियतनिमित्तलब्धप्रतिबोधा-
धियमाविर्भावयन्ति, नार्थान्तरे; न हि जातु गवावग्रहप्रत्ययप्रभावितः संस्कारोऽश्चस्म-
रणमुपकल्पयति ॥ ६ ॥

This is not right.

6. (Impressions (*saṃskārāḥ*) can only cause the cognition of those things by whose perceptions they have themselves been caused. Therefore, the understanding of the meaning is still inexplicable.

Impressions, when awakened by fixed causes, produce cognition in regard to those things by whose perception they were themselves caused, not in regard to other things. An impression caused by the perception of a cow cannot cause the remembrance of a horse. (6)

यदि मन्वीत — प्रत्येकमभिमतकार्यदर्शनाभावाद्द्वर्णेभ्यो यौगपद्याभावाच्चावश्यकल्पनीयं तस्य किञ्चन बीजम् । तन्न शब्दः, अनेककल्पनादोषात्, तस्य खल्व्वात्मा अर्थाधिगमनिमित्तभावश्चेति द्वयमुपकल्पयितव्यम् । संस्कारं तु वासनाद्वितीयनामानं पटुतरसंवेदनसमनुभूतवस्तुगोचरं सर्व एव संगिरन्ते स्मरण-फलप्रसवोन्नीपमानात्मानं प्रवादिनः ; अर्थाधिगमनिमित्ततापां तु तस्य विवादः । तत्र च कार्यान्तरे इव तद्भावे भावो निर्णयनिबन्धनम् । न खलु पुरस्तनवर्ण-विज्ञानोपहितसंस्कारविरहे केवलाद्विसर्जनीयादर्थधियमुदीयमानमुदीक्षामहे, तद्भावे च पश्यामः । यद्यपि चान्यत्रास्य कार्यान्तरोदयप्रत्यपता न प्रतीता, तथापि न कार्यान्तरोपजनगोचरसामर्थ्यं प्रतिरुध्यते केनचित् । तस्मात् कार्यान्तर-परिकल्पितसत्ताकस्य संस्कारस्यैव शक्त्यन्तरपरिकल्पनामात्रमस्तु, इह विषये कार्यान्तरदर्शनात् ; न तु स्फोटपरिकल्पना युक्ता, क्लृप्तसत्ताकस्य तस्यैव शक्तिमात्र-कल्पनया कार्योपपत्तावर्थापत्तिपरिक्षयात् ।

(Objection) If what he (the upholder of the phoneme) means is this :—As the desired result does not come from each individual phoneme and as they (the phonemes) cannot co-exist, some cause (bīja) for the understanding of meaning must be postulated. And that cannot be the sphoṭa because that would involve the assumption of more than one thing : its own existence and the fact of its being the cause of the understanding of meaning — two things have to be postulated. As for the impression¹, otherwise called predisposition (*vāsanā*)² having as its object that thing which had been clearly cognised before, the existence of which is inferred from its effect, namely, remembrance, all disputants accept it. Whether it can be the cause of the understanding of meaning is the only point in dispute. As in the case of the other effect, the ground for decision here is that the understanding of meaning takes place where the impressions are present. We do not see any

understanding of the meaning from the visarga only, in the absence of the impressions left by the previous phonemes. We do see it in their presence. Even though elsewhere one does not see impressions producing other effects (than remembrance) still nothing prevents them from having the capacity to produce other effects.³ Therefore, as a new effect is seen in this case, let there be merely the postulation of a new power for the impressions the existence of which has already been inferred from other effects. The postulation of a *sphoṭa* is not right, because the effect in question is explained by postulating a mere power for the impressions the existence of which is already ascertained and, therefore, the need for any presumption (*arthāpatti*) disappears.⁴

[1. Impressions or residual traces (saṃskāras) are of two kinds: (1) those that, when awakened, cause remembrance (2) those that cause an effect other than remembrance. The present discussion proceeds on the assumption that Śābara, in his Bhāṣya on Mī. Sū. I, 1.5 referred to before, has the former kind in mind.

2. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 99.

3. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 102.

4. Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is resorted to in order to explain a fact which is otherwise inexplicable. The fact to be explained in this case is the understanding of meaning. If it can be explained by attributing a new power to an entity (the impressions) already known to exist, the need to presume the existence of another entity the *sphoṭa*, would naturally disappear, See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 105]

तदिदमसमञ्जसमिव लक्ष्यते । तथा हि—

शक्तेः शक्त्यन्तरायोगस्तत्र सत्यप्यदर्शनम् ।

विलक्षणस्योपजनो नाविशेषाच्च कारणात् ॥ ७ ॥

ज्ञानान्तरोपजनगोचरं सामर्थ्यमेवात्मनि प्राचीनविज्ञानाहितनिवेशं संस्कार-
माचक्षते धीराः । न च सामर्थ्यानां सामर्थ्यान्तरयोगः, अनवस्थापातात् । अपि च

क्रमव्यतिक्रमभावितपूर्ववर्णसम्पादितसंस्कारसद्भावेऽपि नार्याधिगमः समीक्ष्यते । तन्नासौ तद्वेतुर्भवितुमर्हति । न खलु क्रममेवेऽपि प्रत्येकमक्षरोपलम्भप्रभाविताः संस्काराः परस्परमतिशेरेते । अपि च अन्यत्रासमीक्षितैवंविधस्वभावोऽभिमत एष संस्कारो न विशेषविकलाद्वेतोरुदेतुमुत्सहते । न च वर्णात्मानः प्रत्येकं विशेषवन्तः, नाप्यपरसमवधानमेतान् विशिनष्टि, नियतानुवृत्त्यया असम्भवात् समवधानस्य निरुद्धागामिनोः खलु तदानीमत्यन्तासत्तेरनतिशयतया कार्योपजनोपयोगायोगादित्युक्तम् ॥ ७ ॥

(Answer) This seems to be rather incoherent, for, 7. A power cannot have another power; even when the impressions are there, one does not see (the understanding of meaning); from a cause without any peculiarity, no special result can come.

Wise men give the name of 'impression' (*saṃskāra*) to that power, which exists in the soul, of producing another cognition and which has been brought there through a previous cognition.¹ Powers cannot have power, for that would lead to regressus ad infinitum (*anavasthā*). Moreover no understanding of meaning is seen even in the presence of impressions left by the previous phonemes cognised in a different order. Therefore, the impressions cannot be the cause of the understanding of meaning. Impressions left by the cognitions of individual phonemes cannot differ even when the order is reversed. Secondly, the desired impressions having a character not seen elsewhere cannot be produced from causes possessing no peculiarity. The phonemes, in their own nature, cannot have any peculiarity (in one case not found in other cases). Nor can association with others bring about that peculiarity, because, being uttered in a fixed sequence, there cannot be that association. A phoneme which has totally perished and one which is yet to come, being both equally non-existent, do not differ from each other and, therefore, cannot produce any special impression. (7)

[1. According to G., this sentence is a summary of the arguments used by Kumārila in the Tānt. Vār. on Mī. Sū. 2. 1. 5. to

prove the existence of *apūrva*. There it is shown that *apūrva* exists and that it is a power (*Śakti*). Here, *Samskāra* is looked upon as a power,]

योऽपि मन्यते — न खलु साक्षाद्भावनानां व्यापारमभिधेयप्रत्ययविषयमुपेयः, अपि तु ताभ्यः स्थायित्वेन प्रतिलब्धयौगद्याभ्यः प्रत्ययमृष्टसकलवर्णरूपात्मा एकः प्रत्यय उदेति; तत्र स एव वा तद्विपरिवर्तिनो वा वर्णास्तत्र समधिगतसहभावा जनयन्त्यर्थावबोधमिति वृथा शब्दपरिकल्पनापरिश्रमः । स्मृतौ च सहभावो न प्रत्यक्ष इति चेत्, किमत्र प्रत्यक्षवर्तिना यौगपद्येन ? सर्वथाज्ञाने नैषां तदर्थ्यते; तच्च स्मरणज्ञानेऽस्येव । स चैष प्रत्ययः स्मरणप्रत्यक्षरूपाभ्यामुभयात्मा सदस-द्वर्णरूपावभास्यन्त्यवर्णगोचर इष्यते कैश्चित् । अन्यैस्तु सकलवर्णोपलब्धिनि-बन्धननिखिलभावनावीजजन्मा युगपदखिलवर्णरूपपरामर्शी चरमवर्णप्रत्यक्षोपल-ब्धिसमनन्तरः स्मरणैकरूपः सङ्गीर्यते । क्रमसमधिगतात्मसु न युगपदनुस्मरणमिष्यपि मिथ्या । तथा हि — सकलवादिनामभिमतं पौर्वापर्यालोचितेष्वपि भावेषु समुच्च यावग्राहि ज्ञानम् ; तदनभ्युपगमे हि तत्प्रकारानुपातिषु शतं विंशतिरिति समुच्चयदर्शनं विरुध्यते । तस्माच्छ्रोत्रमनोजन्मभिः क्रमवतीभिरपि बुद्धिभिरववृतेष्वपि वर्णात्मसु पुरस्तात्, परस्तादद्वयमक्रममखिलवर्णरूपावग्राहि स्मरणमवकल्पते । तत्र च प्रतिसंक्रान्तप्रतिविम्बा इव वर्णाः समीक्षितकार्यं प्रत्यनन्तरतां नातिक्रामन्तीति लौकिकवचनमपि समञ्जसम् शब्दार्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे — इति, । शास्त्रकारवचनं च “ भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे ” इति । तदिदमुक्तम् —

“ यद्वा प्रत्यक्षतः पूर्वं क्रमज्ञानेषु यत्परम् ।

समस्तवर्णविज्ञानं तदर्थज्ञानकारणम् ” ॥ इति ।

(Objection.) As for one who argues as follows—¹ We do not say that the impressions directly convey the understanding of the meaning. But from them which, being lasting,² have become simultaneous, there arises a single cognition in which all the phonemes figure. Either this cognition or the phonemes which figure in it³ and are, therefore, simultaneous in it, produce the understanding of the meaning. Therefore, the postulation of the *sphoṭa* is quite useless. If it is contended that this simultaneity is in remembrance and not in perception,

well, the answer is : what is the use of simultaneity in perception ? It would be required if the phonemes could not be cognised simultaneously in any way (*survathā*)⁴ but there is simultaneous cognition of them in remembrance. According to some, this cognition is of a complex nature, being both perception and remembrance in which figure present and past phonemes and has the last phoneme as the object. Others have declared it to be exclusively remembrance, produced by the seeds in the form of the impressions caused by the cognitions of all the phonemes, revealing all the phonemes at the same time and arising immediately after the perception of the last phoneme.⁵ It would also be wrong to hold that it is not possible to remember at the same time things which were perceived in a sequence. Because all the disputants accept the possibility of a cognition in which figure a whole collection of things perceived in a sequence. If such a cognition were not accepted, knowledge which finds expression in such words as 'hundred' 'twenty' in regard to things perceived in a sequence, would be inexplicable.⁶ Therefore, in regard to phonemes which were at first perceived by the ear and the mind in different cognitions in a sequence, there arises later on a remembrance which is indivisible, which has no sequence within it, in which all the phonemes figure⁷. The phonemes which are, so to speak, reflected in such a remembrance, are not incapable of accomplishing the desired result and thus the layman's statement. 'we understand the meaning from the word' and the specialist's statement 'through the verb, one expresses action' are both justified. This is what is meant in the following—

“The cognition of all the phonemes which takes place after they have been separately cognised in a sequence, is the cause of the understanding of the meaning.”⁸

[1. A second interpretation of Śabara's statement : *Pūrvavarṇajanitasamśkārasahito* ' *utyō varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ* ' (Śab. Bhā. on Mī. Sū. I. 1.5) is now being given. According to the previous interpretation, the cognition of the final phoneme, accompanied by the impressions of the cognitions of the previous phonemes, conveys the

meaning. In the present interpretation, all the phonemes *together* convey the meaning.

2. *Sthāyitvena*. They are said to be lasting because they last till they have produced their effect, namely, the understanding of the meaning.

3. The two alternatives are based on Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 109, 116.

4. The text here is : *Sarvathājñāne naiṣāṁ tadarthayate*. The commentator does not seem to have had *na* before *eṣāṁ*. Without it, the meaning is a better one. I have, therefore, omitted it in my translation.

5. See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 111, 112.

6. See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 113, 114.

7. See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 115, 116.

8. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 109,]

तस्यापि

पूर्वोपलब्धिभेदेऽपि भवेदर्शस्य दर्शनम् ।

एकोपलब्धौ नैतेषां भेदः कश्चन लक्ष्यते ॥ ८ ॥

पूर्वोपलब्ध्योऽपि हि क्रमविशेषवत्यः परिगृहीताभिमतविपरीतानुपूर्व्या अक्रमाद्यैकवक्तृप्रयुक्तवर्णविषया विपरीताश्च न पश्चाद्वाविन्यां समस्तवर्णावभासिन्यामुपलब्धावनुविपरिवर्तमानान् वर्णात्मनो भिन्दन्ति; असम्प्राप्तनिरन्वयनिरुद्धयोर्विशेषाभावादित्युक्तम् । एकोपलब्धौ तु यौगपद्यान्नुपूर्विको विशेषः । न चेदमिह समीचीनम् उपलम्भगोचरमिदं यौगपद्यम्, नोपलब्ध्यविषयम्; उपलब्ध्या हि वर्णाः क्रमविशेषभाज एवैकया प्रख्यया प्रख्यायन्त इति । तथा हि स्वतो वर्णा नित्यतया विमुक्तया च न देशनिबन्धनं नापि कालनिबन्धनं परापरभावमनुपतन्तीति प्रख्याननिबन्धन एव समुपाश्रीयते । तच्चेदमद्वयमक्रमम्, यद्विपरिवर्तिनस्ते ऽर्थप्रत्ययहेतवः । न चेदं पूर्वोपलब्धिसंबन्धिनीं परापरतां गोचरयति, वर्णावलम्बितया तदुपलब्धीनामविषयीकरणेन; न चासमीहितावध्यवधिमद्भावं पौर्वापर्यं

प्रत्येतुमर्हति; न चैकस्मिन्नानावर्णावयवात्मनि पदे भिन्नमवध्यवधिमद्वावमपेक्षितुं क्षमते; प्रतिवर्णोपलम्भनप्रभावितानि च भावनावीजानि कामं संहतिसमासादनादेकमनेकावलम्बि स्मरणं जनयेयुः, तावता चरितार्थेभ्यो नापरो वर्णात्मसु विशेषो लभ्यते । तथा च सति यथाकथंचित् पुरस्तादधिगतसंवेदनेभ्यः सकलसंस्कारजन्मनि चरमसमधिगमेऽतिशयविरहादर्थपरिच्छेदः स्यात्; न चैवं दृश्यते । ततस्तदतिरिच्यमाननिमित्तावातजन्मायमित्यनुमीयते ।

अनेनैतदप्यपाकृतं भवति

इत्थं क्रमगृहीतानां युगपद्यायवा परा ।

स्थितिः सा कारणं तु स्यान्नियमर्थधियं प्रति ॥

इति । भेदाभावाच्चिरानन्तरास्तमितानुपजातानामविशेषात्; असति तदन्वये क्वचित् सदा प्रतीतिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ८ ॥

To him, the following answer is given.

8. Even if the previous cognitions vary, there would be understanding of meaning, because in the (final) single cognition, no variation would be noticed.

Previous cognitions having a particular sequence or one different from it or having no sequence at all,¹ having as objects phonemes uttered by the same speaker or otherwise, do not make any difference to the essence of the phonemes which figure in the later cognition which reveals all the phonemes at the same time. Because, as has been said already, there is no difference between that which has never been and that which has perished without leaving any trace. In a single cognition (in which many figure at the same time) there cannot be any distinction based on sequence, just because of the simultaneity (of the things which figure in it). Nor would it do to argue as follows—"This simultaneity relates, not to what are cognised, but to their cognition. It is the phonemes which are perceived and they have sequence and it is they which are cognised by a single remembrance." Because, in themselves, the phonemes are eternal and all-pervasive and

therefore, they have no sequence temporal or spatial; hence sequence based on their cognition is resorted to. And that cognition is indivisible and has no sequence within it the phonemes figuring in which are the cause of the understanding of meaning. This cognition does not relate to the sequence of the previous perceptions of the phonemes, because it relates to the phonemes themselves and not to their perceptions; nor can it embrace the sequence because it does not require any relation of limit and delimited (*avadhi* and *avadhimat*); nor does it, in regard to the word which is one even though composed of different phonemes, depend upon any relation of limit and delimited which involves plurality. The impressions caused by the perceptions of the individual phonemes may well cause a single remembrance embracing all the phonemes, because of their having been collected together.² Having thus accomplished their task, they do not bring about any further distinction in the phonemes. Thus, it should be possible, because of the absence of any distinction, to understand the meaning from the phonemes perceived anyhow (*yathākathā-mcit*) before and now figuring together in the final cognition produced by all the impressions together. That is just what does not happen. Therefore, one must infer that the understanding of meaning is caused by something which is different from them. And that disposes of the following statement—

“Or the later simultaneity of the phonemes thus perceived in a sequence would be the inevitable cause of the understanding of meaning.”³

Because there is no difference (between the two simultaneities)⁴, considering that there cannot be any difference between that which perished long ago, that which has perished in the immediate past and that which was never produced at all. In the absence of something else with which it is connected, there would always be understanding of meaning (and that is just what does not happen.)” (8)

[1. If the phonemes of a word are uttered by different speakers at the same time, there would be no sequence.

2. This is said to allay a doubt which might arise here as to how one does not remember the sequence when one remembers the

phonemes perceived in a sequence. It is being argued here that, according to the Mīmāṃsaka himself, the final remembrance in which all the phonemes figure cannot also embrace the order in which the phonemes were previously perceived, because order is a property of the perception and not of phonemes. Sequence does not actually figure in the final remembrance. The collection of the impressions left by the previous perceptions of the phonemes will have finished its task once it has caused the remembrance in which all the phonemes figure.

3. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 108.

4. The two simultaneities are : (1) the simultaneity resulting from all phonemes being eternal and all-pervasive. (2) the simultaneity resulting from all the phonemes of a word figuring at the same time in the final remembrance. The former cannot cause the understanding of the meaning whereas the latter, the Mīmāṃsaka argues, can do so. See Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 107, 108.]

न च समुच्चयज्ञानोपारोहि वर्णनिबन्धनार्थबोधाभिप्रायम्—शब्दादर्थं प्रति-
पद्यामहे - इति, नापि शब्दजात्यभिप्रायम् । तथा हि—

नेक्षिता जातिशब्दानां समुदायानुपात्तिता ।

जातिमाचक्षते ते हि व्यक्तीर्वा जातिसङ्गताः ॥ ९ ॥

न तावदिदं शब्दजात्यभिप्रायम्; न शब्दजातितोऽर्थप्रतीतिः, गवाश्वा-
दिपदेषु तद्विशेषादभिधेयाविशेषप्रसङ्गात् । न चानुपाश्रितव्यावृत्तयो व्यक्तयो
जात्यात्मना निर्दिश्यन्त इति साम्प्रतम्, वर्णव्यक्तिसामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात्—गोशब्दा-
दर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे—इति । नापि शब्दव्यक्त्यभिप्रायम्, तद्वेदात्—गोशब्दात्—
इत्येकवचनानुपपत्तेः न हि व्यक्तिविशेषपरास्तदभिधायिसामानाधिकरणवृत्तयो
जातिशब्दा जातिसंख्यामनुरुध्यन्ते; न जातु भवति—देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ ब्राह्मणः—
इति,—धवखदिरौ वृक्षः—इति वा । नापि समुदायाभिप्रायम्, जातिशब्दाना-
मेकैकव्यक्तिसमवायेन जातेः समुदायनिवेशशून्यतया तदनुपातसामर्थ्याभावेन;

ते हि जातिं तद्वतीर्ग व्यक्तीर्निमित्तरूपोपादानेनाचक्षते, न समूहम्; न हि भवति यथा धवादीनां वनम् धवादिवनम्—इति वा, तथा धवादीनां वृक्षः धवादिवृक्षः इति—वा ।

The statement current in the world, namely, “we understand the meaning from the word,” does not relate to the understanding of meaning from the phonemes which figure in the collective cognition. Nor does it relate to the word considered as a universal.

9. One does not see words expressive of universals denoting a collection of things. They either denote the universals or the individuals in which the universals inhere.

This statement cannot refer to the word considered as a universal, because no meaning is understood from the word considered as a universal. If meaning can be understood from the word as a universal, the same meaning would be understood from the words ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ because the universal, namely, ‘wordness’ exists in both the words. Nor would it do to maintain that the statement really refers to individuals whose distinctions are ignored and, therefore, are presented as the universal, because we sometimes see the expression ‘word’ used in apposition to words in the form of individual phonemes as in the sentence : we understand the meaning from the word ‘cow’. Nor does the expression ‘from the word’ in the worldly statement refer to the individual words, because there are many of them and the singular number in ‘from the word cow’ would become wrong; words expressive of universals, used to denote individuals and in apposition with words expressive of individuals, do not take a number appropriate to the universal. Nobody says : Devadatta and Yajñadatta, a Brāhmaṇa or Dhava and Khadira, a tree. Nor does the expression ‘from the word’ in the worldly statement refer to a collection (of phonemes). A universal inheres in each individual, it does not refer to a collection and, therefore, words expressive of universals have no capacity to denote a collection. They denote either universals or individuals in which the universal inheres, but not a collection

of individuals. Just as one can say, a forest of Dhavas or Dhava-forest, in the same way, one cannot say, 'a tree of dhavas' or 'dhavas-tree'.

ननु दृष्टः समुदायानुपाती जातिशब्दः — सहकाराः वनम् — इति सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात् । न; समूहिनीर्व्यक्तीराचक्षाणस्य समूहसमूहिनोरभेदविवक्षायां सामानाधिकरण्यम् ; तथा च बहुवचनम् ; अन्यथा तदनुपातिन एकवचनं स्यात्, वनशब्दवत् । न चेह तथा, समुदायशब्दाभावात् । गौः — इति गक्रारादीनां विभक्तैरात्मभिरुपादानात् । बहुवचनाभावाच्च । अत एव च न समाहारनिर्देशः, न हि भवति — धवखदिरं वृक्षमानय इति, अपि तु धवखदिरं वृक्षौ — इति, समूहसमूहिनोरभेदोपचारात् । नाप्यन्यवर्णाभिप्रायम्, पूर्ववर्णपरामर्शनात् । तस्मान्नैकं शब्दात्मानमन्तरेण लौकिकवचनोपपत्तिः ।

स्यान्मतम् — मोपपादि, लौकिकवचनानामुभयथापि दर्शनादुपपन्नार्थानामनुपपन्नार्थानां च; न हि वचनानुपपत्तिमात्रेण प्रमाणरहितोऽर्थः शक्योऽवगन्तुमिति ।

तदसत् । अनुपपन्नार्थत्वाप्रतीतेः, भवति हि जरद्ववादेवाक्येष्वनुपपन्नार्थप्रतीतिः, न त्विह तथा; न हि सार्वलौकिकमविगानेन प्रयोगपथमवतरत्यनुपपत्तिरुपपत्तिमती; विप्रतिपद्यमाना अपि हि शब्दे नैनं प्रयोगं नानुमन्यन्ते । न चाप्रमाणकत्वम् ; नूनमुपलभन्ते प्रमाणेन शब्दात्मानमेकम् ; यत एवमपहस्तित-विप्रतिपत्तयः प्रयुज्यन्ते । तस्मान्न पश्चात्तनज्ञाननिवेशिभ्यो वर्णेभ्योऽर्थप्रत्ययः ॥९॥

(Objection). Well, there are words expressive of universals sometimes standing for a collection, because we have expressions like 'mango trees, a forest' (*sahakārāḥ vanam*) in which the word mango-tree, expressive of a universal, is in apposition to the word forest (*vanam*) expressive of a collection.

(Answer) This is really not so. The word mango-trees (*sahakārāḥ*) really denotes individual trees which form the collection and it is used in apposition to the word forest (*vana*) by ignoring the distinction between the collection and the things which belong to the collection. And that is why there

is plural number (in the word mango-trees-*sahakārāḥ*)¹. Otherwise, it should have the singular number just like the word 'forest' (*vana*). Here (i. e. in the worldly statement) that is not the case, because in it there is no word at all expressive of collection. In the word '*gauḥ*', the individual phonemes are presented in their separate forms (and not as a collection) and there is no plural number.² And that is why it (the word *gauḥ*) is not a case of a collective compound (*samāhāra*). Nobody says : bring the tree, dhava and khadira but everybody says; bring the trees, dhava and khadira. The two words, (though not in the same number) are in apposition to each other, because the collection and the things belonging to the collection are identified through courtesy. Nor does the worldly statement refer to the final phoneme, because the previous phonemes have also been referred to. Therefore the worldly statement becomes inexplicable without the postulation of a single word-essence.

It might be said : let it be inexplicable ! Worldly statements are seen to be of both kinds; some whose meanings are alright and others whose meanings are not. Simply because of the inexplicability of a worldly statement, one cannot accept something without proof.

But this is wrong. Because it is not felt that it (the worldly statement) has an inexplicable meaning. In the case of sentences like *jaradgavaḥ etç*,³ one does have such a feeling. That is not so here. To impute inexplicability to something which is used by everybody without any difficulty is unreasonable. Even those who disagree on the question of the word (i. e. the *spṛṣṭa*) approve of the worldly statement. Nor is there any lack of proof. There is proof for the existence of the single word-essence. People use the worldly statement being free from all doubt and controversy. Therefore, the meaning is not understood from the phonemes which figure in the later cognition. (9)

[1. Those who hold that the word conveys the universal primarily, i. e. through its function called *abhidhā* explain that the individual in which the universal inheres is understood through

lakṣaṇā, the requisite relation being *samavāya*. The question is : can the collection also be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* ? The answer given is that it cannot. In the expression : *sahakārāḥ vanam*, the first word is expressive of the universal, whereas the latter denotes a collection. The two words are in apposition to each other and yet one cannot say that the first word denotes the collection by *lakṣaṇā*, though it may denote the universal by *abhidhā*. The very fact that it is put in the plural number shows that it denotes the individuals by *lakṣaṇā* and not the collection. The two words have been put in apposition to each other only by ignoring the difference between the collection and things belonging to the collection.

2. Even what has happened in the expression *sahakārāḥ vanam*, namely, attribution of identity (*abheda*) even though there is difference, has not taken place in the worldly statement. *gośabdād artham pratipadyāmahe*, because, in that statement, there is no word expressive of collection nor the plural number suggestive of the ignoring of *bheda* for the sake of *abheda*.

3. G. quotes the following full verse :—

*Jaradgavaḥ kambalapādukābhyām dvāri sthito gāyati madra-
kāni; tam brāhmaṇī prcchati putrakāmā rājan rumāyām laṣunasya
ko'rthaḥ.]*

अस्तु तर्हि पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्त्यो वर्णो वाचक इत्येव; मा भूदेप ज्ञानप्रसवः स्मरणनिमित्तं संस्कारः, अपि तु यागादिकर्मभेदोपपादित इव स्वर्गादिनिमित्तमपूर्वाभिधानोऽन्त्य एव नियतक्रमकर्तृभेदप्रयुक्तवर्णविज्ञानोपाहितोऽर्थधिगमफलः, यथा चापूर्वाभिधानभावनोपजने कर्तृक्रमनियमोपयोगावगमः शास्त्रसामर्थ्यात्, तथेहापि कार्यव्यवस्थादर्शनसामर्थ्यात् कर्तृक्रमनियमोपयोगावगमः । संस्कारापेक्षिणश्चान्त्यवर्णस्य प्रत्यायकत्वान्न शब्दस्याप्रत्यायकत्वम्, येन शब्दार्थसंवन्धहानिः स्यात्; न हीतिकर्तव्यतापेक्षित्वं कारकाणां कारकतां विहन्ति, सर्वत्र व्याहृतिप्रसङ्गात्; पूर्वोऽपि च वर्णाः संस्काराभिधानव्यापारो मया यथास्वमभिधेयप्रत्ययमुपादधाना नाप्रत्यायकाः; न हि स्वव्यापारव्यायः कारकाणां कारकतां

विहन्ति, मोघानि सर्वत्रेति । न च संस्कारोपजनार्थं शब्दोच्चारणम् । अपि त्वर्थप्रतीत्युद्देशेन । न चेदं चतुरश्रम्, तुल्यायामदृष्टकल्पनायां कः संस्कारेऽनुरोधः — इति, संस्कारकल्पनाया अवश्यंभाविनीत्वात् । तथा हि — यस्याध्यनवयवः शब्दात्मार्यप्रतीतिनिमित्तं ध्वनितो वर्णतो वा प्रतिलब्धाभिध्यक्त्यनुग्रहः प्रकाशते, तस्यापि नानपेक्षितेरेतरा वर्णा ध्वनयो वा तमवद्योनर्यान्तः तस्यार्थस्याप्रकाशनात्; अत्रयवशस्त्वद्योतनमनाशङ्कनीयमेव, तदभावादप्रत्ययाच्च; नापि संहताः नियत-क्रमवृत्तिवाद् दृष्टप्रकारविपर्यये चेति तुल्यः पर्यनुयोगः । तदनेनापि विशिष्टः संस्कारोऽवद्याभ्युपेयः स्फोटोभिव्यक्तिसिद्धये; तथा च तत एवार्थाधिगमः सेत्स्य-तीति न स्फोटकल्पनावीजमस्तीति । तदुक्तम् — “शब्दकल्पनायां सा च शब्दकल्पना च” इति ।

तथा

“सद्भावव्यतिरेकौ च तथावयववर्जनम् ।

तत्राधिकं भवेत्तस्माद्यत्नोऽसावर्थबुद्धिषु” ॥ इति ॥

(Objection.) Well then, let the original proposition stand, namely, ‘that the last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions of the previous phonemes, expresses the meaning.’ Let not ‘impression’ here mean that which is produced by cognition and which is the cause of remembrance, but something else¹ which is brought about by the cognition of the phonemes uttered separately in a fixed order by a particular speaker and leading to the understanding of meaning and it is similar to the effect called *apūrva* (residual force) brought about by the performance of the different rites like a sacrifice and leading to heaven. Just as we understand the need for a fixed order and agent for the production of the residual force from the purposiveness of scripture, in the same way, here also we understand the need for a fixed order and agent from the purposiveness of the effect being regulated. Simply because it is the last phoneme, depending upon the previous impressions, which causes understanding of the meaning, it does not mean that it is not the word which does it nor that the eternal relation between the word and the meaning is

impaired. Dependence upon mode of performance does not take away the causality of a cause.² If it does here, it should do so everywhere. Nor are the previous phonemes inexpressive, in as much as, through their impressions, they also help in the understanding of the meaning. A cause does not cease to be a cause simply because between it and the effect comes its own function. If it did so here, it would do so everywhere. Words are not uttered in order that they may leave impressions, but in order to convey a meaning.⁴ Nor would it do to question this insistence on the impression on the ground that *tṛ* is just like the unitary word, i. e. something invisible. Because the postulation of impressions is inevitable. It is like this : He who maintains that the indivisible word suggested by the sounds or the phonemes, is the cause of the understanding of meaning, must necessarily accept that the sounds or phonemes suggest the word by depending upon one another, because the indivisible word cannot come from a single sound or phoneme. Nor can the word be revealed in parts, because it has none and they are not perceived either. Nor can the sounds or phonemes reveal the word together because they exist in a fixed sequence and if they could still reveal it together, they should be able to do it even when the ordinary procedure is reversed. Thus the objection (against the theory of the indivisible word manifested by the phonemes) is the same as against their conveying of the meaning⁵. Therefore, to establish the suggestion of *sphoṭa*, one has to have recourse to a special kind of impression. Why not attribute the conveying of meaning to such an impression ? Thus there is no ground for postulating *sphoṭa*. As has been said :

“In postulating the word (*sphoṭa*), there is the postulation of a special kind of impression and that of the word.”⁶

“ You, the protagonist of the *sphoṭa*, have to postulate several extra things : the existence of the *sphoṭa*, its distinction from phonemes, its indivisibility. Therefore, it is better to assume that the special impression which has to be postulated conveys the meaning (rather than that it reveals the word.”⁷)

[1. Another kind of impression than the one which causes remembrance is now being postulated by the Mīmāṃsaka on the basis of results which would otherwise remain inexplicable. The reasoning is found in the following verse quoted by G.

Pramāṇavantyadr̥ṣṭāni

Kalpyāni subahūnyapi

Adr̥ṣṭaśatabhāgo pi

na kalpyo hyapramāṇataḥ

2. Cf. Śl. Vār. (*Sambandhākṣepa*) 36, 37.
3. Cf. Śl. Vār. (*Sph.*) 125.
4. Cf. Śl. Vār. (*Sph.*) 128.
5. Cf. Śl. Vār. (*Sph.*) 91, 92, 93.
6. Śab. Bhā. on Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 5 (p. 48, Ānandāśrama edition)
7. Śl. Vār. (*Sph.*) 94]

अत्रोच्यते

अपूर्वमिव नैवान्यः संस्कारः स्फोटवादिनः ।

प्रकृतवासनारूपाद्यया स्याद्द्वर्णवादिनः ॥ १० ॥

वर्णवादी हि कर्ममेदजन्यमपूर्वमिवात्यन्तारिदृष्टमर्थसमधिगमनिमित्तं वर्णविज्ञानजन्मानं संस्कारं परिकल्पयति, न तु प्रकृतवासनाभिधानसंस्कारनिवन्धनोऽर्थप्रत्ययोऽस्य सिध्यति; अन्योऽपलब्धिप्रतिलब्धजन्मनो भावनाया अन्यत्र ज्ञानहेतुत्वायोगात् अतिप्रसङ्गादित्युक्तम्, कार्यमेदे कारणैकत्वायोगात्; स्फोटोपलब्धिनिवन्धनस्तु भावनाभिधान एव संस्कार इति वक्ष्यते । अतो नास्यात्यन्तारिदृष्टपरिकल्पनादोषः । दृष्टस्यैव सन्निधिमात्रानुमानमिति ॥ १० ॥

This is answered as follows—

10. As in the case of the upholder of the expressive power of the phonemes, the protagonist of *sphoṭa* does not

postulate an impression (*saṃskāra*) different from the well-known one called disposition (*vāsanā*) and analogous to the residual force (of the sacrifice.)

The upholder of the expressive power of the phonemes postulates the existence of an impression, born of the cognition of the phonemes and leading to the understanding of the meaning and resembling the residual force (*apūrvā*) produced by the performance of the sacrifice. He cannot explain the understanding of meaning through the well-known kind of residual impression called disposition (*vāsanā*, which is the cause of remembrance) because such an impression which is caused by one thing cannot bring about the cognition of something else. Otherwise, as has been said,¹ there would be other undue possibilities (*atiprasaṅgāt*). When the effects are different, the cause cannot be the same. As to the cognition of the *sphoṭa*, this is caused by the same kind of impression called impulse (*bhāvanā*). This is going to be stated later.² Therefore, the upholder of the *sphoṭa* does not postulate anything totally unknown. He only infers the presence of something which is already known. (10)

[1. See Verse 7

2. See verse 18]

अपि च—

कर्तृक्रमादिनियमात्तत्रादृष्टस्य भूयसः ।

कल्पनाम्नानसामर्थ्यादिह तस्यास्तु हीयते ॥ ११ ॥

दर्शयदूर्ध्वविषये हि कर्तृक्रमादिनियमनिमित्तं बहुतरमदृष्टमगत्या शास्त्रसामर्थ्यात् कल्प्यते, न त्विह तथा, गत्यन्तरसम्भवात्, प्रत्यक्षप्रयत्नभेदसाध्यध्वनिभेदप्रकाशितशब्दविशेषलभ्यत्वादर्थप्रत्ययस्य । तथा हि प्रयक्षः प्रयत्नभेदः, कारणभेदानुविधायी च कार्यभेदः प्रतीयत एव, वर्णवाद्यपि च नैव व्यञ्जकध्वनिभेदमपहुते, वर्णभेदसिद्धेस्तदधीनत्वात्, शब्दभेदमात्रं तु कल्प्यम्, न वा तदपि, तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वादित्युपपादयिष्यामः । अपि च अनेकादृष्टकल्पनायास्त्रस्यता नैकः

M. M...3

शब्दोऽभ्युपेयते तत्र कर्तृक्रमादिनियमगतमदृष्टमपरं बहु कल्पयता किं तत् परिहृतं भवति ? यदि परं लौकिकी प्रतीतिः - शब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे, 'सिद्धे शब्दार्थसंबन्धे' इति च शास्त्रप्रतीतिः संस्कारस्याशब्दत्वात्, अन्यवर्णस्य चाप्रत्यायकत्वात् समुदायस्याशब्दत्वात्, अप्रत्यायकत्वाच्चेत्युक्तम् - इति ॥ ११ ॥

Moreover

11. In the other case, one postulates, on the authority of Scripture, much invisible effect produced by restrictions as to agent, sequence etc. Here, on the other hand, one abstains from such postulations.

In the case of the residual force of ceremonies like the New Moon sacrifice, one postulates, because there is no other way, a good deal of invisible effect produced by restrictions as to agent, sequence etc.¹ That is not the case here, because there is some other way. Understanding of meaning is caused by particular words, manifested by particular sounds, brought about by clearly visible particular efforts. It is like this : Diversity of effort is clearly visible. It is obvious that a difference in the cause leads to a difference in the effect. The upholder of the phoneme does not deny any diversity in the manifesting sounds, because diversity of the phonemes depends upon it.² The only thing which has to be postulated is the word (over and above the phonemes.) In fact, even that need not be postulated because it is directly perceptible, as will be proved.³ Moreover, through fear of postulating many invisible things, the upholder of the phoneme does not accept the single (indivisible) word; but in assuming much invisible effect due to restrictions as to agent, sequence etc. is he avoiding it ? (All that is being avoided is) the vindication of the worldly saying : "We understand the meaning from the word" and the statement of the science of Grammar : the word, meaning and their relation being eternal."⁴ Because, it has been said that the impressions, after all, do not constitute the word, the final phoneme is not expressive, a collection of phonemes does not constitute the word and it is not expressive any way. (11)

[1. Cf. Tant. Vār. p. 399.

2. G. quotes the following verse where the argument behind this statement is clearly stated.

*Yatrobhayoḥ samo doṣaḥ
parihāro' pi vā samaḥ,
Naikaḥ paryanuyuktavyaḥ
Tādṛgarthavicāraṇe.*

“ Where both the disputants are in the same difficulty and both have the same way of avoiding it, one only of the two should not be taunted when such matters are being discussed. ”

3. See Verse 19.

4. Vā. I. of the Paspasāhnikā.]

न संस्कारविशेषश्च युक्तो हेत्वविशेषतः ।
अन्यसन्निधितो भेदो नास्य नापि स्वरूपतः ॥ १२ ॥

द्विविधा हि हेतवः कार्यानिशयमुपकल्पयितुं क्षमन्ते - स्वरूपतो वातिशय-
शालिनः, सहकारिसमवधानप्रकट्यतातिशया वा । तत्र न स्वरूपभेद एवमुपेयते ।
नाप्यपरसमवधाननिबन्धनः, नियतक्रमवृत्तितयानापन्नयौगपद्यत्वेन । यद्यपि च
पूर्वोपहितात्मनः संस्कारस्य स्थेम्ना तत्सन्निधिरुत्तरमतिशययेत्, प्राचीनस्य तु
नापरसमवधाननिबन्धनः, नाप्यात्मना भेद इति कथमिव सोऽर्थप्रत्ययानुगुणं
संस्कारमादधीत ?

येऽपि स्वरूपभेदमेव वर्णानां प्रतिपदमास्थिषत, तेषामसौ सन्नपि
नोपकारकः, ब्रह्मानपरामर्शविकल्पस्य भेदस्य ज्ञापनायोगात्, न हि सत्तामात्रेण
श्रुतयोऽर्थप्रत्ययानाङ्गतामुपयन्ति ॥ १२ ॥

12. No peculiarity in the impression is possible, because there is none in its cause. Nor can any peculiarity arise in it due to association or its own nature.

Two kinds of causes are capable of bringing about a peculiarity in their effects : (1) those that have a peculiarity in their own nature (2) those that acquire a peculiarity through association. These (the phonemes) have no peculiarity in their own nature.¹ Nor can there be any due to association, because they have a fixed sequence and, therefore, they cannot be simultaneous. Even though the impression left by the previous phoneme is lasting and its presence can bring about a peculiarity in the next phoneme, the very first one cannot have any peculiarity due to association or due to its own nature. Therefore, how can it produce an impression favourable to the understanding of meaning ? As for those who hold that a phoneme occurring in different words is not the same, but is slightly different in its nature, this difference even if it exists, is ineffective, because a difference which is not realised in cognition is not capable of helping in the understanding of meaning. Sounds (or words) do not, by their mere existence, become the cause of the understanding of meaning. (12)

[1. That is the implication of the statement :

Pūrvavarṇajanitasaṁskārasahito'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ
(Śab.. Bhā. on Mī. Sū. 1.1.5.)]

न चान्यवर्णमात्रस्य पुरः संबन्धवेदनम् ।
अक्षवर्मातिवृत्तत्वात् संस्कारस्य न तद्वत् ॥ १३ ॥

विदितसंगतयो हि शब्दा यथास्वमर्थान् प्रकाशयन्ति । न चान्यवर्णमात्र-
मर्थसंबन्धितया प्रतिपद्यन्ते पुरस्तात्, मा भूत् केवलादर्थविज्ञानमिति । नापि
संस्कारविशेषणम्, तस्यातिपतितेन्द्रियविषयसीम्नः साक्षादवेदनात्, अर्थप्रकाश-
लक्षणस्य च फलस्य तदानीमसत्त्वादनुमानाप्रवृत्तेः, अपरिगते विशेषणे च विशिष्ट
प्रतीतेरप्रवृत्तेः, अप्रत्ययविपरिवर्तिनश्च संबन्धबोधवैधुर्यादतिप्रसंगाच्च । नन्वेष
शब्देऽपि तुल्यप्रसङ्गः । न, तस्यैन्द्रियकत्वादित्युपपादयिष्यते । किमर्थस्तर्ह्य-
नुमानपरिश्रमः ? यः खलु कुतश्चिद् भ्रमनिबन्धनात् संवेदनमप्यवजानीते, तं प्रत्यनुमानं
साक्षिस्थानीयमुपन्यस्यते ॥ १३ ॥

13. The final phoneme only was not understood before¹ (*purah*) as connected with meaning. And as the residual impression (of the previous phonemes) is beyond the range of the senses, the final phoneme, as associated with it, is not connected with meaning either.

Words, whose connection with meanings is previously known, convey their respective meanings. People do not previously understand the final phoneme only as expressive of meaning, lest the final phoneme only (without the cooperation of the previous ones) should be capable of conveying the meaning. Nor does the final phoneme, associated with the impression (of the previous phonemes) convey it, because it (the impression) is beyond the range of the senses and is not directly perceived. The effect, namely, the understanding of the meaning, does not then (at the time of the understanding of the relation between word and meaning) exist; therefore one cannot infer the impression as its cause.² When the attribute is not cognised, one cannot cognise something as qualified by it. One cannot cognise a relation with something which does not figure in knowledge. If one did, one would understand the relation of everything with everything else.

Are not all these objections applicable to the theory of the indivisible word also ?

No. Because it is going to be shown that it (the indivisible word) is within the range of the senses.

Why then all this trouble to make use of inference ?

Inference is put forward as a kind of witness to convince one who, through some mistake, denies even direct experience. (13)

[1. *Purah*—before i e. at the time when the relation between a particular word and its meaning is understood by the learner.

2. Though verse 13 only speaks about the impression being beyond the range of perception (*akṣavartma*), the commentary

points out that it is beyond the range of inference also. G. goes further and points out that it is beyond the range of *upamāna* and *arthāpatti*, in fact, of all the positive means of valid knowledge.]

निरुद्धबुद्धयो नैव पूर्वं वर्णा विशेषकाः ।

एकबुद्धानुपारोहे क्रमाद्यस्तमुपागतम् ॥ १४ ॥

अथापि स्यात् - पूर्वं वर्णा भेत्तार इति, न, तदैवास्तमितोपलब्धिवात्, सत्तामात्रेण चाभेदकत्वात्, सकलसद्भावाविशेषादैकपक्षप्रसङ्गात्, सकलोपलम्भ प्रभावितभावनाबीजजन्मनि चरमे प्रत्यये स्यात् सहभावाविशेषकत्वम्, तत्र तु क्रमादिभेदप्रत्यस्तमयात् अस्तमितक्रमादिभेदानां च सामर्थ्याख्यापनात् यथा कथञ्चिदपि पुरःपरिगतरूपेभ्य एकोपलब्धिप्रकाशिभ्यः स्यादर्थप्रत्यय इत्युक्तम् इति ॥ १४ ॥

14. The previous phonemes whose cognitions have already disappeared cannot specify the last phoneme. If they all figure in a single cognition (in the form of remembrance) sequence etc. disappear.

If it be said that the previous phonemes modify it, well, no! Their cognitions disappear then and there. They cannot modify (the last phoneme) merely because they exist. As all the phonemes are in the same position as far as existence is concerned, they would all constitute one word. The previous ones can perhaps specify the final one if they all figure simultaneously in a final cognition (in the form of remembrance) produced by the residual impressions of the cognitions of all of them. But then, sequence etc. would disappear in that final remembrance and phonemes whose sequence etc. have disappeared have no capacity to convey meaning. If they had, the position would be that one can understand the meaning from phonemes figuring in one cognition no matter how they were previously perceived. This has already been said. (14)

न प्रत्ययः स्यादेकत्वे प्रयोक्तुरविभाविते ।

न च तस्य परिज्ञानमकस्मादवकल्पते ॥ १५ ॥

इदं चैष वर्णवादी प्रष्टव्यः किमियमनानाप्रयोक्तृकर्तार्थज्ञानाङ्गम्, न वेति ।
तत्रानङ्गत्वे वक्तृभेदेऽपि तत् स्यात्, न चेप्यते, दृश्यते वा । एवं ह्युक्तम् -

तेषां तु गुणभूतानामर्थप्रत्यायनं प्रति ।
साहित्यभेककर्त्रादि क्रमश्चापि विवक्षितः ॥
वक्त्रेकत्वनिमित्ते च क्रमे सति नियामकम् ।
प्रयुञ्जानस्य यत् पूर्वं वृद्धेभ्यः क्रमदर्शनम् ॥
यौगपद्यं त्वशक्यत्वान्न च तेषामिहाश्रितम् ।
कर्तृभेदश्च तत्र स्यान्न चैवं दृश्यतेऽभिधा ॥

इति । अङ्गत्वे तु ज्ञापकानुप्रवेशान्नानवधारितार्थप्रतीतिसिद्धौ हेतुः । दृश्यते च
व्यवहिततिरोहितोदीरितेभ्यो वर्णेभ्योऽर्थज्ञानम्, न च व्यवहिततिरोहितयोरक
स्मादेकत्वज्ञानं वक्त्रोः संभवति, संभवति हि स्वरसादृश्ये निरन्तरोच्चारणे वक्तृभेदेऽपि
कलकलशब्दश्रुतौ चार्थज्ञानम्, कस्तत्र वक्तुरेकत्वानानात्वे विवेक्तुं क्षमः ? न च
ध्वनिमात्रश्रवणं तत्र, वर्णपदवाक्यपरिच्छेदानामपि केषांचिद् बुद्धावुपारोहात् ॥ १५ ॥

15. There would be no understanding of meaning if the sameness of the speaker is not ascertained and that would be inexplicable without some reason.

The upholder of the phoneme should be asked this question : Is the fact of the different phonemes not being uttered by different speakers a secondary cause (aṅga) of the understanding of meaning or not ? If it is not, then there should be understanding of meaning even when the speakers are different. That is not desired nor seen. This is what has been said.¹

“Simultaneity, the fact of being uttered by the same speaker and a particular sequence—all this is intended in the case of phonemes which exist only to convey the meaning.

“Sequence, due to the speaker being the same, being admitted, the fact that the utterer has previously noticed a particular sequence in the utterance of elders, determines what the sequence should be.”

“Simultaneity being impossible, has not been required in this case. Simultaneity would require diversity of speakers and expression never takes place in that manner.”

If it is (a secondary) cause, it enters into the category of indicators² and cannot be the cause of the understanding of meaning unless it is previously ascertained. But we do see meaning being understood from phonemes uttered by speakers who are hidden or invisible. One cannot, without any cause, ascertain the singleness or the plurality of hidden and invisible speakers. Understanding of meaning is possible even when there are different speakers, provided there is similarity of the voice and uninterrupted utterance and when one hears the confused talking of a crowd. One cannot say that (in the confused talking of a crowd) one hears only the sounds. Some people manage to perceive distinct phonemes, words and sentences. (15)

[1. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 70, 71, 75.

2. *Jnāpakānupraveśāt*. If the fact of all the phonemes being uttered by the same speaker is helpful (*aṅga*) in understanding the meaning, it can be so only as a *jnāpaka* (an indication) and not as a *kāraka* (a cause). In other words, that fact must be known before the understanding of the meaning can take place. But it does take place even if that fact cannot be ascertained.]

संवन्धज्ञानसमये ज्ञायते न नियोगतः ।

तिरोहितः प्रवहितः प्रयुक्तौ वक्तुरेकता ॥ १६ ॥

आवृत्तविदूरवर्तिवक्तुप्रयुक्तेष्वपि वर्णेष्वविदुषे विद्वानर्थमाचष्टे, न च तत्र वक्तुरेकतामाश्रयति प्रतिपादकः, नापि तदनुपात्तां प्रतिपादः स्वयमेव प्रतिपद्यते, यथोपलब्धस्य संवन्धाख्यानात्, वक्तुरेकताया निमित्तमन्तरेण प्रतिपत्तुमविभवादित्युक्तम् ॥ १६ ॥

16. At the time of the understanding of the relation (between the word and its meaning) if the speaker is hidden

or distant, one does not necessarily ascertain the singleness of the speaker.

Even when the phonemes are uttered by a hidden or distant speaker, one who knows the meaning tells it to one¹ who does not. The one who tells does not depend upon the singleness of the speaker, nor does the one who is told understand by himself what he is not told. The one who tells only teaches the relation of the word such as he understood it. The one who is told cannot understand the singleness of the speaker without any cause. This has already been said.¹ (16)

[1. What is pointed out here is that, at the time when somebody tells another the meaning of words, he does not at all refer, for the purpose of delimiting the word, to the sameness of the speaker as something to be ascertained before the meaning is understood. At the most, he would mention the seven factors mentioned in a passage like Śl. Vār. (*Vākya*) 183.

Padāvadhāraṇopāyān bahūn icchanti sūrayaḥ,

Kramanyūnātirikatatvasvaravākya-smṛtiśrutīḥ.

“Scholars are of the opinion that there are many ways of delimiting the word such as sequence, absence of deficiency or excess, accent, connection, tradition and direct statement. ”]

तस्मात्—

अनङ्गे वक्तुरेकत्वे वक्तृभेदे निरुद्धत्वा ।

संस्कारादावभिन्नेऽपि धीर्हेत्वन्तरसूचनी ॥ १७ ॥

तदित्यं संबन्धकालेऽनाश्रयणात् प्रत्ययकाले चानावेदनात् अनङ्गे वक्तुरेकत्वे वक्तृभेदेऽपि वर्णीपलव्धिसंस्कारावशिष्टेषादुत्पत्तुमर्हत्यर्थज्ञानम्, अनुत्पद्यमानं तु निमित्तान्तराधीनजन्मानमात्मानमावेदयति । न चैष निमित्तान्तरेऽपि तुल्यः प्रसङ्गः तस्य भिन्नवक्तृप्रयोगे स्फोटस्यानुपलब्धेः ॥ १७ ॥

नन्वर्थाभिव्यक्ताविव शब्दाभिव्यक्तावपि तुल्यः प्रसङ्गः सर्वः । तदुक्तम्यस्यानवयवः स्फोटो व्यज्यते वर्णबुद्धिभिः ।
सोऽपि पर्यनुयोगेन नैवानेन विमुच्यते ॥

Therefore,

17. As the singleness of the speaker is not a cause and as the understanding of the meaning does not take place when the speakers are many, even though the residual impression etc. are the same, it all points to the existence of some other cause.

Thus, as the singleness of the speaker is not a cause, not being resorted to when the relation is taught nor experienced when it is learnt, the understanding of the meaning should really arise even when the speakers are many, considering that the perceptions, residual impressions etc. of the phonemes, are the same. Well, it does not arise and, therefore, it points to something else as its cause. Nor do these difficulties arise in the case of that something else, because, according to him,¹ the *sphoṭa* is not perceived when the speakers are many.

Do not the same difficulties arise in the theory of the suggestion of the individual word as in that of the suggestion of the meaning? It has been said—

“One who holds that the indivisible *sphoṭa* is manifested by the cognition of the phonemes, is also not free from this very difficulty.”² (17)

[1. *Tasya*, I have taken this as referring to one who believes in *Sphoṭa*, but it can also be connected with *Sphoṭasya* in the same sentence.

2. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 91. The next two verses of the Śl. Vār also continue the same argument.]

अत्रोच्यते—

प्रयत्नभेदतो भिन्ना ध्वनयोऽस्य प्रकाशकाः ।

प्रत्येकमनुपाख्येयज्ञानतद्भावनाक्रमात् ॥ १८ ॥

न तावत् कैवल्ये योगपथेऽभिमतानुपूर्व्यभेदे वक्तृभेदे वाविशेषादर्थ-
भिव्यक्ताविव शब्दाभिव्यक्तावपि तुल्यः प्रसङ्गः । तथा हि — सर्वत्र शब्दसमुत्थापक

प्रयत्ननिरूपणचित्तवृत्त्याध्यक्षमुपलभ्यमानरूपभेदाः प्रयत्नाः स्वात्मन्यायतमानाः स्वभावभेदहेतुतया ध्वनीन् व्यावर्तयन्ति, ततो नियतनादनिबन्धनोपव्यंजनाः न सर्वत्र शब्दभेदाः प्रकाशन्ते । नापि प्रत्येकमनवद्योतनात्, उत्तरनादवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्, अवयवशो व्यक्त्यनुपपत्तेस्तदभावात्, प्रत्येकमशक्तौ समुदायेऽप्यशक्तेः, क्रमजन्मना-मनवाप्तयौगपद्यानां समुदायाभावात्, पदाभिव्यक्तिरपि दुर्लभेति साम्प्रतम्, यतः प्रत्येकमपि तेऽधिकलं स्फोटात्मानमभिव्यज्जन्ति । न चेतरेनादवैयर्थ्यम्, अभिव्यक्तिभेदात् । तथा हि—पूर्वे ध्वनयोऽनुपजातभावनाविशेषमनसः प्रतिपत्तुरव्यक्तरूपोप-ग्राहिणीरुत्तरव्यक्तपरिच्छेदोत्पादानुगुणभावनावीजवापिनीः प्रख्याः प्रादुर्भावयन्ति, पश्चिमस्तु पुरस्तनध्वनिनिबन्धनाव्यक्तपरिच्छेदप्रभाधितसकलभावनावीजसहकारि-स्फुटरविनिविष्टस्फोटविम्बमिव प्रत्ययमतिव्यक्ततरमुद्भावयति, यथा रत्नपरीक्षिणः परीक्षमाणस्य प्रथमसमधिगमानुपाख्यातमनुपाख्येयरूपप्रत्ययोपाहितविशेषायां बुद्धौ क्रमेण चरमे चेतसि च्चकास्ति रत्नतत्त्वम्, न ह्यन्यथा स्फुटप्रकाश उपपद्यते पुर इव पश्चादपि, विशेषाभावात् । तदिदमुक्तम्—

यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोऽद्वयमुपगच्छति ।

आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति निरूप्यते ॥

प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्येयैर्ग्रहणानुगुणैस्तथा ।

ध्वनिप्रकाशिते शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते ॥

नादैराहितवीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।

आवृत्तपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥

अनुपाख्येयाकारस्फोटोपलब्धिजन्मानश्च संस्कारास्तत्रैव स्फुटरपरिच्छेदां धिय-मुत्पादयन्तीति न वर्णवादिन इवार्थविषये नानात्वदोषः ॥ १८ ॥

To this, the following answer is given—

18. The sounds which differ because of the difference in the effort to produce them, reveal it (the indivisible sphoṭa) by the process of their indefinable cognition and their residual impressions.

It cannot be maintained that, as the phonemes remain the same whether they are isolated or whether they are together, whether the sequence is other than the desired one,

and whether the speaker is one or more than one, therefore, the same difficulties arise in the theory of the revelation of the indivisible word as in the theory of the conveying of the meaning.¹ It is like this : In all cases,² efforts, differences among which are directly perceived in the very mental activity of determining the effort to utter particular sounds and which are dependent on the Self because of their being caused by particular desires,³ bring about distinctions in the sounds. Therefore, words the manifestation of which is based on particular sounds,⁴ are not always revealed. Nor it is right to maintain that, because each sound cannot reveal (the indivisible word) as that would make the other sounds useless, because it (the word) cannot be revealed in parts, as it has no parts, because the sounds cannot collectively reveal it if they cannot do it individually, because there cannot be a collection of things which come into existence in a sequence and never attain simultaneity, therefore, the revelation of the (indivisible) word is impossible. For each sound individually reveals the whole *sphoṭa*. Nor do the other sounds thus become useless because there is a difference in the revelation. It is like this : All the previous sounds bring about in the listener whose mind is free from any particular residual impression, cognitions in which the word figures vaguely and which sow seeds in the form of residual impressions capable of producing a later clear cognition of the word. The last sound produces a clear cognition in which figures, as it were, clearly the image of the *sphoṭa* caused by all the seeds in the form of residual impressions left by the vague cognitions of the previous sounds.

Just as the genuineness of a precious stone, not perceived at the first gaze, shines in a final cognition arising in the mind of a tester of precious stones whose mind has been previously prepared by the residual impressions of the vague cognitions. Otherwise, there would be no clarity of the object in the final cognition anymore than there is in the first cognition as then there would be no difference between the two. That is why the following has been said :

Just as a Vedic passage (*anuvāka*) or a verse is mastered by the last repetition and is not clearly grasped in any one recitation.

In the same way, by means of the previous cognitions, indefinable but favourable to the final clear cognition, the real form of the word (*sphoṭa*) suggested by the final sound, is perceived.

The word is grasped by the final cognition in which residual impressions have been left by the (previous) sounds together with the last sound and which has thus become progressively mature.⁵

As the residual impressions are due to the vague perceptions of the *sphoṭa*, they ultimately cause the clear perception of that very *sphoṭa*; therefore, in this view, there is not, as there is in the theory of the phonemes, the defect of diversity⁶ of object in regard to the understanding of meaning.(18)

[1. One cannot argue against the upholder of the *sphoṭa*, as one could hold against the protagonist of the phonemes, that each phoneme by itself cannot reveal the *sphoṭa*, nor that there cannot be a collection of phonemes, nor that the *sphoṭa* cannot be suggested when the sequence is changed or when the speakers are many in number.

2. *Sarvatra*—in all cases. That is (1) in the case of the upholder of the phoneme theory and in the case of the upholder of the *sphoṭa* theory (2) at all times and in all places, (3) in the case of all persons and all utterances, (4) in the case of the phonemes being uttered in isolation or simultaneously, in other than the required sequence and by more than one speaker.

3. *Svabhāvahetutayā*. G. dissolves this compound word in as many as four ways. The translation is, in accordance, with its first explanation which seems to be in agreement with the context.

4. *Niyatanādanibandhanopavyañjanā*. The words *dhvani* and *nāda* occur in the *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari. Sometimes a slight distinction is made between the two in that work, as for example, in Vak. I. 47 where the Vritti says : *Tacca sūkṣme vyāpini dhvanau*

karāṇavyāpāreṇa pracīyamāne sthūlenābhraśaṁghātavad upalabhyena nādātmanā prāptavivartena tadvivartānukāreṇāntyantamavivartamānaṁ ivvartamānamiva gṛhyate. The word which is entirely without change appears to change in terms of the gross nāda, perceptible like a mass of clouds brought into being when the subtle all-pervasive sounds (*dhvani*) are amassed (*pracīyamāna*) by the movements of the articulatory organs. The dhvanis are conceived of as something atomic, all-pervasive and imperceptible. When amassed by the movements of the articulatory organs, they become gross and perceptible and are then called nāda. Maṇḍana, does not make this distinction. The word *dhvani* in verse 18, is explained by the word *nāda* in the commentary thereon. As G. puts it : *Nādo dhvanir ityanarthāntaram.*

5. Vāk. I., 82, 83, 84.

6. *Varṇavādina iva arthaviśaye nānātvadoṣaḥ.* [The defect in the theory that the phonemes themselves convey the meaning is that, according to it, the residual impressions are caused by the cognitions of the phonemes but, when awakened, they cause the understanding of meaning. Thus there is a difference between their cause and their effect, whereas impressions, when awakened are supposed only to cause the remembrance of that which caused them. In the *sphoṭa* theory, this discrepancy does not exist.]

ननु शब्दान्तराण्येव वर्णाः प्राक् प्रकाशन्ते, न पदरूपमव्यक्तं व्यक्तं वा । न च तदेव तिरोहितात्मरूपं शब्दान्तरात्मना प्रकाशत इति साम्प्रतम्, कथमन्य-
प्रकाशेऽन्यः प्रकाशेत, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ? अन्याकारप्रकाशोपहितं च भवनावीजं कथम-
न्याकारप्रकाशप्रादुर्भावनिमित्तं स्यात् ? तथा च तुल्यो दोषः । विपर्यासप्रकाशनं च
निमित्तापेक्षम्, न च तदिहास्ति । न नादाः, तेषां तत्त्वपरिच्छेदहेतुत्वात्, न हि
यदेवास्योपलब्धिनिमित्तं तदेव विपर्यासनिमित्तं भवितुमर्हति, विपर्यासनिमित्तत्वे वा
न ततस्तद्रूपोपलब्धिरित्यनभिव्यक्तिप्रसङ्गः । नियमानुपपत्तिश्च । न खलु रज्ज्वादिषु
सर्पादिविपर्यासा नियोगतो भवन्ति । नियोगतस्तु वर्णग्रहणसरूपाः पदपरिच्छेदात्

पूर्वं बुद्ध्यो जायन्ते । न च सर्वप्रतिपत्तृणामेकरूपो विपर्यासो युक्तिमान्, रज्ज्वां हि कश्चित् सर्प इति विपर्यस्यति, कश्चिद्द्वारेति । न च विपर्यासे क्रमनियमः । कदाचिद् धारा—इति विपर्यस्य सर्पः इति विपर्यस्यति, कदाचिद् विपरीतम् । इह तु नियतभावी नियतक्रमो नियतरूपश्च विपर्यास इति किमत्र कारणम् ? विपर्यासत्वं च प्रत्ययविपर्यासाधीनम्, तदभावादिह कथ्यमानं बालोल्लापनायैव केवलं भवति ।

(Objection)

But it is not the word which shines at first, vaguely or otherwise,¹ but totally different verbal elements, the phonemes. Nor would it be right to maintain that the word disguises itself and appears as the phonemes. How can cognition have the form of something when its object is something else ? That would mean that any cognition can have any object. How can a residual impression left by a cognition having a particular form be the cause of a cognition having a different form ? Therefore, the difficulties (in the *sphoṭa theory*) are the same (as in the theory of the phonemes.) Something appearing as something else is due to some cause and that is just what is absent here. It cannot be the sounds because they are the cause of our apprehension of the word (of the truth.) That which is the cause of the apprehension of something cannot be the cause of its misapprehension. If it is the cause of its misapprehension, its apprehension cannot be due to that. That might mean that it cannot be revealed at all. The inevitability of the misapprehension is also inexplicable.² In the case of rope etc. their misapprehension as snake etc. does not inevitably take place. Here, on the other hand, cognitions in which the phonemes figure inevitably take place before the apprehension of the word. Nor does it stand to reason that all hearers should have the same misapprehension. In the case of a rope, somebody mistakes it for a snake, another for a little stream. Nor is there any fixed order in which the misapprehension takes place. Sometimes, one mistakes it, first as a streamlet and next as a snake; at other times, in the opposite order. Here, on the other hand, the misapprehension takes place inevitably, it takes place in a fixed order and in a particular form. How is it so ? The falsity of a cognition is

ascertained by its later sublation. To speak of a misapprehension here where there is no later sublation can only convince children.

[1. Because the cognition has the form of the phonemes.

2. The opponent, i. e. the Mimāṃsaka points out four defects in the argument of the upholder of the *sphoṭa*. If, when the phonemes actually figure in the cognition, we maintain that it is the *sphoṭa* which is being so cognised, it would mean (1) that any cognition can have any object, (2) that impressions left by the cognition of phonemes can cause the cognition of something different from them which is contrary to the nature of residual impressions, (3) that misapprehension can take place without a cause. (4) that it is inevitable and that it must take place in a fixed order and in a particular manner. All the above assumptions are contrary to facts.]

उच्यते—

आरूपालोचितेष्वस्ति ह्यन्यथात्वप्रकाशनम् ।

तत्संस्कारक्रमाच्चापि व्यक्तं तत्त्वं प्रकाशते ॥ १९ ॥

दृष्टमिदमारूपालोचिताः पदार्थाः कचिदन्यथा प्रकाशन्ते यथा दूराद्गन्तव्यतयो हस्यादिरूपप्रख्यानाः, बहुतरालोकाच्च देशान्मन्दतरालोकागर्भगृहादिषु प्रविष्टस्य रज्ज्वादिषु व्यक्तमप्रकाशमानेषु सर्पाद्याकारप्रकाशोदयः । न च तेषां न प्रथनमिति साम्प्रतम्, इन्द्रियस्य तत्सन्निकर्षात्; न ह्यन्यसन्निकर्षोऽन्यज्ञानहेतुः । असन्निकर्षजत्वे वा तदपेक्षा न स्यात्, तस्मात् पूर्वदर्शनान्येव यथोत्तरोत्कर्षेण संस्कारमादधति व्यक्तवृक्षादिप्रतिपत्तिनिमित्तं भवन्ति । अन्यथा प्रथमदर्शनेऽपि स्यात्, तद्देशावस्थितानामेव च प्रणिधानाभ्यासक्रमेण भावान्न दूरत्वादलव्यजन्मा सामीप्यादुदेतीति युक्तम्, प्रकृतिस्थेन्द्रिया अपि बहिर्वस्वन्तरदर्शनादन्यथा प्रतिपद्यथावदुपलभन्ते, तन्नेन्द्रियदोषात् प्रागप्रतिपत्तिः । स्वरूपमात्रख्याताविन्द्रियाधीनायां वृक्षादिषु सादृश्यनिमित्तं मानसं स्मरणमिति चेत्, शब्दान्तरेऽपि भागाभिमतेषु तथास्तु । तदुक्तम्—

ययैव दर्शनैः पूर्वदूरात् सन्तमसेऽपि वा ।
 अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्ययैवाध्यवस्यति ॥
 व्यज्यमाने तथा वाक्ये वाक्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुभिः ।
 भागाग्रहरूपेण पूर्वं बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते ॥ १९ ॥

To this, the answer is as follows :

19. "Vaguely apprehended objects do appear to be different from what they are, but through (the progressively clearer) residual impressions of the previous cognitions, the truth shines fully.

What follows has been seen : vaguely perceived objects sometimes do appear to be different from what they really are : from a distance, trees look like elephants etc; when one enters dimly lighted inner apartments from bright places, vaguely perceived ropes etc. do look like snakes etc. Nor would it be right to maintain that it is not these which so appear, because it is these which are in contact with the senses. Contact of the senses with one thing cannot be the cause of the knowledge of something else. If it is held that the eye, without being in contact, manifests silver, there would be no requirement of the contact at all.¹ Therefore, it is the previous cognitions (having tree as the object and the form of the elephant) leaving progressively clearer residual impressions, which become the cause of the clear perception of the tree etc. Otherwise there would be a clear perception of the tree at the very first gaze. It would not be right to maintain that it (the clear perception of the tree) did not arise at first because of the distance, but arose afterwards because of proximity, for it arises in the case of those who stay in the same place through continuity of attention. Even those whose senses are normal as can be judged by their correct perception of other objects, at first apprehend wrongly and later perceive correctly. Therefore, it is not due to any defect in the senses that there is initial misapprehension. If it is held that, in the case of trees etc. the bare form is apprehended through the senses and the rest is remembered through resemblance, the same thing can

be said of the other verbal elements considered to be parts of the word,² For, it has been said—

“Just as through distance or darkness, one mistakes an object in the previous cognitions and finally apprehends it correctly.”

“In the same way, when the sentence is being suggested by the elements which are the cause of its manifestation, there is, at first, a cognition in which its parts figure.”³ (19)

[1. The position taken up by the upholder of the *sphoṭa* is this :—One sometimes sees a tree from a distance and mistakes it for an elephant but by continually looking at it, one sees that it is a tree and not an elephant. Here the impressions left by the previous erroneous cognitions help in the ultimate correct cognition. Though the previous cognitions have the form of the elephant, the tree is their object, because it is with the tree that the sense of vision is in contact. As it is with the tree that the sense is in contact, the resulting cognition is that of the tree, even though it has the form of the elephant. It is not possible to say that the sense is in contact with one thing but that the resulting cognition is that of something else. If the sense of vision can illuminate something with which it is not in contact, why did it not do so before the eye came into contact with the tree ? Why this dependence on contact with the tree for producing a knowledge of the elephant ? The fact is that the appearance of the elephant depends upon the contact of the sense with the tree and its vague apprehension. As G. Puts it : *ārūpā-locitaviṣayatvam anyathāprakāśanasya* = the misapprehension has as its object something which has been vaguely perceived (p. 141). In other words, vague apprehension and misapprehension amount to the same thing.

2. The upholder of the *sphoṭa* has been maintaining that through the progressively clearer impressions of the previous (vague or erroneous) apprehensions, a clear and correct apprehension takes

place in the end. The opponent here points out that no misapprehension takes place through the sense of vision. When the tree is first seen, the eye perceives what is common to it and an elephant and not what distinguishes it from an elephant. What it actually perceives, i. e., that which is common to the tree and the elephant is quite correct. On this basis, however, the mind thinks of the elephant, because the common point has been perceived. So this cognition is a mixture of perception and remembrance. Both the aspects are quite valid. The mistake lies only in not distinguishing between the two. If there are thus no misapprehensions, there cannot be any question of progressively clearer impressions of them, followed by a final clear apprehension. The upholder of the *sphoṭa* points out in reply that the argument can be applied to the misapprehension of parts in the partless indivisible *sphoṭa*. Why not say that while the indivisible *sphoṭa* is being vaguely apprehended through the sense of hearing, the mind remembers the unreal parts like the phoneme and the word? Of course, he himself does not argue in this manner.

3. Vāk. I. 89, 90.]

ध्वनयः सदृशात्मानो विपर्यासस्य हेतवः ।

उपलम्भकमेवेष्टं विपर्यासस्य कारणम् ॥ २० ॥

यद्यपि वर्णपदवाक्यविषया भिन्नात्मानः प्रयत्ना मरुतश्च तदुदीरिताः स्थानाभिघातिनः स्थानाभिघातलब्धात्मानश्च ध्वनयः शब्दाभिव्यक्तिहेतवः, तथापि स्थानकरणादिसाम्येन कथंचिल्लब्धसादृश्याः सङ्कीर्णा इव; तन्निबन्धनोऽयं शब्दान्तरेषु शब्दान्तरग्रहणाभिमानः, *उपलब्धिनिबन्धनमेव च विपर्यासस्य निमित्तम्, हेत्वन्तरानवसन्धानात्, विपर्यासस्याप्युपलब्धिरूपत्वात् अनुपलब्ध्युपयोगि कथं तत्रोपयुज्यते? यथा विदूरवर्तिवन्स्पताविन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष एव विपर्यासस्य निमित्तम्; उपलब्धेरपि स एव प्रणिधानाभ्यासप्रसूतशसनाक्रमेणेति यत्किंचिदेतत् — विपर्यासनिमित्तत्वे वानभिव्यञ्जकत्वमिति ॥ २० ॥

20. It is the sounds that resemble one another which are the cause of the error. That which leads to the final correct

cognition (of the *sphoṭa*) is just what is held to be the cause of the error too.¹

Even though the different efforts aiming at the utterance of phonemes, words and sentences, the different breaths raised by them striking at the different places of articulation and the different sounds produced by contact with the places of articulation are the cause of the revelation of the word, they somehow resemble one another because of the resemblance in the place of articulation and are, therefore, mixed up as it were. That is why one thinks that one perceives one kind of verbal element when one is actually perceiving another.² That which is the cause of perception is just the cause of the error, as no other cause is perceived. As even error is a kind of cognition, how can that which is the cause of non-cognition lead to it ? It is as in the case of the tree at a distance where it is the contact with the object which is the cause of the error. The same contact, through the process of the residual impressions left by the continuous attentive perception, is the cause of the final correct perception of the tree. Therefore, it is not a weighty thing to say that, if the sounds are the cause of error, they cannot lead to the final correct perception of the word. (20)

[1. G. points out that it is true of all errors that they are caused by the very causes of correct knowledge. : *Sarvabhrāntisādhāraṇam etaditi bhāvaḥ*.

2. When the sounds of a word are uttered by the speaker, the hearer understands that word at first vaguely and wrongly, i. e. in the form of phonemes and finally, he understands it clearly and correctly. The first cognitions are errors. There were several theories current in Ancient India in regard to error, known by the names *ātmakhyāti* (Vijñānavādins) *asatkhyāti* (Mādhyamikas) *akhyāti* (Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas) *anyathākhyāti* (Naiyāyikas) *anirvacanīyakhyāti* (Vedāntins) *Satkhyāti* (Rāmānuja) and *Viparītakhyāti* (Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas). Maṇḍana looks upon error as *anyathākhyāti* which is closely related to *viparītakhyāti* and argues against

the *akhyāti* interpretation. According to Maṇḍana, in error something appears as something else. In the present case, the *sphoṭa* appears as the phoneme. This misapprehension is looked upon as a means to the final correct apprehension. If error is interpreted as *akhyāti*, it cannot serve as a means to the final correct cognition.]

उपायत्वाच्च नियमः परदर्शितदर्शिनाम् ।

ज्ञानस्येव च वाचोऽयं लोके ध्रुव उपप्लवः ॥ २१ ॥

निमित्तमेवेदमीदृशं शब्दतत्त्वोपलब्धेर्यद् विपर्यासयदेव शब्दमुपलभ्यतीति, नियतसारूप्यत्वात्; न हि शब्दान्तरविषयध्वनिविलक्षणा ध्वनयोऽन्ये तस्य व्यक्तौ नः सन्ति, येनाविपर्यासोऽवसीयेत । अत एव च तुल्यरूपः सर्वप्रतिपत्तृणां विपर्यासः, तन्निमित्तस्य समानत्वात् । क्रमनियमश्च नियतक्रमत्वात् यथा चाविद्यमानात्मभूतसंख्यान्तरज्ञानं संख्यान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ निमित्तं तदुपायत्वात्, तथेहापि शब्दान्तरपरिच्छेदः । न हि क्वचित् क्रियायां हि निर्जिज्ञासितसंख्येषु शतादिसंख्यापरिच्छिन्नेषु वस्तुषु पूर्वसंख्यासम्भवः, संख्यायाः परिच्छेदरूपत्वात्, तस्य च तत्रासम्भवात् । यथैव चोत्पत्तौ क्षीरबीजादिकार्याणामानुपूर्वीनियमस्तथोपलब्धावपि । तस्मात् परोपदर्शितशब्दतत्त्वग्राहिणामनन्योपायतया विपर्यासनियमः । अपरप्रदर्शितविषयास्तु परमर्षयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणोऽव्याहतान्तः प्रकाशा विधूतविपर्यासक्रमं च वाक्तृत्वं प्रतिपेदिरे प्रतिपादयामासुरिति च प्रतिज्ञायते । यथोक्तम् “साक्षात्कृतधर्माण ऋषयो बभूवुः । ते च परेभ्योऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य उपदेशेन मन्त्रान् सम्प्रादुः उपदेशाय ग्लायन्तोऽगरे बिम्बग्रहणायेमं ग्रन्थं समाम्नासिषुर्वेदं च वेदांगानि च ” । तदुक्तम्—

असतश्चन्तराले यः शब्दो नास्तीति मन्यते ।

प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः ॥

यथाद्यसंख्याग्रहणमुपायः प्रतिपत्तये ।

संख्यान्तराणां भेदेऽपि तथा वर्णान्तरश्रुतिः ॥

यथानुपूर्वीनियमो विकारे क्षीरबीजयोः ।

तेनैव प्रतिपत्तृणां नियतो बुद्धिषु क्रमः ॥

यथा च ज्ञानस्यासद्ग्राह्याकारानुकारविपर्यासोपप्लवो नियतः तथा वागात्मनोऽपि सदृशव्यञ्जकध्वनिभेदानुकारात् क्रमभावी विपर्यासोपप्लवः । तथा हि-येषामपि वर्णलक्षणं वाक्तृत्वमविद्यमानभागावच्छेदमित्यभ्युपगमः, तेऽपि भागक्रमसंसर्गलक्षणमन्यं चोदात्तदीर्घत्वादिरूपमुपप्लवं नियतं न तस्यावजानते । तथा हि-सन्ध्यक्षरेष्वकारैकरौ चान्येष्वपि स्वरेषु स्वरितगुणयुक्तेषूदात्तानुदात्तगुणभेदविभज्यमानभागभेदभिन्नेषु न भागक्रमसंसर्गप्रख्यापह्वमर्हति तदुक्तम्—

भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस्य वाचश्चोपप्लवो ध्रुवः ।

क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा वाज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपश्रयम् ॥

न ज्ञेयेन विना ज्ञानं व्यवहारेऽवतिष्ठते ।

नालब्धक्रमया वाचा कश्चिदर्थोऽभिधीयते ॥ २१ ॥

21. In the case of those who apprehend the word through others, misapprehension is inevitable because it is the means. This error is inevitable in the case of the word as in the case of cognition.¹

The cause of the understanding of the word is such that it first causes a misapprehension of it and then leads to its correct final cognition because of the fixed similarity of the sounds. For there are no sounds available to us other than those which bring to the mind the superimposed verbal element. If there were, the correct cognition of the word might come through them without the previous misapprehension.² That is why there is a uniform misapprehension in the case of everybody, namely, because the cause of the misapprehension is the same in the case of all.³ Because the process of the conveying of the word depends upon a sequence, the sequence is also fixed.⁴ Just as the cognition of the previous non-existent numbers is the cause of the cognition of the number in question because it is a means to it, similarly here the cognition of the other verbal element (the phoneme) is a means to the cognition of the word. The previous numbers do not belong to the things whose number in regard to a particular action is fixed and which have been determined by such numbers as hundred etc. because number is a kind of measurement⁵ which,

therefore, cannot relate to them (the previous numbers.) Just as there is a fixed sequence in the production of the effects of milk, seed etc., similarly, there is a fixed sequence in cognition also. Therefore, there is an inevitable misapprehension in the case of those who understand the word as taught by others,⁶ because there is no other means of apprehending it. In the case of the great sages who do not apprehend the word as taught by others, it has been declared that they, having realised the truth (*dharma*) with their inner light undimmed, apprehended the word, disregarding the process of misapprehension and taught it also similarly. Ās has been said—The great sages, directly realised the truth (*dharma*) they imparted the Mantras through instruction to those who had not directly realised the truth.⁷ Others who were incapable of receiving the Mantras through instruction, just learnt the text of the Vedas and the Vedāṅgas, so that at least the means may be apprehended.⁸ It has been said—

“When one perceives those non-existent elements in the middle as existent, it is due to the incapacity of the perceiver : they are only a means to the cognition of the real word.”⁹

“Just as the cognition of the previous numbers becomes the means of cognising the other (real) number though they are different from one another, similarly, the cognition of the other verbal elements (the phonemes) is a means to the cognition of the word.”¹⁰

“Just as there is a fixed sequence in the transformation of milk or seed (into its product) similarly, there is a fixed sequence (in regard to the word.)”¹¹

Just as there is an inevitable error in cognition consisting in the transference to it of the form of the object, similarly there is an inevitable misapprehension of the word because of the transference to it of the differences of the manifesting sounds which are similar to one another. It is like this—Those who believe that the word consists of phonemes which are indivisible, do not deny that inevitable misapprehension in regard to these phonemes, consisting in their association with division and sequence and with accents like the acute (*udātta*)

and quantity like length etc. It is like this—In diphthongs like 'e' division into 'a' and 'i'; in other vowels, when they have the circumflex accent (*svārīta*), their division into two parts, one having the acute accent and the other the grave accent, all this cognition of division and sequence cannot be denied. It has been said—

“In regard to cognition and the word, misapprehension leading to division is inevitable; the word is coloured by sequence and cognition is dependant upon the form of the object.”¹²

“In actual usage, cognition without an object figuring in it is not seen. Nor is meaning conveyed by the word which has not assumed sequence.” (21)

[1. It was urged by the *Mīmāṃsaka* (before verse 19) that the apprehension of the phonemes should not be looked upon as an error because this apprehension has a fixed, unalterable character in three ways : (1) the apprehension of the phonemes takes place invariably before the whole word is grasped (2) it always takes place in the same sequence (3) it is uniform in the case of all hearers. Ordinarily, an error is neither inevitable, nor always of the same nature nor does it follow the same sequence. Therefore, the apprehension of the phonemes is not a case of error. The first half of the present verse is an answer to all the three aspects of this objection.

2. As the initial misapprehension is a means to the final correct apprehension it invariably precedes it. Thus the first aspect of the objection is answered.

3. This is meant to answer the third objection. As the sounds which cause misapprehension in the case of one hearer are similar to those which cause misapprehension in the case of other hearers, therefore, there is uniformity in the misapprehension.

4. This answers the second aspect of the objection. As the sequence in which the misapprehension takes place is also a means to the final correct cognition, it is fixed.

5. According to G. this statement has been made according to the view that number is neither a separate category (*padārtha*) nor does it come under the *guṇas*. The other and more generally accepted view, that of the Vaiśeṣikas, is that it is a *guṇa* and that duality and the numbers higher than that are produced by *apekṣā-buddhi* and are destroyed when the latter are destroyed. The process of production and destruction is elaborately described in the *Upaskāra* on *Vai. Sū. 7. 2. 8.*

6. See *Vāk. 1. 85* and the *Vṛtti* thereon.

7. G. points out that *Dharma* includes not merely the facts but also the words which give expression to them, i. e. the *Mantras*, *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Vedāṅgas* and other *Śāstras*.

8. See *Ni. 1. 20 Bimma (Bilma) grahaṇāya = upāyato vaśīka-
raṇāya (G.)* See *Vāk. I. 5* and the *Vṛtti* thereon where this very passage from the *Nirukta* is quoted in order to show how the *Vedas* have been handed down.

9. *Vāk. I. 85.* The correct text is, however, as follows :

„ *Asataścāntarāle yāñ chabdānastīti manyate, Pratipattur aś
aktiḥ sū grahaṇopāya eva saḥ.*

I have adopted this text for the translation. G. also knew it.

10. *Vāk. I. 87.* This quotation is meant to explain how the misapprehension is uniform in the case of all perceivers.

11. *Vāk. I. 91.*

12. *Vāk. I. 86.]*

विपर्यासो निमित्तं च सम्यग्बोधस्य दर्शितः ।
किञ्चिद्भेदानुकारेऽपि दृष्ट एव विपर्ययः ॥ २२ ॥

अथापि स्यात् — कथमिव विपर्यासः सभ्यबोधस्य निमित्तमिति, प्रदर्शितं चैतत् 'यथैव दर्शनैः पूर्वैः' इति,—यथायसंख्याग्रहणम् 'इति च । यत्तु' 'विपर्यासत्वं प्रत्ययविपर्ययाधीनं तदभावे बालोल्लापनम्' इति, सत्यम्, यदि स न स्यात्, अस्ति तु व्यक्तैकशब्दपरिच्छेदार्थसिद्धेश्चान्यथाऽलभ्यत्वादुक्तेन प्रकारेणावश्याभ्युपेय एकः शब्दः

स्यान्तम् — अविरोधान्नैष भेदमपवर्तयितुमलमिति, अविरोधश्च तस्य भेदानुविद्धस्यैवोत्पादात्, न हि तदा भेदो न प्रकाशत इति ।

तदसत् । तथा हि — भेदेनानन्वीयमानमपि मणिकृपाणदर्पणादिषु तत्त्वस्य भेदविरोधात्तत्त्वप्रत्ययेन समुत्सारितनिखिलभेदं मुखमवसीयते । तथा दीर्घादिभेदानुगमेऽपि वर्णात्मा प्रत्यभिज्ञावलेन विधूतभेद एकोऽवगम्यते, तथा पदमपि स्वप्रत्ययावगम्यमानैकस्वभावं किञ्चिद्भेदपरामर्शेऽप्यभिन्नं निश्चीयते ॥ २२ ॥

22. It has been shown that misapprehension is the cause of correct apprehension. Sublation of the misapprehension does take place inspite of the word appearing as possessing some distinctions.

It might be said—How can misapprehension be the cause of correct apprehension? But this has already been shown in the verses :—"Just as in the previous cognitions" etc.¹ and "Just as the cognition of the previous numbers" etc.² As to the objection that one can ascertain something to be a misapprehension only if there is a later sublation, as, otherwise, one can convince only children, it would be valid if there were no later sublation. But there is, because one does finally perceive the clear indivisible word and there can be no understanding of meaning otherwise, as has been explained.³ Thus the one indivisible word has necessarily to be accepted.

It might be objected. "The cognition of the word is not capable of doing away with the distinction (of phonemes) because there is no contradiction between the two. The cognition of the one word arises as mixed up with that of the distinct phonemes; hence we know that there is no contradiction. One cannot say that then (when the cognition of the

one word arises) distinction does not appear.” The objection is not valid. It is like this—Even though appearing as different in the precious stone, sword, mirror etc. the face is ultimately cognised as free from all distinction because of the cognition of identity, identity being opposed to distinction. Similarly, the phoneme, inspite of such distinctions as long, short etc. appears as one, free from distinction, through the cognition of identity. In the same way, the word, the unity of which is grasped at the time of its cognition, is recognised as one inspite of the cognition of some distinctions. (22)

[1. Vāk. I. 89.

2. Vāk. I, 87.

3. G. explains that when an error takes place, it is later sublated by the correct cognition. It can take a negative or a positive form. In the case of the mother-of-pearl being mistaken for silver, the later sublation takes the form “ this is not silver ” i. e. it is negative in form; if it takes the form “ this is mother-of-pearl, it would be positive in form. In the case of the word, the later sublation is of a positive character.]

अथ कस्मादेव स्फोटोपलब्धिक्रमोऽर्थोपलब्ध्यावेव नाश्रीयते ? यतः

प्रत्यक्षज्ञाननियता व्यक्ताव्यक्तावभासिता ।

मानान्तरेषु ग्रहणमथवा नैव हि ग्रहः ॥ २३ ॥

इन्द्रियं हि व्यक्तावभासिनोऽव्यक्तावभासिनश्च प्रत्ययस्य हेतुः । यथा दूरात् ग्रहणे सूक्ष्मार्थनिरूपणायां च । लिङ्गशब्दादयस्तु निश्चितात्मानं प्रत्ययमुपजनयन्त्येकरूपम्, नैव वा । न तत्र व्यक्ताव्यक्तग्रहणबुद्धिभेदः, अर्थश्च शाब्दप्रत्ययावसेयः, स्फोटात्मा तु प्रत्यक्षवेदनीय इति निर्वचम् ॥ २३ ॥

Why not resort to the very process by which the *sphoṭa* is cognised to explain the comprehension of meaning ?¹
Because—

23. The revelation (of an object) clearly or vaguely is confined to direct perception. In the case of the other means of knowledge there is either apprehension (of the object) or not at all.

The senses are the cause either of a cognition which reveals the object clearly or of one which reveals it vaguely. For instance, when something is cognised from a distance or when something subtle is cognised.² Such things as a sign (*liṅga*) and the word either produce a cognition in which the object figures clearly or not at all. In their case, no such distinction as first a vague cognition and then a clear cognition takes place. Meaning is to be understood through verbal cognition. The *sphoṭa*, on the other hand, is to be cognised through direct perception. Thus everything is alright.³ (23)

[1. This objection is implied is Śl Vār. (Sph.) 91, 93.

2. G. points out that by 'sense', both the external and the internal senses are meant here. The senses cause vague and clear cognitions; sometimes, they produce a vague cognition first and a clear cognition later. The perception of a tree from a distance and of the genuineness of a precious stone are examples of vague cognitions being followed by clear ones.

3. That is, the process of the revelation of the *sphoṭa* by the sounds does not suffer from the same defects as the process of the revelation of the meaning by the phonemes.]

कथं प्रत्यक्षवेद्यता स्फोटात्मनः ? वर्णविज्ञानविलक्षणस्य पश्चाद् 'गौः' इति विज्ञानस्य निरालम्बनत्वायोगात् । न हि तद्वर्णालम्बनमेव, वर्णबुद्धिविलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मादर्थान्तरमवलम्बितुमर्हति ।

नन्वस्तीदं पश्चादेकैकवर्णविज्ञानविलक्षणं विज्ञानम् । न तु तदर्थान्तरालम्बनम्, वर्णरूपानुबुद्धत्वाद् रूपान्तराप्रतिभानाच्च । तथा हि - त एव वर्णात्मनः पुरः परिगतपरिच्छेदा अत्राप्यवभासन्ते, न तु रूपान्तरम् । अर्थान्तरविषयत्वे तु यथा वर्णविज्ञानानि परस्परविषयरूपप्रत्यवमर्शशून्यानि प्रकाशमानरूपान्तराणि

प्रकाशन्ते तथेदमपि स्यात् । वैलक्षण्यं तु पूर्वोपलब्धीनामेकैकवर्णगोचरत्वादस्य च समुचितविषयत्वादिति नार्थान्तरविषयत्वं वैलक्षण्यमात्रात् सिध्यति । यदि वैककस्मात्त्रयमर्थान्तरमस्तु प्रत्ययस्य विषयः, न तु तदतिरिक्तः कश्चिच्छब्दात्मा, वर्णपरित्यागेनान्यस्य बुद्धावप्रतिभासनात् । अथ मतम् — ‘गौः’ इत्येकं विज्ञानम् । को बाह्यान्यथा ? ज्ञानं तु नैकम् इति । ज्ञेये तु तद्ग्राह्यतयैकार्थकारितया वैकत्वभ्रमः, एकत्वोपचारो वा वनादिवत् । अपि च शैप्र्याल्पाचूतरत्वाभ्यां गोशब्दे भवेदध्यैकत्वभ्रमः, देवदत्तादिशब्दे तु स्पष्ट एव भेदः प्रकाशते । तदुक्तम् ‘न च प्रत्यक्षेभ्यो गकारादिभ्योऽन्यः शब्दात्मा, भेददर्शनाभावाद-भेददर्शनाच्च । तथा—

वैलक्षण्यं तु तस्येष्टमेकैकज्ञानतः स्फुटम् ।
 वर्णरूपानुबोधात् न तदर्थान्तरं भवेत् ॥
 यदि वार्थान्तरत्वं स्यादेकैकस्मात् त्रयस्य तु ।
 वर्णत्रयपरित्यागे बुद्धिर्नान्यत्र जायते ॥
 गौरित्येकमतित्वं तु नैवास्माभिर्निवार्यते ।
 तद्ग्राह्यैकार्थताभ्रान्त्या शब्दे स्यादेकतामतिः ॥
 शैध्व्यादल्पाचूतरत्वाच्च गोशब्दे सा भवेदपि ।
 देवदत्तादिशब्दे तु स्फुटो भेदः प्रतीयते ॥

How is the *sphoṭa* cognised through direct perception ? Because the cognition of the whole word which takes the form ‘*gauḥ*’ and which is different from the previous cognitions of the phonemes cannot be without any basis. The phonemes cannot be the basis, because this cognition is different from that of the phonemes. Therefore, some other object must be the basis.

(Objection) : It is admitted that there takes place a later cognition different from the cognitions of the single phonemes. But it has no other object as the basis. Because it is coloured by the forms of the phonemes and the form of no other object shines in it. It is like this. It is the same phonemes which had been previously cognised which figure in this also and not

anything else. If it were something else, then this final cognition would have that thing figuring in it, just as the cognitions of the different phonemes do not have the forms of the mutual objects figuring in them, but reveal some other form. The difference between the previous cognitions and this final one is just this : the former have single phonemes as their object, the latter has their collection as the object. But this difference does not mean that the later cognition has a totally different object. If a difference in the object is insisted upon, one might say that three phonemes do constitute a different object than a single phoneme. But there is no object over and above the phonemes, because nothing beyond the phonemes figures in the cognition. If it is maintained that the cognition which takes the form 'gauḥ' is a single cognition,¹ well, who said otherwise, namely, that the cognition was not one ?² But singleness is wrongly apprehended in the objects, either because they are the objects of a single cognition or because they produce a single effect.³ Or it may be that singleness is attributed to them as one attributes singleness to trees when one calls them a forest. Not only that. In the case of the word 'gauḥ' the illusion that its objects have singleness can be explained by the fact that the phonemes are uttered very quickly and that there is little vowel in it. In words like *Devadatta*, plurality is clearly perceived. It has been said : "there is no word over and above the directly perceived phonemes 'g' etc., because something different from them is not perceived and because they are themselves identified with the word."⁴ Similarly

"The difference of the final cognition from those of the previous cognitions of each single phoneme is admitted. But the phonemes figure in it; it has no other object."

"Or three phonemes together might be looked upon as constituting a different object from each single phoneme. No other object over and above the three phonemes figures in the cognition."

"That the cognition which takes the form 'gauḥ' is a single one is not denied by us. But there takes place an illusion of singleness in regard to the word because the phonemes

are cognised by a single cognition or because they together produce a single effect."

"The illusion of singleness can be explained in the case of the word '*gauḥ*' because of the speed with which it is uttered and because there is little vowel in it; but in words like '*Devadatta*' the difference of phonemes is clearly perceived.⁵"

[1. As it is a single cognition, it would be better if its object was also a single one rather than a number of phonemes.

2. An '*iti*' is required after '*Jñānam tu naikam*' "*Jñānam tu naikam iti*" would thus become an elaboration of '*anyathā*'. It has been translated accordingly. G. knew another reading : *Jñeyam tu naikam* That would also yield a good meaning.

3. The effect meant here is the conveying of the meaning.

4. Cf. Śab. Bhā. p. 48. The actual text there is : *Na ca pratyakṣo gakārādibhyo'nyo gośabda iti, bhedadarśanābhāvād abhedadarśanācca.* G. knows this reading also.

5. Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 118, 119, 120, 121.]

अत्रोच्यते

अन्यानुविद्वबोधेऽपि नान्यत्वमुपरुध्यते ।

एकरूपपरिच्छेदे कथमन्याप्रकाशनम् ॥ २४ ॥

न खल्वन्यरूपव्यतिभिन्नाऽऽ कुतश्चिन्निमित्तादवबोधः प्रकाशमानो नान्या-
वलम्बन इति चतुरश्रम् । तथा हि — जातिप्रत्ययो व्यक्तिविशेषस्वरूपसम्भेदे, अवय-
विज्ञानं भागरूपानुगतावयवसमवाये, चित्ररूपावभासिनी च प्रख्या अवयवगतनीला-
दिरूपभेदेऽपि, नार्थान्तरगोचरतां जहाति । न ह्यर्थान्तरसमवायिनीलानीलादिमात्रं
चित्रम्, अवयविनो नीरूपतया अचाक्षुषत्वप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वं चाक्षुषं प्रभारूपानु-
विद्वबुद्धिबोधम्, न ततोऽन्यविषयतामुञ्चति । अथ रूपान्तरप्रकाशस्तत्र, न
त्विह तथा । कथं नास्ति ? यदेकः शब्दात्मा स्फुटं प्रकाशते । न चासौ वर्णाना-

मात्मा, तेषां भेदादैक्यविरोधात् । पटादयोऽपि तन्त्वादिभ्य एवमेव भेदेन व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते ॥ २४ ॥

To the above objection, the following answer is given.

24. There is no bar to a cognition in which one thing figures being based upon something else. As the form of the one (indivisible word) does figure in the cognition, how can one say that something else than phonemes does not figure in it ?

It is not right to maintain that a cognition in which, for some reason, one thing figures may not be based on something else. It is like this—The cognition of the universal, even though it is mixed up with the form of the individual, does not thereby cease to have something else as its object, nor that of the whole, inspite of its connection with the parts, having their own parts and attributes, nor the cognition of the picture, even though it is connected with colours like blue belonging to its parts. A picture is not merely blue and other colours inhering in something else (than the picture). If it were so, the whole (the picture) would be colourless and would be beyond the range of visual perception.¹ All visible objects are perceived by a cognition in which the form of light figures. That does not mean that the cognition in question has no other object. If it is objected that, in the examples given, the form of something else does figure in the cognition, but not here, well, how do you say that the same thing does not happen here ? For the one indivisible word does figure in the cognition. It cannot be identical with the phonemes (*varṇānam ātmā*), because they are many and, therefore, opposed to unity. Similarly, cloth etc. are also cognised as something quite distinct from thread etc. (24)

[1. *Avayavino nīrupatayā acāṅkṣuṣatvaprasaṅgāt.* The idea behind this statement is that the picture is something over and above its different parts having colour. Otherwise, it would itself have no colour and be invisible. A whole having parts becomes visible only

if it has colour. [Colour itself and the universal come within the range of visual perception, even though they themselves have no colour. But a dravya having parts would be visible only if it had colour. Even those who believe that substances like Dik (Direction) Kāla (Time) are visible even though they have no colour, insist that a substance which is a product and is a whole can become visible only if it has colour.]

तद्ग्राह्यैकार्यताभ्यां च शब्देषु वदतैकताम् ।

विवेकहेत्वभावेन सर्वत्रोत्सारिता भवेत् ॥ २५ ॥

एकबुद्धिग्राह्यतयैकार्यकारितया च शब्देष्वेकतां ब्रुवन् सर्वत्रैकतामवजानीते, विशेषाभावात् । तथा हि—पटादयोऽप्येकविज्ञानविषया एकार्यकारिणश्चेति तन्निबन्धनमेकत्वं लभेरन् यावदपकर्षपर्यन्तगतमर्थवस्तु; तदपि चैतद्विधानुपातीति केदं भाविकमेकत्वमासदं बध्नातु? बुद्धाविति चेत् तन्न, तत्रापि विषयतो भक्तिसम्भवाद्विवेकहेत्वभावेन निश्चयाभावात्; न चेदं कचन भाविकमेकत्वं निश्चीयते ॥ २५ ॥

25. One who explains the cognition of unity in the phonemes by the fact of their being cognised by one act of cognition or by their serving one single purpose would really do away with unity everywhere because there is no reason for discrimination.

One who explains the cognition of unity in the phonemes by the fact of their being cognised by one act of cognition or by their serving one and the same purpose is really doing away with unity everywhere, because there is no difference (between this case and other cases). It is like this : cloth etc. also would acquire their unity by the fact of their being cognised by one cognition and serving one single purpose and this would hold true of all objects up to the smallest. Even that would be subjected to the same reasoning; therefore, where would natural unity find an abode? If it be said : 'in cognition', well there also there can be superimposition of the attributes of the object.¹ Thus, there being no cause for discrimination, one cannot be sure even of the unity of cognition. Nowhere would one be certain of the existence of natural unity. (25)

[1. The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the many phonemes of a word themselves constitute the word and that there is no single word apart from the many phonemes. If we speak about the one word, it is only by courtesy. Because the different phonemes figure in one cognition and together cause the understanding of meaning, we speak of them as constituting one word. This unity is bhākta; aupādhika and not bhāvika that is, natural, real. The upholder of the sphaṭa answers that if unity in the word is questioned, one can question unity in everything. The things (vastu) which constitute the world are of two kinds : śabda and artha. The unity of śabda is under discussion. If that is questioned, one can question the unity of artha too. A piece of cloth (paṭa), for instance. Is it one or are we only attributing unity to it because it figures in one cognition and fulfils one purpose ? Ultimately, is there unity in the cognition itself ? Is it not possible to say that we attribute unity to it because one thing figures in it ? Thus, to cast doubt on the unity of the word would end in our casting doubt on the unity of everything.]

अपि च

अर्थस्याधिगमो नर्ते पदरूपावधारणात् ।

तदर्थबोधाद्यदि व्यक्तमन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ २६ ॥

न खल्वविदितपदरूपावधिरर्थं प्रत्येति । अवध्यन्तरपरिग्रहे तच्चेऽपि वर्णानामप्रत्ययात् । तत्रार्थप्रतीत्या पदरूपावधिविशेषमुपकल्पयन् दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयमाविशति । न चैकार्थसंबन्धाख्यानमेकपदतामापादयति, वर्णाध्वनामनाश्रितपदरूपाणामप्रत्यायकत्वात् । असंबन्धिनां संबन्धाख्यानायोगात् । संबन्धाख्यानानुपदभावे इतरेतराश्रयत्वम् । पदत्वाद्धि संबन्धित्वे सत्याख्यानम्, आख्यानाच्च पदभावे संबन्धितेति । व्यवस्थितं हि वाचकरूपमाख्यायते, न त्वाख्यानाधीनैव वाचकता । देवदत्तादिशब्देषु च नार्थप्रययमपहुत्यैकपदप्रत्ययोऽनुज्ञानमर्हति; न हि पदप्रत्ययमन्तरेण सोऽवकल्पते ॥ २६ ॥

Moreover

26. Unless the form of the word is cognised, there cannot be comprehension of meaning and if that depends upon the

comprehension of meaning, it is clear that mutual dependence would result.

One who has not understood the limits (within which phonemes constitute the word) does not understand the meaning; if he takes other limits, no meaning is understood even though the phonemes may be the same. If one maintains that through the understanding of the meaning, one comes to know the limits which constitute the word, one gets into the difficulty called mutual dependence¹ from which there is no escape. Nor does a statement of the connection (of the phonemes) with a single meaning enable one to make up a word, because phonemes which have not been made up into a word are inexpressive and one cannot proclaim the connection of that which is unconnected. If the making up of the word itself depends upon connection with meaning, there would be the difficulty of mutual dependence : The fact of being a word being there, it becomes connected with meaning and then there is a declaration of the connection; on account of the declaration of the connection, something becomes a word and then it becomes connected with meaning. A word, the expressive power of which is already fixed, is declared to be so; it is not through the declaration that it becomes expressive. Even in the case of names like Devadatta, there cannot be any making up of the word by disregarding the factor of the understanding of meaning. Nor can there be any understanding of meaning unless the word has been made up.² (26)

[1. Cf. Śl. Vār. (Saṁbandhākṣepa) 136.

2. If the making up of the word depends upon the understanding of the meaning, there would be the defect of mutual dependence, because the meaning cannot be understood unless the form of the word is grasped. The connection between the word and the meaning is eternal, it is only made known and not created. Even where it appears that the connection is made by man as when somebody is given a name, one cannot make up the unity of the name by disregarding the factor of the named nor can the named be

understood unless the name is grasped as a unity. In other words, the defect of mutual dependence comes in here also, if one does not accept the one word over and above the phonemes.]

भिन्नक्रमेऽपि विज्ञाने समूहिषु न भेदवान् ।
समूहः पदरूपं तु स्पष्टभेदं प्रतीयते ॥ २७ ॥

यदि खलु पदसमूहमात्रावलम्बना पदप्रख्या स्यात् नदीदीनजराजेति स्पष्टं भेदेन पदं प्रतीयते स्फुटश्चेह श्रुतिभेदः । न हि समूहिनामुपलब्धिक्रमभेदेऽपि समूहबुद्धिभेदः । तथा हि—दशान्तादितरतो वोपलम्भक्रमे न पटबुद्धिर्भेदवती । नापि वनबुद्धिर्ध्वाम्राद्युपलब्ध्यानुपूर्व्यनानात्वे । तदेवमभिन्नेषु भिन्नेषु च वर्णात्मसु यन्नानैकं च प्रकाशते, तत्प्रत्यक्षं पदमिति ।

27. Even though there might be a difference in the sequence of the cognitions of the things which make up the collection, the collection itself is not different and the form of the word, clearly different in each case, is, however, perceived. If the cognition of the word has only the collection of phonemes as its basis, in the pairs *nadī*, *dīna*, *jarā*, *rāja*, the words are cognised as quite distinct and there is clear difference in the audition only¹ (and not in the sounds heard). Merely because of a difference of sequence in the cognition of the things which go to make up a collection, the cognition of the collection itself does not become different. It is like this—the cognition of the cloth, whether we perceive it from one end or the other, does not differ; nor does that of a forest, inspite of any difference that there might be in the sequence of the cognitions of the trees *dhava*, *khadira* etc. (which go to make up the forest). Therefore, that which appears as different even though the phonemes are the same and that which appears as one even though the phonemes are different, is the word and that is directly cognised.²

[1. *Sphuṭaśceha śrutibhedaḥ*. G. says—“*Śravaṇamātrabheda eva kevalo'sti, na tu śrūyamāṇaśabdavastubhedaḥ | kathamcidapi vidyate ityuktamityarthaḥ*.” The translation follows this explana-

tion which is the best that can be given of an otherwise unsatisfactory text. What is pointed out is that in jarā and rāja, while the phonemes are the same, there are two different words. That the phonemes are the same cannot be the meaning of śrutibhedah. Śrutyaabhedah would certainly be better as Dr. Miss. Biardeau suggests (D. S. p. 50) but it is remarkable that it is not one of the many variants which G. knew and which are discussed in it.

2. In the pairs nadī, dīna and jarā, rāja, the phonemes are the same but the words are cognised as quite distinct; in the word 'gauḥ', the phonemes are cognised as distinct from one another, but the word is perceived as one.]

यानि तु साधनानि

वर्णा वा ध्वनयो वापि स्फोटं न पदवाक्ययोः ।
 व्यञ्जन्ति व्यञ्जकत्वेन यथा दीपप्रभादयः ॥
 सत्त्वाद्धटादिवच्चापि साधनानि यथारुचि ।
 लौकिकव्यतिरेकेण कल्पितेऽर्थे भवन्ति हि ॥
 नार्थस्य वाचकः स्फोटो वर्णेभ्यो व्यतिरेकतः ।
 घटादिवन्न दृष्टेन विरोधो धर्म्यसिद्धितः ॥
 प्रतिषेधेतु यो वर्णास्तज्ज्ञानानन्तरोद्भवान् ।
 दृष्टबाधो भवेत्तस्य शशिचन्द्रनिषेधवत् ॥
 वर्णोऽथा चार्थवीरेषा तज्ज्ञानानन्तरोद्भवा ।
 येदृशी सा तदुत्था हि धूमादेरिव वह्निवीः ॥
 दीपवद्वा गकारादिर्गवादेः प्रतिपादकः ।
 ध्रुवं प्रतीयमानत्वात् पूर्वं तत्प्रतिपादनात् ॥

तत्र पदवाक्ययोरहितं संवन्धनं वा स्फोटं नाभिजन्तीति सिद्धम्; पदवाक्ये एव हि स्फोटः । अथ पदवाक्यविषया वर्णा ध्वनयो वेति मतम्, तथापि को विषयार्थोऽन्यत्र व्यञ्जकभावात्? नावयवित्वम्, तदभावात्; तत्राप्यप्रसिद्धविशेष्यता पक्षदोषः । हेतोश्चाश्रयासिद्धता श्रोत्रमनोभ्यां च व्यभिचारः, तयोः स्फोटव्यञ्ज-

कत्वात् । न चोपलब्धिनिमित्तादन्यद्व्यञ्जकत्वम् । उपलब्धिनिमित्ते च श्रोत्रमनसी । संस्कारस्यापि व्यञ्जकत्वेन समाधानादिभिरनेकान्तः ।

तथा सत्त्वादिति श्रोत्रादिभिरनैकान्तिकः, प्रतिपादितं च श्रोत्रप्रत्यक्षत्वं स्फोटात्मनः । एकवर्णे च पदे ध्वनीनां व्यञ्जकत्वनिषेधेऽभ्युपगमविरोधः । वर्णव्यतिरेकश्च स्वतोऽसिद्धः, तस्यासत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् । एकवर्णात्मके च पदे वर्णव्यतिरेकस्योभयासिद्धत्वादव्यापकत्वम्, अभ्युपगमविरोधश्च । अर्थस्येति विशेषणमनर्थकम्, सर्वथा वचननिषेधात् । वचनं यदि प्रत्यायनम्, तदा तत् घटादिष्वप्यस्तीति साध्यविकलता । अथ शब्दप्रत्ययहेतुत्वं निषिध्यते, संस्कारेणानैकान्तिकः । अथ शब्दस्य सतः प्रत्यायकत्वनिषेधः, शङ्खादिशब्दैः कालादिज्ञानार्थैर्व्यभिचारः । वर्णाश्च वर्णान्तरव्यतिरेकिणो वाचकाश्चेति तैरनेकान्तः । वर्णाश्च न वाचकाः स्युः, स्फोटव्यतिरेकित्वात् घटादिवत् । न दृष्ट्वाधः, अर्थप्रत्ययस्य तद्वेतुत्वात् । वर्णानां तु तद्वेतुत्वमदृष्टमेव । गोशब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे इति लौकिकी प्रतीतिः, न संस्कारात् शब्देभ्यो विसर्जनीयाद्वेति । न शशिचन्द्रनिषेधवत् प्रतीतिविरोधः । ‘तज्ज्ञानानन्तरोद्भवात्’ इत्यसिद्धम्, पदबुद्ध्यनन्तरमर्थधिय उद्भवात् । द्रुतादिज्ञानानन्तरं चोत्पद्यमाना न द्रुताद्युत्थार्थधीरित्यनेकान्तः । धूमविशेषज्ञानानन्तरोद्भवा च वह्निबुद्धिर्न तत्प्रभवा । ‘ध्रुवं प्रतीयमानत्वात् पूर्वम्’ इति । सत्त्वद्रव्यत्ववर्णत्वशब्दत्वे व्यभिचारः । न चेदृशं साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यमात्रं हेतुं विपश्चितोऽनुमन्यन्त इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन ॥ २७ ॥

As to the arguments¹—

“Phonemes or sounds in words or sentences do not manifest the *sphoṭa* because they reveal (the meaning directly) as the lustre of the lamp etc. reveals (the object directly) ”.

“(Phonemes or sounds in words or sentences do not manifest the *sphoṭa*) because they exist, like the jar etc. Such arguments, according to one’s taste, can be brought forward against the thing which is postulated and which is different from what is accepted in the world.”

“The *sphoṭa* is not expressive of meaning because it is different from phonemes, like jar etc. There is no contradiction of known facts in this argument because the subject (*sphoṭa*) is not established.”

"There would be such a contradiction in the case of one who denies the expressive power of the phonemes, because it is after the knowledge of the phonemes that the understanding of the meaning takes place, as there would be in the case of one who denies that the word 'candra' denotes the one having the hare on it (the moon)."

"The knowledge of the meaning which takes place after the comprehension of the phonemes is surely due to the latter. Similar knowledge would be attributed to a similar cause, as the knowledge of fire is attributed to that of smoke."

"It is the phonemes 'g' etc. which denote the objects cow etc. because the latter are invariably understood from the former and because the former are uttered previously." (they are answered as follows.)² Saying that the phonemes or sounds do not manifest the sphoṭa existing in or connected with the word or sentence is only repeating what is accepted. Because the word and the sentence are themselves the *sphoṭa*.³ If what is meant is that the phonemes or sounds of which the object is the word or the sentence (do not manifest the *sphoṭa*) even then, what can be the meaning of the word 'object' except that which manifests? It cannot mean the fact of being wholes, because neither the word nor the sentence is a whole (having parts).⁴ Even (if 'object' is taken to mean the 'whole' and, therefore, *padavākyayor varṇā vā dhvanayo vā* is taken to mean 'phonemes or sounds belonging to a whole, in the form of a word or sentence) the subject (*pakṣa*) in the inference would suffer from the defect called unknown qualification (*aprasiddhaviśeṣyatā*). The reason (*hetu*) also would suffer from having an unestablished substratum. Moreover, the thing to be proved does not hold in the case of the sense of hearing and the mind, because they do manifest the *sphoṭa*.⁵ What is called manifesting capacity is nothing more than the fact of being the cause of understanding and the sense of hearing and the mind are causes of understanding. And as the residual impressions, awakened through attention etc., manifest the *sphoṭa*, there is discrepancy between the reason and what is to be proved.⁶ The reason 'because they exist' is inconclusive, because of the sense of

hearing etc. It has been declared that the essence of the *sphoṭa* is directly perceptible by the sense of hearing. And there would be contradiction with one's own tenet in the case of a word consisting of one single phoneme, if the suggestiveness of sounds is denied.

The reason "because it is different from the phonemes is not established in itself, because its (the *sphoṭa*'s) very existence has not been accepted.⁷ In the case of the word consisting of one phoneme, this reason is not proved for both of us and, therefore, it does not even cover the subject,⁸ And there would also be contradiction with one's own accepted view.⁹ The qualifying word 'of the meaning' is useless because expressiveness of any kind whatsoever is denied. If by 'expression' mere conveying of something is meant, then even an object like jar does convey something else (when it is a *liṅga*). Thus the probandum (*sādhya*) is defective. If what is denied is the fact of the *sphoṭa* being the cause of the comprehension of the word, then the reason given does not hold good in the case of the residual impression.¹⁰ If, on the other hand, what is denied is the fact of the *sphoṭa* as a sound conveying something else, then the statement does not hold good in the case of the sounds of conch etc. made for the purpose of conveying time etc. Nor does the reason given hold good in the case of phonemes, because they are expressive (according to you) and yet they are different from other phonemes. (A counter-syllogism can be brought forward as follows—) "The phonemes are not expressive of meaning, because they are different from the *sphoṭa*, just like a jar etc." Nor would there be contradiction with facts seen, because the comprehension of the meaning is due to it (the *sphoṭa*) whereas it is not a known fact that the comprehension of the meaning does come from the phonemes. What is understood by people in the world is that they understand the meaning from the word 'cow' and not from the residual impressions nor from the phonemes nor from the *visarjanīya*.

There is no contradiction of worldly understanding as there would be in the case of the denial that the word 'candra' denotes the one having the hare on it (the moon).¹² The

reason "because it is after the knowledge of the phonemes that the understanding of the meaning takes place" is not established, because it is after the comprehension of the word that the understanding of meaning takes place.¹³ The understanding of the meaning takes place also after a knowledge of high speed etc., but it is not attributed to high speed etc. Thus the reason is inconclusive. The inference of the fire, taking place after the comprehension of a particular smoke, is not attributed to the particularity in that smoke. As to the reason: "because the latter are invariably understood from the former and because the former are uttered previously," it does not hold good in the case of being in general, the fact of being substance., the fact of being a phoneme and the fact of being the word in general. Learned people do not consider that such similarity and dissimilarity can constitute a reason. Enough of this digression. (27)

[1. Now follow a few arguments in syllogistic form put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka, against the acceptance of sphoṭa. The verses quoted constitute Śl. Vār. (Sph.) 131-136.

2. The first anti-sphoṭa syllogism is contained in the first verse quoted. The expression "padavākyayoḥ" in that verse can be connected either with 'sphoṭam' or with varṇā vā dhvanayo vā. Thus the syllogism would have two forms—

*Varṇā vā dhvanayo vā (pakṣa) padavākyayoḥ sphoṭam
nābhivyañjanti (sādhyā)*

Vyañjakatvāt (hetu)

Dīpaprabhāvat (dṛṣṭānta)

or

Padavākyayor varṇā vā dhvanayo vā (pakṣa) sphoṭaṁ nābhivyañjanti. (sādhyā)

Vyañjakatvāt (hetu)

Dīpaprabhāvat (dṛṣṭānta)

The first form of it is refuted first.

3. This is refutation of the second form of the syllogism.

4. *Taṭrāpi*. Even if, for the sake of argument, the word or the sentence is taken as a whole of which the phonemes or the sounds would be parts.

5. The inference which is being criticised is that the phonemes or sounds do not manifest the *sphoṭa*, because they directly convey the meaning. Here it is pointed out that the sense of hearing and the mind also convey the meaning, but they do not manifest the *sphoṭa*. The reason, therefore, suffers from the defect of deviation.

6. Here we have the criticism of the syllogism found in the second verse quoted. In fact, this verse only gives a new reason and a new example for the proposition which has already been set forth in the first verse. The syllogism would be as follows—

Varṇā vā dhanayo vā (pakṣa) sphoṭam nābhivyañjanti
(*sādhya*)

Sattvāt (hetu)

Ghaṭādivat (dṛṣṭānta)

As G. puts it—*Vārttikakāreṇa hi sattvād ghaṭādivacceti pūrvasyāmeva pratijñāyām hetvantaraṁ dṛṣṭāntātāraṁ ca darśitam.*

Where the word consists of one single phoneme, that would be the expressive element whether it is called *sphoṭa* or not. Even, the Mīmāṃsaka admits that the sounds manifest such a word. (i.e. the expressive element) So to deny manifesting power totally to the sounds would be selfcontradiction on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka.

7. This is the refutation of the argument contained in the third verse quoted. The first two verses argued against the very existence of the *sphoṭa*; this one argues against its expressive power. The syllogism may be stated as follows—

Sphoṭo (*pakṣa*) *nārthasya vācakaḥ* (*Sādhya*)
Varṇebhyo vyatirekataḥ (*hetu*)
Ghaṭādivat (*dr̥ṣṭānta*)

One criticism against this argument is that, as the very existence of the *sphoṭa* has not been accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka, its difference from phonemes is equally unreal and there is, therefore, no point in mentioning that as the reason for the *sphoṭa* not being expressive.

8. *Avyāpakatvam*. In the syllogism given under note 7, the reason "difference from the phonemes" would not cover the case of a word consisting of a single phoneme, because both the disputants agree that the expressive element (whether it be called *sphoṭa* or not) is not different from the phoneme. Therefore, it is *avyāpaka*.

9. *Abhyupagamavirodhaśca*. The Mīmāṃsaka accepts that the word expressive of a single phoneme is expressive. So his main proposition in the syllogism under discussion is self-contradiction.

10. *Samśkāreṇānaikāntikaḥ*. It is the reason in the syllogism under discussion which is so characterised. The reason is "varṇebhyo vyatirekataḥ" because it is different from the phonemes. The residual impression is also different from the phonemes and yet it is the cause of the apprehension of the word (either in the form of *dhvani* or *varṇa* or *sphoṭa*).

11. Now begins the criticism of the argument found in the fourth verse quoted. The Madras edition has 'tājñānāntarodbhavān corresponding to *varṇān* and so has Śl. *Vār* (*Sph.*) 134 (Chowkhambha edition) But Maṇḍana and Pārthasārathimisra had obviously 'dbhavāt' in this verse as well as in the next one where the printed text has 'dbhavā'. The translation takes the text to be 'tājñānāntarodbhavāt.' The argument is : whoever denies the expressive power of the phonemes would go against what is actually seen, just as one who denies that the word 'candra' denotes the one having hare on it would go against what is actually seen. The

Mīmāṃsaka has the upholder of the sphoṭa in mind. He attributes the following argument to the sphoṭavādī against the Mīmāṃsaka—

Dhvanayo na varṇān abhivyañjanti

Dhvanayo na varṇān abhivyañjanti

Vyaññakatvāt

Dīpavat

or

Varṇā na vācakā

Sattvāt

Ghaṭādivat.

12. Cf. Śl. Vār. (*Anumāna*) 64

13. Now follows the refutation of the arguments contained in the last two verses quoted. These two verses are meant by the Mīmāṃsaka to establish his own view, whereas the four previous verses were meant to refute the sphoṭavādin. The present two verses contain the two following syllogisms.

(a) *Arthadhīr varṇotthā*

Tajjñānānantarodhavadvāt

Yedṛśī sā tadutthā, dhūmāderiva vahnidhīḥ

(b) *gakārādir gavādeḥ pratipādakāḥ*

Dhruvaṃ pratīyamānatvāt, pūrvam tatprat'pādanāt

Dīpādivat.

In criticising (a), Maṇḍana points out that even the Mīmāṃsaka cannot maintain that the understanding of the meaning immediately follows the apprehension of the phonemes, because he also postulates the apprehension of the word in the middle, even though for him, the word is not the sphoṭa over and above the phonemes. But there is something and that is enough to vitiate his argument. Secondly, it is not only the apprehension of the phonemes which precedes the understanding of meaning, but the speed with which they are uttered is also apprehended and yet nobody connects that apprehension with the understanding of the meaning. The illustration

of the smoke and the fire is also defective, because not only does one see smoke in general, but also the particular character of it and yet nobody associates the apprehension of its particular character with the understanding of meaning. So the whole of the first syllogism is defective.

The second one is no better, because, just as from the phonemes 'g' etc., the object 'cow' is invariably understood, in the same way the 'being' (*sattva*) which exists in the cow and the fact of being a substance (*dravyatva*) which exists in it are also understood and yet nobody would say that being and the fact of being a substance are also understood from the phonemes 'g' etc. Similarly, not only are the phonemes 'g' etc. previously apprehended, but the fact of being a phoneme and the fact of being a verbal element which exist in them are also apprehended and yet nobody connects these two properties with the understanding of meaning.]

योऽप्याह—वाक्यं न भिन्नं वर्णेभ्यो विद्यतेऽनुपलम्भनात्; न हि देवदत्तादिषु पदवाक्येषु दकारादिप्रतिभासव्यतिरेकी प्रतिभासो दृश्यते द्वितीयवर्णप्रतिभासवत् । न च तादृशं शक्यावसानसत्त्वमाकारान्तरवत् । न चान्यासम्भवि कार्यं गमकम्, वर्णेष्वेव तत्सम्भवात् । न च पदवाक्यान्तरेषु तदविशेषोऽपि तदभावादसम्भवः, अविशेषसिद्धेः प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य च व्यभिचारात्; अनिदर्शनाच्च, क्षणिकत्वात् सर्वभावानाम् । वर्णविशेषेऽपि वाक्यमेदात् कार्यविशेषोऽयुक्त एव, तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । सन्निधिमान्तादुत्पत्तावव्युत्पन्नस्यापि स्यात् ।

As to the objector who argues as follows—There is no sentence apart from the phonemes, because none is perceived. In words and sentences like Devadatta etc. nothing quite distinct from the phonemes 'd' etc. shines, just as the second phoneme shines as quite distinct from the first. Nor can the existence of any such thing, having a distinct form, be really cognised. Nor can one maintain that the effect, (that is, the understanding of the meaning) not taking place through any other cause, points to its existence (*gamaka*), because it can

take place through the phonemes. It would be wrong to answer that in other words and sentences,² even though the phonemes are not different, the effect (the understanding of the meaning) is not there and that, therefore, it is impossible (that the meaning should come from the phonemes). Because, absence of difference is not established. Recognition (as a reason for absence of difference) is seen to fail.³ Nor is there any other example, because all objects are momentary. To attribute the difference in the effect to a difference in the sentence when there is a difference in the phonemes is not right, because it (the difference in the sentence) is not within the range of the senses. If it produces the effect (of conveying the meaning) by its mere presence, then it would do so even in the case of one who does not know the convention (avyutpanna)

[1. So far the objections of the upholder of the eternal phonemes against sphoṭa have been answered. Now the objections of one who considers the phonemes, like everything else, to be momentary, are being presented, to be refuted later. It may be noted that the present objector, the Buddhist, argues chiefly against the vākya-sphoṭa whereas the Mīmāṃsaka was arguing chiefly against the padasphoṭa.

2. Different words having the same phonemes like jarā and rāja and different sentences having the same phonemes as the following ones given in G. are meant—

*Vāraṇāgagabhīrā sā sārābhīgagaṇāravā,
Kāritārivadhā senā nāsedhā varitārikā.*

3. Recognition (*protyabhiññā*) can sometimes be an error. We recognise the flame of a lamp to be the same, but it is not the same at any two moments.]

अपि चैकमनेकावयवात्मकमनवयवं वा । तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् करपेऽवयवानामानर्थक्यमर्थवत्ता वा । आनर्थक्ये कथं तदात्मकं वाक्यम् ? अर्थवानेवात्मा वाक्यमित्युच्यते । तदेतेष्वेवावयवेषु स्वयमनर्थकेषु वाक्यात्मता कल्पितैव सिंहतेव

माणवक्रादौ स्यात् । अर्थवत्त्वे प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तार्थतया वाक्यलक्षणापत्तेः प्रत्येकं वाक्यभावात् नानेकावयवात्मकं वाक्यम् । तदेकांशज्ञानाच्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानसिद्धेरंशान्तरवैयर्थ्यम् । कालक्षेपाभावश्च । अथ मा भूदनेकावयवत्वहानिरिति सकृत्सकलावयवश्रवणम्, तथापि कालक्षेपो न स्यात्, सकृदेकांशावसायसमये सकलश्रुतेः । अनवयवपश्चिमकल्पेऽप्येकत्वात् क्रमेण गत्यसम्भवात् कालभेदो न युक्तः । न ह्येकस्य क्रमेण गृहीततोपपन्ना । न ह्येकं गृहीतमगृहीतं च भवति, विरोधात् । ग्रहणाग्रहणभेदाच्च क्रमः, न चाक्रमा वाक्यप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति, सर्ववाक्यव्यवहारश्रवणस्मणानामनेकक्षणनिमेषानुक्रमेण परिसमाप्तेः । न चैकमेकबुद्धिप्राह्यमपरामृष्टवर्णरूपं प्रतिभासते शब्दरूपम्; अन्यवर्णबुद्धावपि वर्णानुक्रमप्रतीतिः, तदभावे वाक्यभेदप्रतीत्यभावात् । वर्णानुक्रमोपकारे ह्यनपेक्षिते यथाकथंचित्प्रयोगेऽपि तेषां कस्यचिद्वाक्यस्य प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गात् विना वा, तदनुक्रमस्यानुपकारित्वात् । अक्रमेण च व्यवहरणाशक्तेः, गत्यन्तरासम्भवाच्च । न चेदं साम्प्रतम्—नैव वाक्यं वर्णान्मकम् । येन तदनुक्रमकृतो वाक्यभेदः स्यात्; अपि तु तत् प्रकृत्यैवाभिन्नमेकमविद्यमानवर्णादिविभागमनानुपूर्व्यं व्यञ्जकक्रमवशाच्च क्रमवत् भागवच्च प्रतिभाति—इति, अक्रमस्य क्रमवताभिव्यक्त्ययोगात्, न हि तदेव व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च भवति विरोधात्, येन क्रमेण व्यज्येत । भेदे हि कस्यचिद् व्यक्तावपरमव्यक्तमिति क्रम उपपद्येत । अभावात्वे च सकलाश्राविणो न स्याद् वास्यबुद्धिः, वाक्यस्याश्रवणादवयवाभावाच्च । अतः सकलमेव वाक्यं श्रूयेत न वा किञ्चित् । अथ वर्णानां श्रवणेऽभिव्यक्तिहेतूनां समस्तवर्णोपजनितसंस्कारजन्ययान्त्यया बुद्ध्या वाक्यावधारणमिति । तदपि मृषा, वर्णरूपविवेकेन कस्यचित् कदाचिदज्ञानात्, वर्णानां च क्रममन्तरेणाप्रतीतेः कुतोऽक्रममेकबुद्धिप्राह्यं वाक्यं नाम ? केवलमेष मनोरथः । क्रमवद्भूयश्च ध्वनिभ्यः प्रत्येकमप्रतीतेः समुदायाभावाच्चार्थप्रतीतिमन्विच्छन्नेकं शब्दात्मानं प्रकल्पयन्न तत्रावस्थातुमर्हति; कर्मात्माप्यस्य हस्तसंज्ञादिषु प्रतिपत्तिहेतुरेकः कल्प्य आपतति; तत्राप्येकांशादप्रतिपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं च कर्मक्षणांमिति । तस्मात् क्रमभाविन एव यथास्वं करणप्रयोगाद्विन्ना वर्णभागाः कर्मभागा इव विकल्पविषया यथासंज्ञेयं प्रत्ययहेतवः ।

यैश्च दोषैरनमिमं वर्णानां वाचकत्वम्, ते स्फोटस्यापि वाचकतामपाकुर्युः ।
तथा हि—यथैव ध्वनयः क्रमवर्तित्वात् अनवाप्तोपलम्भसाकल्या न वाचकाः,

तथा स्फोटोऽपि । तथा हि—यथा ते नात्मन्युपलम्भसाकल्याय प्रभवन्ति, तथा स्फोटोऽपि, नियतक्रमवर्तित्वात् । नाप्येक एव तत्कुर्यात्, अन्यवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्; तत्काले च समस्तरूपानुपलक्षणात् । तदयमलब्धसकलोपलम्भो नादवदेवोपलम्भसाकल्यसाध्यमर्थं न साधयितुमर्हति । उपलम्भभावे सतोऽप्यसदविशेषादुपलम्भसाध्येऽर्थे सत्तामात्रेणासाधनात् व्यक्त्यपेक्षाच्चा । सा च व्यक्तिः क्रमवत्यलब्धसाकल्या सदसतोस्तुल्योपयोगात् तद्रूपोपलब्ध्यभावात् । अतो ध्वनिभिर्दशक्यं तत् स्फोटेनापीत्यलम्बनेन ।

स्यान्मतम्—सरोरस इत्यादिपदेषु वर्णभेदाभावादर्थभेदाभावः, कारणाभेदे कार्यभेदायोगादिति । तदसत्, आनुपूर्वतो वर्णानां भेदात् । का पुनरियमानुपूर्वी नाम ? तद्वेतुनां चेतसां तद्ग्राहिणां च कार्यकारणता । तथा च कार्यकारणभूत-प्रत्ययनिर्वैयर्थ्यस्तन्निर्वर्तकश्च प्रतिपदं वर्णानां भिन्न एव स्वभावः कर्तृचित्तसंस्कार-भेदात्; अतोऽर्थभेदसिद्धिरिति ।

Moreover, this one sentence either consists of many parts or is without parts. In the former alternative, the parts have a meaning or they have not. If they have no meaning how can they constitute the sentence? Only a meaningful entity can be called a sentence. Therefore, the essence of a sentence would be superimposed on these very meaningless parts, just as the quality of being a lion is superimposed on a boy and the like. If they have a meaning, then, each part having a complete meaning, becomes endowed with the characteristics of a sentence and thus each part becomes a sentence and, therefore, a sentence would not consist of many parts. Moreover, as there can be a comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence from the understanding of a part, the other parts become useless. Nor would there be that delay¹ (in the understanding of the meaning of a sentence which we all experience.) If, in order to save the view that the sentence consists of many parts, it is maintained that all the parts are heard at the same time, even then the delay would remain unexplained.² Because at the time of the comprehension of any of the parts, the whole sentence would be heard. In the latter alternative, namely, that the sentence has no parts, as

the sentence is one, it cannot be comprehended gradually and, therefore, the delay would be inexplicable. That which is one and indivisible cannot be gradually comprehended. One and the same thing cannot both be cognised and not cognised, because that would be a contradiction. Sequence is the result of partial comprehension and partial non-comprehension. There is no such thing as the comprehension of a sentence without sequence, because all activities in connection with a sentence such as utterance, audition and remembrance take place gradually in a series of moments. Nor does the word figure in the consciousness as one, to be grasped by a single cognition and free from the forms of the phonemes. Even in the comprehension of the last phoneme, the sequence of phonemes is cognised. But for that, there would be no comprehension of a particular given sentence.³ If no service is expected from the sequence of phonemes, then, even if the phonemes are uttered no matter how, or without their help at all, the sentence would be understood, because the sequence is really not useful. Nor can the phonemes be uttered without a sequence and there is no other possibility. It would not be right to argue as follows—"The sentence certainly does not consist of phonemes, so that differences in sentences are not due to differences in the sequence of phonemes. It is by its very nature indivisible and one, free from any inner distinction of phonemes, without any inner sequence but appearing to have sequence and division because of the sequence of the manifesting sounds." Because that which has sequence cannot manifest that which has none. The same thing cannot be manifested and not manifested at the same time so that it could be said to be gradually manifested. If there were inner differences, one thing could be manifested while another thing is not and thus sequence would be explained. If the sentence has no parts, one who has not heard the whole of it could not comprehend it, because he has not heard the sentence and the sentence has no parts. Therefore, either the whole sentence would be heard or not at all. If it is maintained that when the phonemes which are the causes of manifestation are heard, the last cognition produced by the mental impressions of all the phonemes, leads to the cognition of the sentence, well,

we say that this also is wrong, because nothing apart from the phonemes is ever cognised by any one. And as the phonemes cannot be cognised without a sequence, how can there be a sentence, devoid of sequence and cognised by a single act of cognition? It is a mere wish. As the meaning cannot be understood from each of the phonemes which have a sequence and as there cannot be a collection of them, (the upholder of the *sphoṭa*) in order to explain the understanding of meaning postulates the indivisible word, but cannot stop there. In gestures etc. he is obliged to postulate an indivisible cause of understanding consisting of action, because there also the understanding cannot come from any part of it and there cannot be a union of the moments of action. Therefore, phonemes which are parts differing from one another because of the action of different vocal organs, become the object of a mental construction, as parts of action do, and denote a meaning according to convention.⁴

Those difficulties on account of which phonemes are not considered to be expressive would stand in the way of the expressiveness of the *sphoṭa* also. It is like this—Just as sounds are not expressive because, being in a sequence, their comprehension cannot take place at the same time, so is the case with *sphoṭa*. What is meant is this—Just as they are not capable of bringing about a simultaneous comprehension as far as they themselves are concerned, similarly, in regard to the *sphoṭa* also, because they take place in a sequence. Nor can a single phoneme do it, because the others would become useless. Nor is the whole form of the sentence perceptible at the time of the comprehension of a single phoneme. Therefore, the *sphoṭa*, the whole form of which has not been comprehended, is incapable, like the sound, of conveying the meaning which can be conveyed only by a comprehension of the whole. If there is no comprehension, that which exists is as good as non-existent and cannot bring about by mere presence something which can be brought about only by comprehension and also because it depends upon manifestation. And manifestation has sequence and does not take place all at once and there would be no difference in its usefulness whether it exists or not, because its form is not comprehended.

Somebody might object that as, in cases like the two words *sara* and *rasa*, there is no difference in the phonemes, there should be no difference in the meaning. Where there is no difference in the cause, it is not right that there should be any difference in the effect. But this objection is not valid, because (in these two words) the phonemes differ because of difference in sequence. What is this sequence? The relation of cause and effect between the sound-producing states of consciousness of the speaker or the sound-cognising states of consciousness of the hearer. Therefore, the essence of the phonemes, brought about by the states of consciousness standing in the relation of cause and effect and producing similar states is different in each word because of the difference in the sound-producing mental states and the impressions. Thus difference in the meaning is explained.⁵

[1. *Kālakṣepābhāvaśca*. If the sentence were one and indivisible, one should be able to understand its meaning at once, without any delay. As it is, delay does take place. G. explains the delay as follows—firstly, the phonemes are understood; then, they are recognised as stem or as suffix and the word is constituted; next the word-meaning is understood; then their mutual requirement, fitness and proximity are considered; then, their interconnection is understood and, finally, the sentence-meaning is understood.

2. *Sakṛt sakalāvayavaśravaṇam*. G. gives the analogy of our seeing all the different trees of a forest and, therefore, the forest itself, in one act of perception.

3. The following reasoning is in the background of the present context (a) whatever is perceived in a sequence is not partless; the sentence is perceived in a sequence; therefore it is not partless. (b) the sentence consists of phonemes, because the latter invariably figure in the cognition of the sentence, just as threads invariably figure in the cognition of the cloth.

4. *Vikalpaviśayāḥ*. The Buddhist believes only in the reality of the moments. Only the moments of an action are real; the action

itself, like going, is a mental construct (*vikalpa*). It has no external existence. Similarly, phonemes, word and sentence are mental constructs which convey a meaning according to convention.

5, The Buddhist points out that there is difference of sequence of phonemes between sara and rasa even though the phonemes are the same. Not only that; this difference in the sequence brings about a difference in the phonemes themselves. The sequence is defined as the relation of cause and effect between the successive sound-producing states of consciousness of the speaker or the successive sound-cognising states of consciousness of the hearer. The sound-producing states of consciousness of the speaker who utters 'sara' is one series (*santāna*) and the sound-producing state of consciousness of the speaker who utters 'rasa' is another series. So there is difference in the relation of causality in the two series and that accounts for the difference in the words themselves and their meanings

All this is, of course, based upon the Vijñānavāda conception of ālayavijñāna, pravṛttivijñāna, pratītyasamutpāda, saṃskāra and kṣaṇikatva.]

तस्यापि

अन्यस्य खलु वाङ्मात्राद्भूतोऽप्रतिभासनम् ।

वाक्ये पदे वा मर्यादा न विज्ञः केन कल्पिता ॥ २८ ॥

दर्शितो हि भिन्नवर्णासम्भवी प्रतिभास एकात्मा अभिन्नवर्णासम्भवी च नानात्मा प्रतिभासः । वाङ्मात्रहेतुक्रस्तु प्रतिभासाभावो निर्मर्यादया न किञ्चिन्निराकर्तुं क्षमते । अनयरूपानुवेधेन चाप्रतिभासनमयुक्तम्, प्रभारूपाद्यनुस्यूतनीलाद्य-प्रतिभासनप्रसङ्गादिति ॥ २८ ॥

For him

28. Who denies the figuring in the cognition of anything else (excepting the phonemes) it is not known what his limits are of the sentence or of the word.

It has been shown that the single word which cannot be identical with the different phonemes does figure in the cognition and that even when the phonemes are the same, different words figure in the cognition.¹ A mere denial of something beyond phonemes figuring in cognition can refute nothing, because there can be no limit to mere denials. Nor is it true to say that because some things (phonemes) figure in the cognition, therefore, nothing else does. In that way one would have to deny that objects like 'blue' figure in the cognition simply because light does. (28)

[1. The single word 'gauḥ' cannot be identical with the different phonemes *g-au-ḥ* and when the phonemes are the same as in *jarā* and *rāja*, there are two different words.]

नानेकावयवं वाक्यं पदं वा स्फोटवादिनाम् ।

एकत्वेऽपि त्वभिन्नस्य क्रमशो दर्शिता गतिः ॥ २९ ॥

अनेकावयवात्मकदोषाभिधानं तावन्नभरोमन्यनप्रायम्, अनुभ्युपगमात् । एकत्वेऽपि तु क्रमशो गतिरनुपाख्येयोपाख्येयाकारप्रत्ययभेदेन पुरस्तात् प्रपञ्चिता । व्यञ्जकसादृश्यात् शब्दान्तरग्रहणाभिमानः, तेन नाश्रवणं स्यात् सकलश्रवणं वेति ॥ २९ ॥

29. For the upholders of *sphoṭa*, neither the sentence nor the individual word has parts. It has been shown how the indivisible word, though one, is gradually perceived.

Pointing out all the difficulties that would arise by the acceptance of the word having parts is like chewing the cud by an animal which has eaten nothing, because such a word has not been accepted. It has been explained previously that the indivisible word is gradually perceived by the process of vague cognitions followed by clear cognitions. On account of the similarity of the suggestive elements, one has the illusion¹ of perceiving other sound elements (entities) as divisions. Therefore, the difficulty of hearing the whole thing or not hearing it at all does not arise. (29)

[1 G. points out that this illusion is due to avidyā of which another name is śabdabhāvanā. In the *Vākyapadīya*, however, the word śabdabhāvanā is used in the sense of the faculty of speech or the word-principle with which everyone is born and which enables even the baby to act and to utter purposive sounds immediately after birth. It also means the idea of the word and the meaning being so intertwined that they are not differentiated. See Vāk. I. 122, 123 together with the *Vṛtti* thereon.]

उत्पत्तिवादिनो वर्णाः कामं सन्तु प्रभेदिनः
न त्वसाधारणस्तेषां भेदोऽर्थज्ञानकारणम् ॥ ३० ॥

भेदेऽपि हि प्रत्युत्पत्ति वर्णानां न तेनासाधारणेन रूपेणार्थस्य ज्ञापकाः तस्य पूर्वमदर्शनात्; सामान्यात्मनैव तु, तच्चचाविशिष्टं सर्वत्र । न चासाधारणोऽन्यः कश्चिदभेदोऽस्ति, येन प्रतीयेरन् प्रसायकाः । परस्परसमवधानं तु स्यात् सामान्य-रूपाश्रितानां विशेषकम् तच्च क्रमवदुपलब्धत्वादयुक्तम् । एकोपलब्धौ तु साहित्येन यथाकथञ्चिदपि प्रत्युक्तेभ्यः पुरस्तात् प्रत्ययप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्, अविशेषात् ॥ ३० ॥

30. For an upholder of the production theory, let the phonemes be new everytime they are produced; but it is not their uncommon feature which is the cause of the understanding of meaning.

Even though the phonemes are different everytime they are produced, they do not convey the meaning by virtue of their new and unusual feature, because that was unknown before, but by virtue of their common persisting feature and that is the same everywhere. Nor is there any unusual but common identity by virtue of which they could be understood as expressive of meaning. Mutual co-presence might be a distinguishing feature of phonemes having common features, but that is also impossible because they are apprehended in a sequence. If they are apprehended at the sametime, there should be, as has been said before, understanding of meaning, no matter how they are uttered previously, because there would be no difference in the phonemes. (30)

आनुपूर्व्यं विशेषकमिति चेत् । किमिदमानुपूर्व्यं नाम ?

कार्यकारणभावश्चेत् क्रमस्तद्गाहिचेतसाम् ।

तद्वेतुरात्मभेदो वा वक्तृभेदेऽपि धीर्भवेत् ॥ ३१ ॥

भवति हि कदाचिदन्योच्चारितपूर्ववर्णदर्शनसमनन्तरप्रत्ययसहकारी प्रयोक्त्रन्तरप्रयुक्तो वर्णः तज्ज्ञानहेतुः, न हि भिन्नैर्वक्तृभिरव्यवधानम्; उच्चारितेषु वर्णेषु क्रमभेदेन निरन्तरश्रवणेन कश्चन विशेषः । ततश्चानुपूर्वीविशेषस्य विद्यमानत्वात् तदा स्यादर्थावबोधः, न च दृश्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

If it is urged that sequence would make a difference, what is sequence ?

31. If sequence is the relation of cause and effect between the sound-cognising states of consciousness (of the hearer) or an inner difference in the phonemes brought about by it, then the understanding of meaning should take place even if the phonemes are uttered by different speakers.

A phoneme uttered by a given speaker, helped by the cognition of the previous phoneme uttered by the previous speaker, sometimes becomes the cause of its own cognition. Nor is there non-separation of the phonemes by the different speakers and there is also a certain peculiarity in the phonemes because of a particular sequence and by uninterrupted audition. Therefore, as there is a difference in sequence, there should be understanding of meaning and yet it does not take place. (31)

न हेतुफलभावोऽङ्गं समुत्थापकचेतसाम् ।

अर्थवुद्धेरनाश्रित्य सक्कैतज्ज्ञानकालयोः ॥ ३२ ॥

अथापि स्यात् समुत्थापकचित्तकार्यकारणता तद्वेतुर्वा स्वभावभेद आनुपूर्वी-विशेषः, तन्निबन्धनोऽयं सरोरसोराजजरादिषु कार्यभेदः । तदसत् । न खलु समुत्थापकचित्तकार्यकारणता तत्कृतो वा स्वभावभेदोऽर्थप्रत्ययाङ्गम्; ज्ञापकत्वे हि स्वविज्ञानमपेक्षेत । दृश्यते च तिरोहितव्यवहितप्रयुक्ताच्छब्दादर्थज्ञानम् । न च तत्र समुत्थापकचित्तकार्यकारणतां कश्चन निश्चेतुमर्हति । वक्त्रेण च निश्चिते

सा निश्चीयेत । न चान्तरेण शब्दज्ञानं तन्निश्चयः । न च तिरोधानव्यवधानयो-
र्वक्तुरेकत्वे प्रमाणमस्ति; कलकलश्रुतौ च न विवेकहेतुरित्युक्तम् । ज्ञापनाङ्गत्वे च
ज्ञापकः सङ्केतकाले नियोगत आश्चीयेत, सङ्केतरहितस्य ज्ञापनाशक्तेः । न च
नियोगतस्तदैनमुपाश्रयन्ते व्यवहिततिरोहितप्रयुक्तशब्दार्थसंबन्ध इत्युक्तमिति ।
तस्मादेक एव शब्दात्मा अर्थेषु सङ्केतेन नियुज्यते लोके प्रत्ययकाले चाश्चीयेते;
अन्यथा वक्तृभेदे दुर्निवारः प्रत्ययः स्यात् । ननु तस्यापि सत्तामात्रेणाप्रत्यायकत्वा-
दतिप्रसङ्गादव्युत्पन्नस्यापि अतीन्द्रियत्वात्ततोऽपि नार्थप्रत्यय इत्युक्तम् । न, ऐन्द्रिय-
कत्वस्य दर्शितत्वात् ॥ ३२ ॥

32. The relation of cause and effect between the moments of sound-producing consciousness cannot be the cause of the understanding of meaning, because there is no dependence upon it at the time of the establishment of the convention or at the time of the comprehension (of the word).

It might be argued that the relation of cause and effect between the moments of sound-producing consciousness or the difference in the phonemes brought about by it constitutes what is called sequence. That is why there is difference of effect¹ in the case of the words *sara*, *rasa* and *rāja* and *jarā*. This is wrong. The relation of cause and effect between the moments of sound-producing consciousness or the difference in the phonemes brought about by it is not a cause of the understanding of meaning. To be able to convey (the meaning) its own (previous) knowledge would be required. It is seen that understanding of meaning does come from words uttered by speakers who are hidden or screened off. Nobody can be sure of the existence of the relation of cause and effect between the moments of sound-producing consciousness in these cases. That can be ascertained only if the sameness of the speaker is ascertained. Apart from the cognition of the word, there is no other means of ascertaining it. Where the speaker is hidden or screened off, there is no means of ascertaining his sameness. It has already been pointed out that in the confused talking of a crowd, one has no clue to distinguish the number of speakers (and yet the meaning is sometimes understood.)² If it enters into the category of indicators, it should be so ascertained at

the time of the learning of the convention, because nothing has the power to convey the meaning if it is not based on convention. It has already been pointed out that, at the time of the learning of the convention between the words and meanings of speakers who are hidden or at a distance, one does not necessarily have recourse to this (the relation of cause and effect between the singleness of the speaker and the understanding of meaning). Therefore, the word is a unity, applied to things by convention in the world and is so accepted at the time of the understanding of the meaning. Otherwise, understanding of the meaning, even when the speakers are many, would be inevitable.

But the word which is a unity does not convey a meaning by its mere existence, because it would then do so even in the case of one who does not know the convention. Besides, it does not come within the range of our senses. Therefore, that also cannot convey the meaning.

It is not so. It has been shown that it does come within the range of the senses. (32)

[1. *Kāryabhedaḥ*. The difference in the meaning understood is the difference in the effect meant here. For the Buddhist, there is difference in sequence as defined by him between sara and rasa between rāja and jarā, even though the phonemes are the same in these two pairs.

2. See verses 15 and 16.]

इहोत्क्षेपणत्वादिर्नानाव्यक्तिविभाजनः ।

एकस्त्रैविद्यवृद्धानां हस्तसंज्ञादिगोचरः ॥ ३३ ॥

कोऽयं प्रसङ्गः एकः कर्मात्माभ्युपगन्तव्यः इति । यदा त्रैविद्यवृद्धा हस्त-
संज्ञादिविषयान् नानाकर्मक्षणव्यञ्जनीयानभिन्नानुत्क्षेपणत्वादिशब्दनिर्देश्यान् सामा-
न्यविशेषानुपयन्येव, न ह्यन्यथा 'उत्क्षिपति' इत्यादिका शब्दप्रत्ययानुवृत्तिः स्यात्
इति वदन्तः । ते च हस्तादिसमवेतसमवायेन हस्तसंज्ञा इत्युच्यन्ते ॥ ३३ ॥

33. According to scholars well-versed in the three-fold knowledge, raising the hands etc. coming under hand-gestures, is manifested by different moments of action and is a unity.

That one would have to accept action also as a unity, what kind of undesirable consequence (prasaṅga) is this? Scholars versed in the three-fold knowledge¹ do accept the particular universals designated by words like 'lifting' included under gestures of the hand etc. and manifested by the different moments of action, because they declare: Otherwise in particular cases of lifting, the use of the word 'lift' and the corresponding cognition would not take place. Lifting etc. are called gestures of the hand, because they inhere in the moments of action which inhere in the hand etc. (33)

[1. G. explains—Traividyaṣṭāḥ=well-versed in the three-fold knowledge, the three kinds of knowledge being (1) the Vedas together with the six auxiliary branches of knowledge, (2) the smṛtis, itihāsa, purāṇa, āyurveda etc., (3) Mīmāṃsā. As an alternative, G. suggests that the three kinds of knowledge are the three Vedas, within which all other knowledge would be included.]

उपलब्धेश्च साकल्ये क्रमः प्रागेव चिन्तितः ।

नित्यत्वमविकल्पं तु सत्त्वादेवास्य जातिवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

उपलब्धिसाकल्यं येन क्रमेण वाचके ध्वनयः शक्नुवन्ति, स क्रमः पूर्वमावेदित एव प्रयत्नभेदतो भिन्नाः इत्यादिना । यस्तु विकल्पः—सदपि तदनित्यं स्यात् नित्यं वा शब्दरूपमिति, सोऽनवकाश एव, सत्त्वादेव नित्यत्वसिद्धेः जातिवत् । यथैव जातेर्यः सत्तावगमनिबन्धनमन्वितावभासः प्रत्ययः स नित्यतयैव सत्त्वमवगमयति विनाशिनीत्वे हि व्यक्तेरिव तस्या अभावात्, अतो न तत्र नित्या-नित्यविकल्पावतरणं भवति—तथार्थाधिगमफलव्यवस्थाप्यमानसत्त्वः स्फोटात्मा नित्य एवावतिष्ठते । अनित्यत्वे पूर्वदर्शनाभावादर्थप्रत्ययायोगात् कुतो नित्यानित्यविकल्पा-वकाश इत्यलमतिविमर्देन ॥ ३४ ॥

34. In what manner there takes place a cognition of the whole has already been considered. Its eternality should not be a matter of doubt. Just because it exists, it is eternal,

like the universal. How the sounds bring about a cognition of the whole of the expressive word has already been explained in the verse—"The sounds which differ because of the difference in the effort etc."¹ As to the alternatives—"the word, if it exists, may be eternal or otherwise," it does not arise at all, because, as in the case of the universal, it is eternal by the mere fact of its existence. Just as the cause of the understanding of the universal, namely, uniformity of cognition, makes us understand its existence as something eternal, because if it were perishable, it would sometimes not exist like the individual and, therefore, the alternatives of eternality and transitoriness do not arise in this case, similarly, the sphoṭa the existence of which is determined by the fact of the understanding of the meaning, can only be eternal. If it were perishable, it would be something which one has not cognised before and therefore, understanding of meaning cannot take place and, therefore, the alternatives of eternality or otherwise cannot arise at all.² Enough now of pushing this matter any further. (34)

[1. Verse 18.

2. The syllogism establishing the eternality of the word is given in the Śl. Vār. (śabdanityatā) 311.]

यस्य दर्शनम्—अन्यग्रहणसापेक्षः पदप्रत्ययः कल्पनेति तस्यापि

अन्यग्रहणसापेक्षं कथं जात्यादि वस्तुसत् ।

अर्थग्रहणसापेक्ष उक्तमन्योन्यसंश्रयम् ॥ ३५ ॥

यदि तावद्वर्णग्रहणसापेक्षत्वात् कल्पनिकः पदप्रत्यय इति, जात्यादिप्रत्यया अपि कल्पनीयाः स्युरिति जात्यादीनां परमार्थसत्त्वं हीयेत; अर्थग्रहणस्य सापेक्षत्वे च दर्शितमितरेतराश्रयत्वमिति सर्वं मनोहरम् ॥ ३५ ॥

As to the objector who argues that the cognition of the word, depending upon that of something else, is a mere fiction according to him,

35. How can universal etc. depending upon the cognition of something else, be real? As to the cognition of the word depending upon the understanding of the meaning, the difficulty of mutual dependence has already been pointed out.

If the cognition of the word is a fiction because it depends upon that of the phonemes, then the cognition of the universal etc. would also be fictitious and their reality would be affected.

If it depends upon the understanding of meaning, then the difficulty of mutual dependence would result, as shown before. Therefore, everything is perfectly satisfactory.¹ (35)

[1. The comprehension of the word depends upon that of something else. The upholder of the *sphoṭa* means by something else that of the phonemes. Some things, the cognition of which depends upon that of something else may be said to be mere mental constructs. Thus, the cognition of the forest depends upon that of the trees. It may be held that there is no forest apart from the trees. Similarly, it may be held that there is no whole (*avayavī*) apart from the parts. But the *sphoṭavādī* points to the cognition of the universal which depends upon that of the individuals. The *Vaiśeṣikas* and others have shown that the universal not only exists but that it is eternal. Like the upholders of the phonemes, the *sphoṭavādī* does not make the cognition of the word depend upon that of the meaning because that would result in a circle, as shown in verse 26.]

निरस्तभेदं पदतत्त्वमेतद् ।
 व्यादर्शि युक्त्यागमसंश्रयेण ॥
 विधूतभेदग्रहमेतयैव
 दिशापरं संग्रतियन्त्वभेदम् ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Thus the truth concerning the word, free from all differentiation, has been shown on the basis of reason and tradition. Let them understand the other unity also,¹ free from all differentiations, in the same manner.

[1. Aparam abhedam. G. has no doubt whatsoever that this refers to *Vākyasphoṭa*.]

सान्द्राविद्यातिमिरपटलाच्छादितान्तर्दृशो ये
दृष्टिं मन्दा वरमुनिमते कुर्वते सावमानम् ।
तेभ्योऽविद्यातिमिरपटलोल्लेखिनी संहितेयं
स्पष्टन्यायैर्घटितसुमतिर्दक्षिता स्फोटसिद्धिः ॥ ३७ ॥

इति मण्डनमिश्राणां कृतिः
स्फोटसिद्धिः समाप्ता ।

37. This proving of the existence of *sphoṭa*, this marshalling of arguments which destroys the blindness of ignorance and produces the right vision through clear arguments, has been made for the benefit of those, who, with their vision blurred by the myopia of ignorance,¹ cast a critical and derisive glance at the sound view of the Munis.

Thus ends the “Establishment of *sphoṭa*” a work of Maṇḍana Miśra.

[1. While explaining ‘*timirapaṭala*.’, G. says—*Śabdabhāvanā-khyayā timirapaṭalenācchāditā antardṛg antaḥkaraṇākhyam cakṣur yeṣāṃ iti vighrahaḥ*. As in his commentary on verse 29, here also G identifies *avidyā* or *timirapaṭala* with what is called *śabdabhāvanā* which is explained differently in the *Vākyapadīyam*. See note 1. on verse 29.]

